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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Abstract 
Inside the Black Box: The Influence of Government Executive Forces on 
Environmental Policy Effectiveness in New Zealand 
By 
Hugh Logan 
The causes of variation in effectiveness of environmental public policy are subject to debate.  
Different levels of effectiveness in wider government policy are commonly explained by external 
influences. Fewer studies focus on the role of factors within the Executive, such as institutional 
arrangements, differing levels of capability in policy-makers, and ways ideas shape how people and 
institutions perceive environmental values and issues. This study aims to advance our understanding 
of how such factors combine to effect environmental policy in a specific national jurisdiction. The 
research investigates how environmental policy efforts of environmental government departments 
are influenced by factors within the Executive in New Zealand, and how these factors contribute to 
variability in environmental policy effectiveness. 
 
Drawing on theories about the main drivers of policy change and ideas about environmental policy 
effectiveness, the thesis puts forward a framework to analyse three case studies of environmental 
policy development between the 1990s and the late 2000s: oceans policy; biodiversity policy; and 
water policy. 
 
The main finding of the research is that four key intra-government variables are the primary 
determinants of environmental policy effectiveness in New Zealand. These are: the level of 
government commitment to environmental values relative to other values; the environmental 
commitment and capability of ministers holding environmental portfolios; the capability of officials 
within the environmental departments, notably their ability to provide leadership; and the extent to 
which environmental departments are organised and equipped to play a lead role in the 
development of environmental policy. These four variables are interdependent. Government will and 
the actions of ministers and officials can enable structural change that facilitates environmental 
organisations to take a leadership role, but where institutions do not allow or facilitate this to 
happen, environmental policy can be constrained or ineffective even where there is government 
commitment.   
From an organisational perspective features that stand out as being most important to enhance 
environmental policy effectiveness are: ensuring that priority is placed on environmental imperatives 
in policy design; concentrating effort by reorganising and aligning operating procedures internally in 
a timely way to focus on the issue at hand; forming close alliances with supportive departments and 
drawing in opposing departments; and organising to shape and lead the policy process within the 
machinery of government. 
 
Keywords: environmental effectiveness, institutions, environmental departments, environmental 
policy 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This is a study of environmental policy-making in central government in New Zealand. It looks at the 
role played in policy development by the government’s main environmental agencies, at forces 
within government that influence that role, and the results. 
In 1963, American public policy academic Lynton Caldwell predicted that environmental issues would 
become a major focus for public policy.1 Caldwell’s prediction has proved right. In the last fifty years 
there has been a worldwide rise of policies, institutions and agencies designed to maintain or 
improve environmental services and quality. Global, national and local environmental issues 
challenge national economies and social harmony. Human induced climate change, pollution, and 
depleted freshwater resources, for example, threaten human welfare. Whereas once such issues 
were peripheral to government actions, now their social and economic implications, and greater 
public awareness, combined with technical complexity and public good orientation, have moved 
them to the heart of government worldwide. The challenge for government, and for society, is how 
to order affairs in a way that effectively supports the environmental basis of human welfare and 
sustainable economic activity.  
New Zealand, like much of the rest of the world, has set up government departments and a wider 
governmental system for environmental management. New Zealand’s present arrangements, and 
the way they operate, owe much to radical and innovative institutional changes made in the mid 
1980s and early 1990s. Design of legislation and departments was based on identifiable and 
distinctive (yet variable) environmental management criteria, and identifiable (yet variably applied) 
public management criteria. 
For a country which exhibited innovation in environmental management in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
and where a national culture is reportedly supportive of environmental quality,2 it has been argued 
                                                          
1 L.K. Caldwell, "Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy," Public Administration Review 23, no. 3 (1963). 
2 T. Bührs, Bartlett, R.V., Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), P. Ali Memon and Harvey C. Perkins, eds., Environmental Planning and 
Management in New Zealand (Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press,2000), N. J. Ericksen, Berke, P., Dixon, J. , 
ed. Planning for Sustainability: New Zealand under the RMA (Aldershot (England): Ashgate Publishing,2003), 
Growth and Innovation Advisory Board GIAB, "Research on Growth and Innovation," ed. Ministry of Research 
Science and Technology (Wellington2004).The claim for innovation is based on a radical overhaul of New 
Zealand’s environmental management system involving integrated preservation-oriented management of New 
Zealand’s large holdings of state-owned protected land (Conservation Act 1987); integrated resource 
management based nation-wide on a concept of sustainable management (the Resource Management Act 
1991); sustainable management of fish stocks based on environmental principles (the Fisheries Act 1996); 
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that, paradoxically, New Zealand has been slow since then to develop new policies to address 
environmental problems. Environmentally effective principles are displayed to varying degrees in any 
new policies that are developed, and there has been a reluctance to adopt rules or standards.3  How 
can this be explained? 
Although this research involves one country, its basis is implicitly comparative. Studies in Europe and 
in OECD countries show there is considerable difference in environmental policy development and 
policy innovation between seemingly similar countries, hence the value in ongoing country-specific 
research.4 Lafferty, Jänicke, and Jacob amongst others have examined the types and complexity of 
environmental problems and how they are addressed at a national level.5 Their explanations for 
variability echo a wider literature that says in a general sense government policy is driven by a 
country’s socio-economic conditions and the structure of power in a society, 
constitutional/institutional arrangements, and the capacities, views and resources of protagonists 
involved with any given issue.6 Another explanation for variability is the nature and effect of policy 
developed within the government itself. Detailed rules and processes exist to develop government 
policy. Policy decision-making is a central role for ministers and officials. All this suggests two things 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
single purpose environmental protection agencies; an independent auditor of environmental management 
reporting to parliament; and Cabinet portfolios for environmental matters (although this dates back to the 
1970s) and conservation.  
3 T. Bührs, Environmental Integration: Our Common Challenge (New York: State University Of New York Press, 
2009). P.179 & 199. For examples about the length of  time it takes to develop policy see D. Bullock, "The New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: A Step in the Right Direction?," (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 
2009), M.V. McGinnis, "Oceans Governance: The New Zealand Dimension - Summary Report," in Emerging 
issues programme (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, VUW, 2012). For reluctance to develop national 
standards, see Ericksen, ed. Planning for Sustainability: New Zealand under the RMA, OECD, OECD 
Environmental Performance Review: New Zealand (Paris: OECD, 2007). And for the variable exhibition of 
environmental effectiveness see G. Bertram, Terry S., The Carbon Challenge: New Zealand's Emission Trading 
Scheme (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2010), T. Bührs, "From Diffusion to Defusion: The Roots and 
Effects of Environmental Innovation in New Zealand," Environmental Politics 12, no. 3 (2003). 
4 L. Scruggs, Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Industrial Democracies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), D.C. Esty, Porter, M. E., "National Environmental Performance: An Empirical 
Analysis of Policy Results and Determinants," Environment and Development Economics 10: 391-434 (2005), A. 
Jordan, Lenschow, A., "Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review," Environmental Policy and 
Governance 20 (2010). P.156 
5 W.M. Lafferty, Meadowcroft, J., Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High 
Consumption Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), M. Jänicke, Weidner, H., ed. Capacity Building in 
Environmental Policy: A Comparative Study of 17 Countries (Berlin: Springer,2002), K. Jacob, Volkery, A., 
Lenschow, A., "Instruments for EPI in 30 OECD Countries," in Innovation in Environmental Policy?, ed. A. Jordan, 
Lenschow, A. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
6 M. Jänicke, Jörgens, H., "National Environmental Planning in OECD Countries: Preliminary Lessons from Cross-
National Comparisons," Environmental Politics 7, no. 2 (1998), C. Ham, Hill, M., The Policy Process in the 
Modern Capitalist State (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1984). Jänicke, "National Environmental 
Planning in OECD Countries: Preliminary Lessons from Cross-National Comparisons.", Lafferty, Implementing 
Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies, J. Barry, Eckersley, R., 
"W(H)Ither the Green State?," in The State and the Global Ecological Crisis, ed. J. Barry, Eckersley, R. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005), Jacob, "Instruments for EPI in 30 OECD Countries.", R.E. Goodin, Rein, 
M., Moran, M., "The Public and Its Policies," in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. M. Moran, Rein, M., 
Goodin, R.E. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), E.C. Page, "The Origins of Policy," in The Oxford Handbook 
of Public Policy, ed. M. Moran, M.  Rein, R.E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
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at work on environmental policy: external factors that governments respond to, such as interest 
group pressure, the media, the views of other political parties, or disrupting events; and internal 
factors: things inside government comprising the preferences of office holders (be they politicians or 
bureaucrats) exercised within boundaries established by institutional arrangements, and individual or 
group values arising from the authority vested in governments.7 The effect of these internal features 
is to condition the characteristics and development of environmental policy.8 While recognising the 
role of wider forces in society, the internal government features are what much of this study focuses 
on in seeking explanations for variable environmental performance in New Zealand over the past 
twenty years. 
In New Zealand’s case, its political system is characterised by a high level of concentration of formal 
central government power compared with many other developed nations. This has been cited as one 
of the explanations for the speed and radical nature of the environmental changes of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.9 Other explanations are the global nature of environmental institutional change at 
that time, the neo-liberal orientation of New Zealand government policy, and an argument that such 
changes occur sporadically either because of windows of opportunity, or because specific issues 
attract political and policy attention as an issue de jour, and then dissipate.10 Despite concentration 
of power, the New Zealand political system is partially constrained by a three-year electoral cycle, 
and has been modified somewhat since the introduction of a mixed member proportional 
representation system in 1997. Even so a government could, with sufficient coalition majority, 
develop, adopt and change policy more easily than in many other countries because of Cabinet and 
Prime Ministerial dominance of the Executive, a unicameral legislature, and absence of a written 
constitution.11  
 
                                                          
7 E.A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1981). 
8 J. Barry, Eckersley, R., ed. The State and the Global Ecological Crisis (Cambridge MA: MIT Press,2005). P.256. 
A. Weale, "Governance, Government and the Pursuit of Sustainability," in Governing Sustainability, ed. W.N. 
Adger, Jordan, A. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). P.62. 
9 J. Boston, Martin, J., Pallot, J., Walsh, P., Public Management; the New Zealand Model (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
10  J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy (HarperCollins, 1984), F.R. Baumgartner, B.D.Jones, 
Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), O'Riordan, 
"Reflections on the Pathways to Sustainability," in Governing Sustainability, ed. W.N. Adger, Jordan, A. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), T. Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A 
Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis," Political Science 54, no. 1 (2002).  
11 G. Palmer, M.Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government, 4th ed. (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), F. Barker, "Political Culture: Patterns and Issues," in New Zealand Government 
and Politics, ed. R. Miller (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2010). P.15. J. Haywood, "Leadership and the 
Prime Minister," in New Zealand Government and Politics, ed. Miller R. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2010).P.228. E. McLeay, "Cabinet," in New Zealand Government and Politics, ed. R. Miller (Melbourne Oxford 
University Press, 2010). P.202. Although there is no single written constitution there a number of constitutional 
instruments that provide boundaries, notably the Constitution Act 1986 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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Given the amount of formal administrative power that resides at the political level in New Zealand, 
the degree of government commitment to environmental policy development is likely to be a key 
variable amongst those things that influence the nature of environmental policy.12  
Another variable is the degree of influence exercised by government departments. Most literature 
says that government agencies play a formal and informal role - to what extent is frequently debated 
- in all of the processes of policy development.13 Hence central government environmental agencies 
presumably can influence the nature of environmental policy. The detail and dynamics of their 
institutional settings, the role of individuals or groups within the agencies, and values and norms 
within the agencies and other agencies of government are influential internal government factors in 
the processes of policy development. The role played by government environmental agencies in 
policy development is an under-researched field in study of environmental policy development in 
New Zealand since the period of policy innovation of the late 1980s and early 1990s.14  More 
recently, the role of intra-Executive forces play in environmental policy has been referred to 
obliquely15 but the main body of environmental policy research in New Zealand has concentrated on 
policy effectiveness and wider social and economic drivers,16 and rather than jurisdictional and 
administrative features that have characterised a range of European-based studies.17 
 Two government departments deal with environmental policy as their primary raison d’être. These 
departments are the Ministry for the Environment (MfE, the main environmental policy ministry), 
and the Department of Conservation (DoC, the nature conservation operations and policy 
department). One or both of these departments are usually at the centre of environmental policy 
development. That policy development takes place in the absence of a formal institutionalised supra-
agency or horizontal environmental policy coordination of the type found in many other countries.18 
                                                          
12 M. Nilsson, Persson, A, "Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration," Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning 5, no. 4 (2003). 
13 M. Howlett, Ramesh, M., Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). P.64. A. Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Houndsmill, England: Palgrave, 2007), B. 
Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 6th ed. (London: Routledge, 2010). 
14 See T. Bührs, "Working within Limits: The Role of the Commission for the Environment in Environmental 
Policy Development in New Zealand" (University of Auckland, 1991).  
15 J. Boston, "The Complicated Politics of Climate Change," in In the Public Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Professor Keith Jackson, ed. M. Francis, Tully, J. (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2009). Pp.215-216 & 
218, Bertram, The Carbon Challenge: New Zealand's Emission Trading Scheme. 
16 See for example, Memon and Perkins, eds., Environmental Planning and Management in New Zealand. Or for 
example the detailed study of the effectiveness of oceans policy by M.V. McGinnis, "Living up to the Brand: 
Greening Aotearoa's Marine Policy," Policy Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2012), ———, "Oceans Governance: The New 
Zealand Dimension - Summary Report." 
17 Jordan, "Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review." 
18 Jacob, "Instruments for EPI in 30 OECD Countries." Pp.40-41. 
 A form of environmental policy co-ordination has existed at a central government level in New Zealand since 
2008 through an interdepartmental mechanism known as the Natural Resources Sector. As a mechanism for 
coordination its environmental focus is comparatively weak. Its primary purpose is to, “ensure that, across 
government agencies, a strategic, integrated and aligned approach is taken to natural resources development 
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Hence these central government environmental agencies can influence the nature of environmental 
policy.19 The detail and dynamics of their institutional settings, the role of individuals or groups 
within the agencies, and values and norms within the agencies and those of other government 
agencies with whom they interact are internal government factors in the processes of policy 
development. 
The aim of this research is to investigate how New Zealand’s central environmental agencies 
contribute to developing environmental policy, and how Executive government influences the extent 
of that contribution, to see whether this explains the apparently slow and variable nature of 
environmental policy development over the past twenty years. The main proposition of the thesis is 
that given New Zealand’s political system, the sporadic and variable nature of environmental policy 
development can be explained foremost by two factors: the degree of government commitment to 
environmental values; and the ability of central environmental agencies to develop policy that results 
in positive environmental outcomes. Thus the central question of this research is how are efforts by 
New Zealand’s central government environmental agencies to develop effective environmental 
policy influenced by internal factors within government and has this contributed to policy variability?  
To test these ideas a framework, based on concepts of structure and agency, has been developed for 
analysing the role and effectiveness of the main New Zealand government environmental agencies in 
environmental policy development. It also incorporates a wider suite of influencing factors both 
within government and externally. This framework is then applied empirically in selected case studies 
drawing on analysis of departmental files, departmental and Cabinet papers, and corroborating 
evidence from press releases, websites and secondary published sources.  
Chapter 2 defines key terms, reviews literature about environmental effectiveness and policy 
effectiveness, and examines what other literature has to say about sources of policy variability and 
especially environmental policy. Chapter 3 discusses the New Zealand government context for 
environmental policy, looking at macro socio- economic- environmental drivers, the political and 
policy-making system, and the administrative arrangements that deal with environmental matters, 
particularly focusing on MfE and DoC. Chapter 4 sets out an analytical framework and the more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and management.” Its approach involves a “commitment to achieving natural resource outcomes in ways that 
support strong social, economic and cultural development to the greatest extent possible consistent with 
sustainable natural resource management.” http://www.mfe.govt.nz/about/natural-resources-purpose-
functions.html. The argument that it is comparatively weak is because the use of the term “consistent with 
sustainable natural resource management” is not as strong a directive to integrate environmental principles in 
all policies as used many OECD countries. See Jordan, "Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art 
Review." and Jacob, "Instruments for EPI in 30 OECD Countries." 
19 Howlett, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Howlett and Ramesh (P.64) say the 
structure of the bureaucracy has perhaps the strongest effect on public policy processes, especially at the 
sectoral level. 
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detailed questions it gives rise to, the qualitative research methods used, and describes what the 
case studies are and why they have been chosen. The case studies are: the development of a New 
Zealand biodiversity strategy; the development of a New Zealand oceans strategy; and efforts to 
develop national policies to address decline in freshwater quality. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with each 
of these case studies in turn. They outline the context for the particular environmental issue, give a 
narrative of the development of the policy, and then discuss what took place using the analytical 
framework as a structure for analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the characteristics and patterns 
that emerged collectively from the case studies, the value of the analytical framework, and general 
findings and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Study of the literature for this thesis involves two parts: policy variability, and sources of policy 
variability. The focus is on environmental policy and internal government influencing factors.  
The chapter begins with definitions of public policy, institutions, ideology, government agencies and 
the concept of agency, and how these terms will be used. The first part of the chapter then examines 
different perspectives on what constitutes policy effectiveness and environmental effectiveness, as 
this is a key to understanding variability. 
The second part of the chapter looks at sources of variability: what literature says about the role and 
impact of environmental agencies; the influence of complexity on policy development; factors that 
shape public policy (emphasising those that operate within government); and comparative 
environmental performance between similar developed countries. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the merits and limitations of the literature as far as the research question is 
concerned. 
2.2 Policies, institutions, government agencies/departments, and agency 
 
The concepts of public policy, institutions, ideas and ideology, and government 
agencies/departments require a brief explanation, as they are central to this studyThe definition of 
public policy used here is one commonly used to describe intentional courses of government action 
(which include intentional non-action) directed towards goals.20  
How policy is produced and the results of that production help shape whether, how, and in what way 
environmental problems are addressed. Policy can arise from any part of a political system, including 
inside and outside government. It involves the interaction of ideas and values with the exercise of 
power, the actions of individuals, groups and office holders, and the effect of institutions. These 
                                                          
20 A.L. Schneider, Ingram, H., "Policy Design: Elements, Premises, and Strategies," in Policy Theory and Policy 
Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledge, Causes, and Norms, ed. Stuart S. Nagel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
P.79. R. Shaw, Eichbaum, C., Public Policy in New Zealand: Institutions, Processes and Outcomes, 3rd ed. 
(Auckland: Pearson Education New Zealand, 2011). P.2. 
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categories - ideas, interests and institutions - have been described as a trinity of operating conditions 
that affect how public policy is produced.21 
Institutions are an important part of this study because institutions channel public policy.22 Internal 
forces within government derive in part from institutional drivers and help explain the performance 
of public agencies and their approach to policy formulation and implementation.23 Legislation and 
procedures determine the boundaries and frameworks for policy formulation, the nature of the work 
of individual or groups of agencies, and the organisation of the public service and its agencies.  
There is debate about what institutions are. Some of the debate comes from differing disciplinary 
views, for example from rational choice economics, or game theory.24 One perspective is that 
institutions are rules, and distinct from organisations.25 However, organisations, particularly 
government ones, are strongly rules-based.26 Government agencies are built on formal rules of 
purpose (often but not always established in legislation), specified aims, structure, authority, internal 
operating procedures and processes.27 For these reasons, this study treats government agencies as 
institutions. 
Ideas, beliefs and viewpoints of people in government (and elsewhere) influence environmental 
policy. In this study these ideas and beliefs will be termed ideologies.  Negative connotations 
sometimes accompany this term because it has been used by adherents to one set of beliefs to 
criticise alternatives. However this study will endeavour to apply the term in a neutral sense by using 
a social science definition of ideology as sets of beliefs and ideas about how society is, how it should 
be, and how they guide political and government action.28 
                                                          
21Heywood, Politics. P.430. A.R. Zito, Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000). P.8. 
22 J.G. March, Olsen, J.P., "The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life," American Political 
Science Review 78 (1984). B. Guy. Peters, Pierre, J., "Handbook of Public Policy Introduction," in Handbook of 
Public Policy, ed. B. Guy. Peters, Pierre, J. (London: Sage, 2006). P.6. 
23 R.E. Goodin, The Theory of Institutional Design (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). P.21. A. Boin, 
Kuipers, S., "Institutional Theory and the Public Policy Field: A Promising Perspective for Perennial Problems," in 
Debating Institutionalism, ed. J. Pierre, Peters, G.B., Stoker, G. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2008). P.46. 
24 B. Guy Peters, "Institutional Theory: Problems and Prospects," in Debating Institutionalism, ed. J. Pierre, 
Peters, G.B., Stoker, G. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). Pp.2-5. 
25 R. Connor, Dovers, S. , Institutional Change for Sustainable Development (Cheltenham, England: Edward 
Elgar, 2004). P.14, based on the definition of D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance: The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
26 Bührs, Environmental Integration: Our Common Challenge. P.224. Bührs discusses the debate about 
institutions and the rationale for why organisations have institutional characteristics. 
27 Ibid. P.224. 
28 Heywood, Politics. P.45. 
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The terms, agencies and departments, are used in this study to refer to the organisations of 
government. Whether a government organisation is a ministry, a department, an agency, or a 
bureau, authority, or commission, can be a matter of constitutional standing, purpose, role, or 
history. The study uses the term agency when referring to government organisations in a conceptual 
sense (as occurs in most of this chapter), and departments when referring to the New Zealand 
situation. This is because the title “department” is used generically in New Zealand in Schedule 1 of 
the State Sector Act 1988 to describe those government organisations most closely aligned to the 
Executive.  
The term agency, when used in its organisational sense, is distinct from the concept of agency in a 
social sense. Agency in the social sense refers to the capacity of individuals(real people) to make 
independent choices.29 Agency is an important factor within departments because people can choose 
the degree or nature of the rules they apply. Hence when departments don’t do what ministers want 
it is a choice, or when they choose to advance policies ahead of ministers or the government it is a 
form of agency, albeit one that generally is exercised and influenced by the structure or institutional 
arrangements within which they work. Organisations, as institutions, cannot exercise agency. 
Nevertheless, there are institutional organisational characteristics that can condition how people 
exercise agency and what choices they might make.30  
 
2.3 Policies and environmental effectiveness  
 
The apparently slow development and variable effectiveness of environmental policy is part of this 
study’s main question. What constitutes effective environmental policy? The following section 
discusses views about evaluation of public policy, and about what effective environmental policy 
involves. It deals with two linked concepts: general policy effectiveness, and environmental 
effectiveness. 
2.3.1 Policy effectiveness 
 
The usual description of policy effectiveness is whether the policy goals are achieved.31 Based on this 
description, environmental policy effectiveness logically is whether environmental goals are 
                                                          
29 A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1984). P.12. C. Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practise (London: Sage, 2005). P.448. 
30 Goodin, The Theory of Institutional Design. P.21. B. Guy Peters, "Institutional Theory and the Study of the 
Political Executive," in Debating Instiutionalism, ed. Peters Pierre J., G. B., Stoker, G. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008). P.199. 
31 J. S. Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (Oxford, U.K; New York: Blackwell, 1987). 
P.12. R. Denhardt, B., Theories of Public Organisations (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole, 1984). P.133. 
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achieved. Analysising and evaluating policy effectiveness and environmental effectiveness depend, 
however, on what goal is sought, what is being measured, and evaluation criteria.  
There are different sorts of systematic public policy evaluation but they are generally categorised 
under two broad headings; impacts, and processes.32 Bartlett, in reviewing environmental policy 
effectiveness, split the second category arguing there were three broad headings;  
1. Outcomes (equivalent to impacts);  
2. Values of the processes used to define problems, set agendas, formulate alternatives, select 
actions and govern implementation; and 
3. Political architecture that influences outcomes, structures, processes, and constructs and 
elaborates meaning.33 
 Jordan and Lenschow have reviewed literature about effectiveness of environmental policy 
integration and similarly use categories of outcomes, policy process, and political systems.34 The 
benefit of the third category is that it emphasises important political and institutional dimensions of 
public policy creation and implementation that can be forgotten in policy evaluation.35 
Of these three categories, policy outcomes in environmental terms ultimately involve changes in the 
state of the environment. Desirable outcomes are what matter for many environmentalists.36 
Outcomes are reported in various models of State of Environment reports and comparative country 
studies.37 But the literature says that establishing and therefore asserting causal links between 
outcomes and policies is difficult.38  
                                                          
32 S.Z. Theodoulou, "How Public Policy Is Made," in Public Policy: The Essential Readings, ed. S.Z. Theodoulou, 
Cahn, M.A. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995). P.91. 
33 R.V. Bartlett, "Evaluating Environmental Policy Success and Failure," in Environmental Policy in the 1990s, ed. 
N.J. Vig, M.E. Kraft (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1994). Pp.170, 176 & 179. There are other versions of policy 
categorisations, for example Hogwood and Gunn’s scheme involving ten categories (B.W. Hogwood, Gunn, L.A., 
Policy Analysis for the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Pp.13-19. 
34 Jordan, "Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review." The authors distinguish between policy 
as a process of governing (involving policy processes and the politically system within which it works), and 
policy as outcome. 
35 Howlett, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. P.178. 
36 Jordan, "Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review." P.154. Policy might seek to influence 
behaviours. And changed behaviours could be a policy outcome, but ultimately the changed behavior is for a 
purpose. 
37 For a list of a wide range of international indicator reports, see Esty, "National Environmental Performance: 
An Empirical Analysis of Policy Results and Determinants." P.392 Footnote. In New Zealand, State of 
Environment reports are produced by many regional councils. See for example ECAN, "Canterbury Regional 
Environment Report " (Christchurch: Environment Canterbury, 2008).  At a national level, see MfE, Environment 
New Zealand 2007 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2007). 
38 Bartlett, "Evaluating Environmental Policy Success and Failure." P.170. F. Berkhout, Leach, M., Scoones, I., 
"Shifting Perspectives in Environmental Social Science," in Negotiating Environmental Change: New 
2:  Literature Review 
11 
The second category of evaluation involves studying processes and the structural logic of policy, 
especially the assumptions, tools, rules and support involved in policy design and implementation.39 
A strand of scholarship, believing this category can be an instrument of social control, argue that it 
can be used to transform and develop social potential.40 Whichever way it is looked at, this second 
category of evaluation attempts to be predictive about the likely effectiveness of policy. It may, 
however, under-emphasise outcomes and the influence of the institutional effects on policy 
development and implementation.41  
The third category of evaluation, the political architecture perspective, was promoted by Bartlett 
because of the way institutions consolidate long term change. He said, "It is the transformation of 
institutions to be ecologically rational and sustainable that poses the ultimate test for environmental 
policy."42  
As Bartlett points out, though, each category is appropriate to different kinds of questions and 
different kinds of policies.43 In each case they rely on what is being evaluated and what criteria are 
being applied. 
What is being evaluated depends on why and how the policy has been conceived, developed, and 
affected. In turn, there are different evaluation criteria. These include efficiency, legitimacy, equity, 
or effectiveness – with the term effectiveness understood in this context as the extent something 
advances its objective.44 Different approaches to evaluation have their own set of values and criteria 
that, if applied, influence the nature and result of that evaluation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Perspectives from Social Science, ed. F. Berkhout, Leach, M., Scoones, I. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003). 
P.1. W. Jackson, L., "Integrating Ecological Impacts into Evaluations of the Effectiveness of Environmental 
Regimes: The Example of Cites" (Lincoln University, 2011). P.29. Jordan, "Environmental Policy Integration: A 
State of the Art Review." P.154. 
39 Schneider, "Policy Design: Elements, Premises, and Strategies." Pp.80-89. The term “structural logic” used by 
Schneider and Ingram seems more comprehensive than the term “intervention logic” often used in New 
Zealand policy evaluation and design. “Intervention logic” focuses more on rationalist assumptions used to 
justify policy initiatives. There is an active debate about the term and its own assumptions. See K. Baehler, 
"What Are the Limits to Public Service Advising? The "Public Argument" Test," Policy Quarterly 1, no. 3 (2005). 
And R. Gregory, "Politics, Power and Public Policy Making: A Response to Karen Baehler," Policy Quarterly 1, no. 
5 (2005). 
40 F. Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1995). Pp. 7-10 & 23. Fischer describes this as 
“policy relevance”, requiring constructivist methodologies, rather than what he perceived to be dominance of 
positivist and scientific/technical evaluation approaches. 
41 Bartlett, "Evaluating Environmental Policy Success and Failure." P.178.  
42 Ibid. P.178. 
43 Ibid. P.176. 
44 See G.D. Brewer, DeLeon, P., The Foundations of Policy Analysis (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1983). Pp.332-
340. Bartlett, "Evaluating Environmental Policy Success and Failure." P.176. W.N. Adger, Brown, K., Fairbrass, J., 
Jordan, A., Paavola, J., Rosendo, S., Seyfang, G., "Governance for Sustainability: Towards a 'Thick' 
Understanding of Environmental Decision Making," in CSERGE Working Paper EDM 02-04 (2004). P.1. E. 
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). P.66. Ostrom, for 
example, says outcome effectiveness can be assessed by economic efficiency (measuring the magnitude of 
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Given the different categories of evaluation, different understandings about what to evaluate, and 
different criteria of evaluation, there is no single approach to evaluation or effectiveness. The same 
condition can be interpeted differently by different evaluations.45 It is a matter of choice.  
In the case of this study, choices arise from the research question. That question centres on policy 
development rather than policy implementation, and particularly on how rules and norms influence 
policy development. Consequently the evaluative categories of structural logic and political 
architecture are more applicable than an outcomes focus. This is not to dismiss outcomes and they 
will be discussed as part of the research.  But given the emphasis of the research question, general 
policy effectiveness is seen in light of  structural logic (ideas and assumptions) and political 
architecture (rules, processes and tools, and support).These two elements will inform the way the 
study will interrogate the case studies that follow later.  
The research question is not just a generic study of policy though. It  also concentrates on 
environmental issues, which helps us define what goals are being sought. This depends on what we 
mean by the environment and environmental effectiveness. 
2.3.2 Environmental effectiveness 
Environmental effectiveness, like policy effectiveness in general, is determined by what goal is 
sought, what is being measured, and evaluation criteria. Fundamentally it relies on interpretation of 
the term “environment.” How the term is defined will influence evaluations of effectiveness, because 
different definitions contain different parameters. 
The concept of “the environment” is socially constructed.46 There are definitions involving quality-of-
life, and social, cultural and economic intepretations, although these have been criticised both on 
grounds of non-environmental assumptions and more particularly that they are so all-encompassing 
that they become the basis for policies for everything.47 The more commonly used definition refers 
to the natural biophysical world and the way bio-physical conditions impact on people and vice 
versa.48 A definition of environment that emphasises  biophysical issues and their human dimensions 
is more applicable to this research; first because it creates clearer boundaries than wider definitions 
for assessing environmental policy and, second, because it is generally how New Zealand’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
change in terms of net benefits), equity (equality of contribution and benefits received, and differential abilities 
to pay), adaptability, resilience and robustness (originally developed in ecology), accountability (often used in a 
process sense), conformance to general morality (whether procedures are fair?), and the need for trade-offs 
(what else has had to be forgone?). 
45 Howlett, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. P.169. 
46 Bührs, Environmental Integration: Our Common Challenge. P.10.  
47 Ibid. P.16. 
48 D.L. Johnson, Ambrose, S.H., Bassett, T.J., Bowen, M.L., Crummey, D.E., Isaacson, J.S., Johnson, D.N., Lamb, 
P., Sual, M. Winter-Nelson, A.E., "Meanings of Environmental Terms," Journal of Environmental Quality 26, no. 
3 (1997). P.582. 
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environmental agencies view the term.49 It does present a challenge however, because logically it 
leads to assessing effectiveness in terms of biophysical outcomes. But, as explained in the previous 
section, this research focuses on effectiveness in terms of what flows from ideas, assumptions and 
rules, not in terms of outcomes. When seen in this light, environmental effectiveness includes other 
assessment features.  
The first of these assessment features is the values involved in environmental policy. Public policy 
has an intentional component.50 Verweij suggests there is commonality in the various theoretical 
typologies of human responses to public policy issues.51 These comprise what Peters and Pierre 
describe as rationalities, or types of reasoning or assumptions.52 Because rationalities involve values, 
and standards of evaluation, they can lead to choices to include some things and exclude others and 
to view the world in a particular way.53 Such ideological views can end up being internalised in public 
policy to the extent they become defined in accepted tools, methodologies, and procedures, which 
of themselves end up shaping intentions and what decisions are made.54 
Rationalities can take different forms and are described differently, usually because of disciplinary 
perspectives. The most common descriptions in political science are: economic rationality that places 
primacy on efficiency; effectiveness rationality that focuses on result or technical output or outcome; 
equity or social rationality that values social harmony; legal or legitimacy rationality that values 
conflict resolution and a system of rights and rules or process; and political rationality that aims to 
resolve conflict between interests.55  
                                                          
49 See for example DoC, "Department of Conservation: Statement of Intent 2011-2014," (Wellington: 
Department of Conservation, 2011). P.8. MfE, "Statement of Intent 2011-2014," (Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment, 2011). P.6. 
50 Bührs, Environmental Integration: Our Common Challenge. P.17. Things may occur unintentionally but this is 
not public policy if it is not an objective or goal. 
51 Verweij ( M. Verweij, Douglas, M., Ellis, R.,Engels, C., Hendriks, F., Lohmann, S., Ney, S., Rayner, S., 
Thompson, M., "Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate Change," Public Administration 84, 
no. 4 (2006). Pp.820-821.) discusses how people approach all kinds of public policy issues, often in 
contradictory ways. He cites, for example, patterns of economic action (market, redistribution, and reciprocity, 
based on the work of Polyani, 1945), categorisation of types of ‘goods’ (private, public, common pool, and club, 
drawn from Snidal, 1994), and solutions to collective problems (market and contract, hierarchy, and 
community, based on Lichbach, 1995). Werweij’s analysis in turn is based on the ideas of culture theory of 
Douglas (1987), and of Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990), with its typology of hierarchy, individualism, 
egalitarianism, or fatalism, as four basic ways that people justify social relations.  
52 Peters, "Handbook of Public Policy Introduction." P.7. 
53 P. Diesing, Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and Their Social Conditions (Urbana, Ill.: University of 
Illinois Press, 1962). D. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised ed. (New York: 
W.W.Norton, 2002). P.378. 
54 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. P.201. 
55 Diesing, Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and Their Social Conditions, Brewer, The Foundations of 
Policy Analysis.Pp. 332-340 (Brewer and DeLeon refer to notions of effectiveness, efficiency, equity and 
adequacy, rather than explicitly using the term rationality). Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political 
Economy, Brewer, The Foundations of Policy Analysis. P.56. Adger, "Governance for Sustainability: Towards a 
'Thick' Understanding of Environmental Decision Making." P.1. 
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Efficiency focuses on cost and welfare but often this focus can have difficulty in trading off multiple 
sets of values and, for example, in dealing with the cognitive, spatial, and temporal complexities 
often involved in environmental decision-making.56 Effectiveness refers to technically optimal results, 
environmentally seen in biophysical or behavioural terms.57 Commentators say this can lead to a 
technocratic and sometimes absolutist approach with negative consequences if pursued without 
acknowledging other values.58 Equity can enhance the social outcomes of decisions but may 
compromise efficiency or effectiveness.59 Legitimacy is concerned with legal procedural components 
of decision-making, but it carries a risk of potential capture.60  
Achieving environmental results, say advocates of environmental effectiveness, relies on reasoning 
that accepts the ecological foundation of human welfare and survival. Bartlett, citing the example of 
the United States National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), says its effectiveness lay in the way it 
exhibited a functional ecological rationality. Other more traditional forms of reasoning applied to 
public policy, such as economic or social rationalities should not be ignored, he said, but rather, 
“…their dependency on, and hoped for consistency with, ecological rationality is emphasized."61 
Dryzek takes a similar view arguing that the way that environmental issues are treated at a 
governmental level tends to affect the outcomes that are achieved. Dryzek says that an ecological 
rationality should have primacy because the enhancement of the material and ecological base of 
society is necessary not only for the functioning of societal forms such as economically, socially, 
legally, and politically rational structures, but also for action in pursuit of any value in the long term.62  
                                                          
56 ———, "Governance for Sustainability: Towards a 'Thick' Understanding of Environmental Decision Making." 
P.5.  
57 Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity. P. 66. 
58 J. S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). P.143. 
59 B. I. Bryant, "Introduction," in Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies and Solutions, ed. B. I. Bryant 
(Washington DC: Island Press, 1995). Pp.5-6. D. Schlosberg, Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism:The 
Challenge of Difference for Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
60 For an argument about how procedure can be captured, in this case by powerful interests in society, see 
Ham, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. 
61 R. V. Bartlett, "Rationality and the Logic of the National Environmental Policy Act," Environmental 
Professional 8, no. 2 (1986). P.110. A companion paper by Bartlett expands on the argument about the 
significance of “ecological” rationality in advancing environmental effectiveness in policy in the face of 
competing rationalities. See R.V. Bartlett, "Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy," 
Environmental Ethics 8 (1986). A similar argument has been made that the New Zealand Resource 
Management Act 1991, as originally drafted, exhibited an ecological rationality by having sustainable 
environmental management as its primary principle (Bührs, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics 
of Clean and Green? Pp.146-149). 
62 Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. P.58. 
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The role of ecological rationality both in what governments do and in the reasoning applied to 
crafting government action forms a thread of much environmental literature.63 It has a normative 
basis, but so too does any rationality. Within the machinery of government, and in the dynamics of 
policy consideration and decision-making, different rationalities about the form of policies, as well as 
their purpose, come into play. The degree to which different rationalities are applied to solving 
environmental problems can affect the nature of the solution and creates variability in 
environmental terms. Amongst the competing logics present within governments, ecological 
rationality provides the type of environmental imperative to collective choice mechanisms which, it 
has been argued, is required to determine effectiveness in a more general sense.64  
Another assessment feature of environmental effectiveness involves integration. Literature going 
back to the 1960s continually raises it as a principle of effective environmental policy.65 How 
successfully environmental issues are addressed depends on the degree of integration of ecological 
considerations in belief systems, assumptions, knowledge and information that underlie policies.66  
The arguments supporting environmental integration come from two viewpoints: one is normative 
and, in the same way as ecological rationality, holds that all human welfare is based on the long term 
carrying capacity of nature. The other view is that the disjointed character of government policies 
(either accidently or deliberately) pose problems for policy goals (and hence effectiveness) and 
requires coordination.67 The second argument applies to many fields of government policy, not just 
an environmental one. However, in the environmental domain of government policy it is argued that 
there are specific integrative challenges because of cognitive factors involving competing values and 
                                                          
63 Caldwell, "Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy." Bartlett, "Rationality and the Logic of the National 
Environmental Policy Act.", Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy, Jordan, 
"Environmental Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review." Pp.148-150. 
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normative view of the coordination argument is that environmental integration involves more than policy 
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hence priorities, and/or that the span of policy and institutional mandates is arguably wider than for 
other typical domains of government activity.68 There could be an element of special pleading in such 
an argument. Whether the environment domain is more complex than, for example, problems of 
social justice or economic management may be debatable. However, there is a sound technical 
argument in environmental policy about the temporal scales (usually long), spatial scales (multi 
layered), perception issues (often hidden until too late to effect remedies), and very significant 
uncertainties about cause and effect given that physical and biological processes involved are not 
fully understood, or understood at all.69  
There are at least two schools of thought about the degree of integration required for overall 
effectiveness. One is that it should involve integration both within policy (described as internal 
integration) and across the array of government policy (characterised as external integration), 
especially that dealing with traditional non-environmental policy dimensions with significant 
environmental implications, such as transport and energy.70 The other view is that effective 
environmental policy depends on policy-makers focusing on achieving specific objectives  and 
sometimes limited policy outcomes.71 Differences seem to be more about means rather than ends, 
however.72 The rationale for limited objectives is based on cognitive and methodological 
shortcomings, not necessarily the principle of comprehensiveness itself. Those who argue for wider 
integration objectives would say that, conceptually at least, means for internal and external policy 
integration exist and the challenge lies not with the principle itself but in addressing cognitive and 
institutional factors.73  
Linked to the principle of integration is what gets integrated. The substance of what gets integrated 
is important because it influences goals, assumptions and tools, and hence assessments of 
effectiveness. While there can be many different ways of thinking about what should, or does, get 
integrated, two dominant frameworks are the concepts of sustainable development, and ecological 
modernisation.74 Sustainable development aims to combine seemingly incompatible goals of 
economic development, social harmony and opportunity, and environmental protection. Ecological 
modernisation seeks environmental sustainability by the use of technology or new techniques that 
reduce environmental impacts. Of these two, sustainable development enjoys the greatest currency 
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internationally.75 There are different interpretations of the meaning of sustainable development 
ranging from those that attribute a priority to environmental objectives, to others that emphasise 
trade-offs or substitution of natural capital.76 Most recent environmental reviews argue that 
whatever the rhetoric, pro-environmental interpretation finds less common expression in 
government policy than other interpretations.77 
On the basis of the literature canvassed in this section, environmental effectiveness in the way it is 
used in this study involves three elements. First, for purposes of clarity and focus, the environment 
as a concept is defined in biophysical and associated human dimension terms rather than in any 
alternative ways. Second, it draws on normative understandings that human welfare depends on a 
physical and ecological base. Third, integration of that normative perspective in the actions of 
government is essential if those actions are to be effective environmentally. 
2.3.3 Summary 
Policy effectiveness and environmental effectiveness are contingent concepts. This section of the 
chapter has canvassed a range of literature on both subjects in order to develop consistent criteria 
that can be used as the basis for assessing variability in environmental policy. 
Policy effectiveness boils down to whether the policy or proposed policy combines assumptions, 
objectives, rules and support underlying the selection of the means to achieve desired ends.  
Environmental effectiveness, in the terms used in this study, involves a biophysical/human dimension 
perspective on the environment, normative understandings of the environment as critical to human 
welfare, and integration of that perspective in government action.  
Environmental policy effectiveness combines these concepts. Chapter 4 will describe how they will 
be combined, and the questions that will used to assess environmental effectiveness in light of 
potential internal causes of environmental policy variability. 
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Environmental policy and its effectiveness are one component of this research. The key component, 
however, is causes of variable effectiveness. This is the subject of the rest of the chapter. 
2.4 Causes of variability in environmental policy 
2.4.1 Introduction 
There are many views and different disciplinary perspectives about what shapes policy and about the 
causes of variable effectiveness in public policy.78 This study seeks to understand political and 
organisational causes of variability. Consequently, it draws primarily on political science literature 
(although it also involves behavioural elements). 
Public policy is a highly complex phenomenon, involving at its broadest level interactions between 
agency and structure. Giddens argues that agency produces structure which in turn conditions 
agency.79 Complexity in developing policy arises from the series of decisions involving a large number 
of actors operating within the boundaries of institutional frameworks and responding to multiple 
influences.80 Bardach describes the phenomenon as policy dynamics.81 Three major elements that 
influence effective policy are, according to Scharpf:  
 The nature of the policy problem; 
 The orientation of the policy actors; 
 Characteristics of the institutional settings.82 
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Policy is driven by the influence of interests, ideas and institutions, and the exercise of power in 
various guises, impacting on the processes of policy production.83 Policy development itself, and how 
policy changes,  can be described as a contest of ideas between different groups of actors, usually 
involving iterative recalibrations of policies within a dominant paradigm, occasionally broken by 
sudden and sometimes unforeseen events, but still conditioned by institutionally bounded forms of 
policy innovation, producing distinctive and enduring repertoires of policy approaches.84 Within this 
contest, power is all pervasive. Public policy making is a political process, and politics involves the 
exercise of power in a formal way (in a structural institutionalised context of Cabinet rules and rules 
surrounding formal decision-making) and in informal ways of decision-making, agenda setting, 
and/or in influencing beliefs and values.85 It is a central force in the operation of policy practises and, 
ultimately, dominates policy decision-making.86 As such, it is a constant phenomenon in this 
research, revealed in the chapters that follow, but is not of itself a primary focus for study. 
Scharpf’s description of elements that influence policy effectiveness, and the ideas about drivers of 
policy and how policy develops, are useful conceptually for understanding overall causes of policy 
effectiveness. But for this research we need more specifics. To understand internal government 
influences and how environmental agencies contribute to developing environmental policy we need 
to know what literature has to say about those features. We need to know more about the 
interaction between agencies, policy processes and decision-making, about political contexts, and to 
what extent all these features influence policy variability. 
This part of the  chapter begins with a brief overview of different ideas about the role, and impact, of 
environmental agencies. It then looks at ideas about how the nature of the policy problems influence 
policy variability. This is followed by discussion about policy processes and public institutions, the 
actors involved in policy, and policy assumptions and rationalities, and how these all combine to 
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affect environmental agencies and environmental policy. Finally the section looks at wider contextual 
issues that help shape the political settings in which environmental public policy is formed. 
 
2.4.2  The role of environmental agencies 
Two propositions that underlie this study are that causes of variability in environmental policy, in 
New Zealand at least, arise within government from the degree of government commitment to 
environmental values and the ability of central environmental agencies to develop policy that is likely 
to be effective environmentally. The first proposition, about the influence of government on public 
policy is rarely contested, although causes and effect are subjects of an extensive literature. The 
second proposition is contested. There are divided views on the impact of environmental agencies on 
environmental policy. 
In the early period of study of environmental policy, from the 1960s to the 1980s, weight (or hope) 
was placed on the efficacy of government action to address environmental problems, and what was 
(or might) be required of central government environmental agencies.87 Especially, literature 
emphasised the need for agencies to have adequate influencing or directive powers, sufficient 
resources, and technical capacity (especially scientific capability).88 Over time, however, the role of 
concentrated authority in policy development by governments, and government agencies, became 
de-emphasised. Instead literature highlighted the significance of decentralised influences arising 
from ideas about wider societal governance and a view that the role of government lay in direction 
setting (steering) informed from outside government.89 More recently, there has been some move 
back to acknowledging the significance of the role played by government and agencies.90 
The divided views on the role of agencies include ideas that: 
 Because governments are essentially driven by economic growth imperatives they, and 
hence their agencies, are inherently non-environmental (an ideological perspective).91 
                                                          
87 N.J. Vig, "Environmental Policy from the Seventies to the Nineties," in Environmental Policy in the 1990s: 
Towards a New Agenda, ed. N.J. Vig, Kraft, M.E. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1990). Pp.16-17 & 19. 
88 Ibid. 
89 A.M. Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). Pp.24-30. Schout, "Administrative Instruments." 
Pp.50-51. Weale, "Governance, Government and the Pursuit of Sustainability." Pp.58-62. 
90 Barry, "W(H)Ither the Green State?." P.256. P. Christoff, "Green Governance and the Green State: Capacity 
Building as a Political Project," in Managing Leviathan, ed. R. Paehkle, Torgerson, D. (Peterborough, Canada: 
Broadview Press, 2005).P.292. Weale, "Governance, Government and the Pursuit of Sustainability." Pp.55-75. F. 
Fukuyama, "What Is Governance," Governance 26, no. 3 (2013). Pp.347-348. 
91 W. Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory of the Steady State. (San 
Francisco: W.H.Freeman, 1977). Pp.315-319. 
2:  Literature Review 
21 
 The nature of government, involving as it does hierarchical relationships, institutionalised 
processes and the exercise of power effectively disempowers or else neutralises the effect of 
environmental agencies (a power and process perspective).92 
 In contrast to the first two bullet points, government agencies are (my emphasis) significant 
because governments are significant. But there are characteristics that make them more or 
less significant (an administrative perspective). There is no settled agreement on what these 
characteristics are, but some ideas put forward argue for agencies with an across-
government policy coordination role, or alternatively for sufficient capacity for an 
environmental agency to be a nimble operator in the field of policy development.93 Another 
view argues that environmental agencies work best when they have an overriding purpose to 
promote environmental values within government systems.94 There are different views on 
the most effective form of agencies: some promoting mixed functional ministries (on the 
grounds this structure provides greater potential influence and cross fertilisation of ideas); 
and others dedicated environmental ministries (on the grounds this structure supports clarity 
of purpose).95 Three functions in particular are said to be priorities for effectiveness: policy 
evaluation and analysis; standard setting based on sound science; and compliance 
monitoring. 96 
While there are, therefore, different views in the literature about the influence of environmental 
agencies, there is a sufficient strand of opinion to suggest that they can (my emphasis) make a 
difference in developing environmentally effective policies. Whether they do make a difference, 
however, remains rather opaque. The contention in this study is that it depends on internal 
characteristics and the government system within which they work. 
 The rest of this chapter focuses on what literature has to say about internal characteristics, and how 
these and contextual features, both within government and beyond, condition environmental 
agencies and what they do. 
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2.4.3 The nature of the policy problem: complexity as a factor in variability 
Some environmental problems are inherently more or less complex, or politically more or less 
benign, than others.97 This can be for any number of biophysical reasons and/or social or economic 
reasons. A well-known example of a complex environmental problem is the issue of human induced 
climate change. Its complexity arises from a disjunction between the understanding, visibility, and 
timing of costs and benefits of collective action.98 Addressing a similar biophysical class of issue, 
ozone depletion, has been less complex than human induced climate change because the 
disjunctions of knowledge, awareness, and costs and benefits are considerably lower.99  
Complexity (sometimes referred to as “wickedness”) is often cited as a significant factor in an 
environmental problem, or for that matter any public policy problem, because it can involve any 
combination of technical, social, economic or cultural barriers to resolution.100 A 2002 study of 
international environmental regimes found that where a high-capacity system deals with a non-
malignant problem that is well understood there is a 19 to 1 probability of success, compared to a 12 
to 1 probability with a low-capacity system with a malign problem clouded with uncertainty.101 The 
level of understanding of an issue affects the significance of clarity of assumptions and objectives. 
Roe says that in the face of high uncertainty and complexity the essence of analytical choice is to 
“underwrite and stabilize” the assumptions for decision-making. 102  
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Complexity has wider determinants than things that just take place within government.103 Hence it is 
a general background factor rather than a specific intra-government factor in policy variability. It can 
apply to many public policy questions. Complexity is something that governments and environmental 
agencies have to grapple with. For governments, Nilsson and Persson argue that complexity can 
either weaken or strengthen political will, meaning issues are less likely to be addressed or else result 
in less certain outcomes.104 For agencies, complexity has implications for their roles, powers and 
capacities. The greater complexity, the greater the need for problem solving capacity, and, combined 
with complexity’s impact on political will, the increased possibility of policy variability.105   
2.4.4  The Internal milieu: factors within government that may help explain what 
influences environmental agencies 
Amongst ideas about how policy decisions get made, three influences come to the fore: the role of 
rules (institutions), the role of decision-making actors (the exercise of agency), and the role of ideas 
(cognitive influences). Various models of policy decision-making reflect these three influences, for 
example incrementalist and bureaucratic organisation models, rational actor models, and belief 
system models.106 This section examines what literature has to say about the effect of these three 
features within government on the work of environmental agencies, with a caveat that it is difficult 
to separate them too strictly because they are often closely intertwined. 
2.4.4.1 Role of institutional features in shaping policy  
The role of institutional features will be looked at in two ways: from an organisational perspective, 
and from a policy process perspective.  
Organisational perspectives: 
There are a wide range of ideas about how government agencies exercise influence. Peters provides 
six criteria for an agency, or a bureacracy generally, to influence government. They are: an ability to 
formulate intentions for action; the intentions must be workable; competition for resources to drive 
priorities between alternative options; sufficient numerical strength; managerial skills; and 
implementation abilities.107  But what determines how these criteria are met?  Answers to this 
question frequently point to capacity and how organisations perform and behave.  
A challenge for organisational analysis is that it is often highly generalised, or alternatively prone to 
fads or fashion, at least in the popular business literature. James Q. Wilson qualified the theoretical 
basis of his book, Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it, by saying,   
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After all these decades of wrestling with the subject, I have come to have grave doubts that 
anything worth calling "organization theory" will ever exist. Theories will exist, but they will 
usually be so abstract or general as to explain rather little.108 
Although Wilson’s comment may have been a throw-away remark, the type of general theory to 
which Wilson was referring includes complexity and systems theory, and economic, sociological or 
anthropological explanations of what motivates people and the behaviours that flow from this. A 
point common to this theoretical base, however generalised, is that organisations are not 
automatons, but respond to institutional influences. Consequently, it is possible to derive features 
that account for differential performance, as Wilson himself does. 
One approach to understanding capacities of agencies is to apply business oriented analytical or 
diagnostic frameworks, commonly examining organisational strategy, design, resources, and culture. 
An example of this is a framework developed in the McKinsey management consulting firm to assess 
organisations’ strategy, staff, systems, structure, style, skills, and shared values, and how they are 
linked.109 The argument runs that these features need to be aligned for the organisation to be 
successful. Business oriented analyses, while valuable as an internal management tools, can miss 
some of the specifics that come from the institutionalised  drivers and incentives inherent in public 
administration and public policy, such as the political nature of government agency work. 
Another approach, relatively formalistic and echoing traditional institutionalism, is to examine roles, 
powers and resources. Assumptions here are that: 
 Clearer purpose promotes better performance ;110 and/or 
 Stronger powers or positions of authority in the political decision-making hierarchy give 
agencies greater authority to pursue their objectives;111 and/or 
 Resources or, more particularly, lack of resources (often couched in financial terms) assist or 
inhibit departments.112  
Analysis of roles, powers and resources provides a perspective on the configurations and potential 
formal influence of agencies, but says less about characteristics that might enable a relatively lightly 
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resourced agency with, say, ambiguous powers to be effective whereas another agency seemingly in 
a more advantageous position isn’t. 
This question, why some agencies succeed and others fail, is difficult because of the challenge of 
establishing cause. The subject has stimulated research into the less obvious internal drivers of 
performance by government agencies. 
Government agencies operate in a climate in which goals are often ambiguous, where diverse public 
interest considerations are part of decision-making, which together make measuring effectiveness, 
and efficiency, challenging. Success in these circumstances, hinges around agencies’ information and 
expertise, and their internal characteristics.113 Also, external constituencies can affect internal 
performance. One argument is that interest groups capture and drive government agencies, their 
influence becomes internalised, and this in turn influences the creation of new policies and tightens 
the grip of interest groups further114, although as Peters says there are many and more complex 
factors that drive agencies than interests or agency self-interest.115  Wilson argues that key internal 
(my emphasis) drivers of government agency performance are a mix of experience, professionalism 
and agency ideology. These can be harnessed, he said, by effective internal management comprising 
clarity of stated goals, freely inferred tasks for staff underpinned by good leadership  (traditional 
business-oriented factors of performance mentioned earlier),  combined with understanding the 
agency’s culture.116  
Culture, Wilson argues, is especially important in performance and  arises from professional norms, 
and/or the origins of the department, and/or the institutional settings or purpose of the agency.117 
Government agencies are certainly not ciphers. They have their own characteristics that influence 
how they behave and how they perceive and seek to address issues. They frequently have their own 
well-developed ideas about what governments should do drawing on their own experience and 
expertise usually linked with their role or on-going programmes, which Peters describes as agency 
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“ideology”.118 There is also often a patterned persistent way of thinking about their central tasks.119 
Boin says that in these situations agencies can develop a certain identity, which, in turn, informs to a 
significant extent the administrative behaviour of its members.120 They share “decision premises.” 
Hence agencies can create their own “discourse”, or world-view.121 These characteristics can flow 
from: the orientation of their client or interest groups;122 from operating routines, internal 
socialisations and the historical and policy conditions in which these agencies are created;123 from 
structure;124 from leadership;125 and from their professional norms.126  
Culture is certainly not confined just to government agencies. Nevertheless, it has been argued that it 
can be especially prevalent in government organisations because of their strongly institutionalised 
operating environment.127 Johnston’s view is that agency operating environments can embody 
different value systems and different assumptions about people and relationships.  
In my experience, when bureaucrats clash and personalise those clashes, pointing fingers at each 
other for sins they share, they are often acting out of the different value systems implicit in their 
legislative and institutional frameworks, but the difference is personalised (or organisationalised) 
because of a lack of awareness of the underlying values and discourse.128  
The main conclusion about internal organisational institutional features is that agency roles and their 
formal and informal strategies, design, resources, and cultures are likely to have an influence on the 
nature of policy, and hence effectiveness. Furthermore, this may be greater than that suggested by 
traditional models of bureaucracies that separated administration and politics, and ideas that they 
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are (or should be) rational neutral policy advisory units in a way that is debated by some literature of 
the schools of public administration and public policy.129 All this suggests that empirical studies of 
policy development need to account for internal capacities and characteristics of government 
agencies when assessing policy variability. 
Policy process perspectives 
The previous section examined internal agency factors that contribute to policy variability. In getting 
things done, however, departments operate in the arena of government. That arena is a labyrinth, 
through which agencies run a policy gauntlet and where institutional factors also contribute to 
determining the nature of policies and their variability. 
The process of producing policy can be quite formal and bound by sets of rules and conventions 
regarding initiation, consultation, and decision-making.130 Such rules impose order, hierarchy and 
boundaries. They in turn create the strategic position of bureaucrats in the policy process, give rise to 
their status and expertise, and shape the logistical relationship with ministers.131 Nevertheless, while 
the literature suggests public servants can be influential and sometimes highly so, the same literature 
warns against over-emphasising the role of the bureaucracy. Cabinet, ministers and politicians 
usually play a larger part.132 Cases of high profile issues, manifesto commitments, or the talents of 
individual ministers encourage greater roles for the political executive.133 Kingdon argues that a top 
down model, with elected representatives at the top is more accurate than government-by-
bureaucracy critiques. 134  
The formal rules of policy-making are one institutional feature of agency influence. Another 
institutional feature arises from the size and diverse functions of government. These lead to 
specialist sub sectors (or domains) of government policy, which in turn potentially creates room for 
greater influence by those involved in the domain. For example, environmental policy often tends to 
be a specific domain. Domains of government policy, although frequently interconnected, respond to 
different sets of pressures and urgencies, fostering the operation of distinctive policy and advocacy 
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coalitions in the manner identified by Sabatier.135 This can encourage processes, and to some extent 
power, to be spread across and within government amongst sub-sectors. It also can lead ministers 
and senior public servants to devolve the bulk of decision-making to less senior officials in 
agencies.136 There is a degree of difference in the literature about whether the locus of influencing 
decisions lies at a lower or higher hierarchical level. Some, for example Richardson, Page, and 
Cairney, focus on the role played by lower level officials whereas Scharpf sees a greater degree of 
exercise of power and decision-making at a higher level, which aligns with Kingdon’s view (cited 
earlier) that it tends to be a top-down process.137 Nevertheless, the idea of policy domains and their 
dynamics supports the proposition of Richardson, and Page, that some of the origins of policy (and 
by inference aspects of its likely effectiveness) lie in the day-to-day decisions being taken in less 
visible government arenas, including within government agencies.138 
A further potential cause of policy variability is the tendency to follow standard operating procedures 
for policy content, style, and structure, based on frameworks of ideas about the nature of policy 
problems and goals, the manner in which decisions are made (described by Richardson as policy 
style), and instruments or tools that fit within these frameworks.139 Policy content, style and 
structure arise and persist in policy domains, reinforced by incrementalist patterns of policy 
development (distinct from the rarer form of radical policy departure). Such standard operating 
procedures are simpler procedurally and cognitively (and less challenging of the dominant internal 
actors). In a complex government system it is easier to follow established policy trends.140 These 
policy approaches (a term I will use to describe this phenomenon later in the thesis) arise from 
institutional and cognitive perspectives, but the fact that they become a standard means they take 
on institutionalised form, reinforced by those dominant powers within government.141  
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Power positions and internal politics in the policy process are an important part of policy variability. 
Certain agencies and office holders exercise more influence than others. How this occurs takes 
different forms in different jurisdictions.142 Governmental decision-making power structure hinges 
around: the relational dynamics within Cabinet; the seniority, capabilities, and relationship dynamics 
between ministers; the relative authorities, strengths and capabilities of public service “central” 
agencies; and the relative strengths, capabilities and internal and inter-agency dynamics of 
government departments. In particular, it is commonplace for a government’s key economic 
management agencies to exercise considerable influence because most new policies are likely to 
have economic implications and because of the power of economic considerations in the political 
process.143 
Different power relationships among agencies and their ministers mean that public service managers 
have to engage in the politics surrounding the purposes of their organisations and the policies that 
arise in association with those purposes. The rules and expectations of policy development (including 
its initiation) mean agencies need to have sufficient internal capacity to undertake engagement at 
multiple levels in the processes of policy negotiation and bargaining if they are to be effective. Moore 
has described this as engaging with the “authorising environment”, where forces can lend legitimacy 
and support or alternatively can interfere or withdraw support or authority for what an agency, or 
for that matter a minister, is attempting to achieve.144  
The idea that policy process plays a role in shaping policy, and hence its effectiveness, is well 
rehearsed and widely recognised, even though there are diverse views about how that role is played. 
Government agencies, and government decision-makers are bound by rules, formal and informal 
relationships, and modes of operating that prescribe freedom of action. The precise details of 
boundaries, how they operate in practice, and their effect on policy depend on the nature of the 
jurisdiction in which they operate. This will be elaborated on in the chapter dealing with the New 
Zealand government context.  
What the literature tells us is that institutional features cause variability in policy at two levels: 
through processes that take place within government and; within agencies. Thus, when seeking 
causes of policy variability and policy effectiveness, we need to look to internal agency capacities, 
and to the formal and informal rules of engagement of policy-making including the decision-making 
rules, policy domains and policy networks, policy approaches, and power relationships. 
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2.4.4.2 The role of individuals in shaping  policy 
The previous section covered ideas about how rules and processes work to influence policy. But 
policy is also the result of actions of people. Their skills and their preferences, values, personal 
agendas, and idiosyncracies can also have an effect. Individuals or groups can influence policy by 
drawing attention to policy problems, advancing policy solutions, building support, and securing 
action.145 This is commonly labelled as policy entrepreneurship.146 How this happens is a result of 
choices, the exercise of will, skill, and leadership (often backed by formal or informal influence and 
power, which in turn often has an institutional basis).  
Baehler, and Scott, argue that both effective policy and variability in policy rely, at least in part, on 
the quality of policy advice from public servants (suggesting the exercise of agency).147  Mintrom and 
Norman argue that there are four elements involved when individuals are successful in driving policy: 
social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example.   They say how these 
elements are used is conditional on policy processes and cognitive frameworks.148 
There is, though, an empirical challenge about the influence of individual actions in that the choices 
of individuals and groups, and the contexts within which those choices are made, are closely linked, 
as pointed out in the introduction to this section.149 One way of looking at the role of individuals is to 
view the role of the bureaucracy as one of an agent and the role of formal decision-makers as one of 
principal. This is where politicians (and senior public servants), not having all the necessary 
knowledge and skills to develop a policy, delegate to an agent, in turn giving rise to information 
asymmetries and then efforts to control and manage the agent (and hence institutionalise 
relationships).150 Another way to analyse policy decision-making is to view it as collaboration 
between the political and administrative parts of the Executive, even though the political executive is 
at the apex of such collaboration. Page and Jenkins suggest that in practice, elements of both 
principal-agent and collaborative dynamics are at work, the former within the latter.151 They say,  
Making policy is a collaboration between the two parts of the executive. The officials do their best 
to develop practical measures that will meet what they perceive as their political masters’ 
priorities and intentions. For their part, ministers depend heavily on what their officials suggest.152 
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But whether the context for individual choices arises from principal/ agent or, as Page suggests, more 
likely from a combination of principal/agent and collaborative contexts, both involve persuasion and 
negotiation. The first is a contest of ideas, and the second a process of bargaining. Both, too, involve 
a mix of skill and influence. Scharpf describes this process as, 
…policy proposals usually being produced through a 'nexus' of horizontal negotiations among 
lower level units within and across ministries and with outside actors in parliament, in political 
parties, as well as in interest organisations. Conflicts are either are avoided unilaterally by the 
practices of negative coordination or are settled through distributive bargaining over compromise 
solutions that allow the units involved (often the different government agencies) to present 
common proposals to the minister or cabinet, where they are then likely to be accepted 
summarily.153  
Scharpf says the processes of horizontal self-coordination involves vertical dialogue in which the 
political concerns of ministers are communicated downwards and issues regarding the technical 
feasibility and appropriateness of available options are communicated upwards.  
How ministers and agencies work together can be an important feature in forming policy.154 A 
capable agency, or a group of capable officials, in sync with a capable minister can achieve a great 
deal, because they tend to optimise a mixture of knowledge, skill and decision-making authority. A 
capable agency/officials in sync with a capable minister and backed by the whole government can 
achieve even more.155 
The nature of the relationship is in part institutional and in part personal. It is institutional because of 
respective roles of ministers and agencies. It is personal because of the issue of trust. Trust assures 
the two parties that certain types of behaviour will or won’t be displayed and simplifies interactions 
and expectations.156 Peters highlights the significance of this issue in an opposite way.157 He points 
out the rather obvious fact that there can at times be conflict or mistrust (my emphasis) between a 
minister and public servants. Peters observes that many incoming political leaders feel they cannot 
trust the advice of public servants who served under a previous administration of a different political 
persuasion. He argues this is especially true for ministers from leftist political parties who tend to 
regard the public service as a conservative institution (which lies behind Marxist critiques of 
bureaucracies158), although, as Heywood points out, the same can be just as true for rightist 
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administrations on the basis of an alternative critique that public servants are inherently self-
interested and promote growth of budgets or agencies.159 This is not, in Peters’ view, that public 
servants necessarily obstruct or sabotage a programme. Rather, he says, that perhaps their support 
of a programme, policies or even a Minister might not be as energetic as it might be.160  
But to return to the positive perspective of trust, a tactical objective for agencies and officials if they 
want to advance policy interests is to build and maintain an atmosphere of mutual trust with 
ministers. Once achieved, it assists both parties in processes of negotiation and bargaining, and 
hence increases the possibility of advancing policy. 
Finally, choices, persuasion, and bargaining also involves politics. The idea of public servants 
engaging with the politics of situations might seem to run counter to an administrative tradition of a 
neutral public servant. There are many who argue the idea of a neutral public servant is a myth.161 
Moore’s position is that in arguing for, or making the choices involved in, policy development public 
servants must engage with politics, not necessarily to drive politics (but as described earlier their 
institutional base can often do this), but to understand it so they can perform better. Others go 
beyond the organisational effectiveness viewpoint that Moore focused on and argue that public 
servants have an individual role, almost a moral duty, to advocate policies. Scott, for example, says 
that the role of public service leaders is to “negotiat(e) the boundary between good politics and good 
policy- not only giving Ministers what they want, but what they need”.162 It is debatable how 
“political” this is. Scott seems to be making a distinction between party politics and broader notion of 
politics as the creation of general rules for society.163 But what “good” policy is and what is meant by 
what ministers “need” might itself be political.164  
The overall point that the literature makes is that individuals and groups,the choices they make, and 
their skill and will are factors in advancing environmental policy, and need to be considered in the 
analysis of intra-governmental influences on the nature of such policy. 
                                                          
159 Heywood, Politics. Pp.384-386. W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: 
Aldine/Atherton, 1971).  
160 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. Pp.223-224. Peters argues that there is little evidence of bureaucratic 
obstruction. From my own observations of Minister-departmental interactions, to suggest that it doesn’t 
happen from time to time is a bit naive. 
161 Denhardt, Theories of Public Organisations. Pp.47-49. Goodin, "The Public and Its Policies." P.8. Peters, The 
Politics of Bureaucracy. P.166. 
162 Scott, "Improving the Quality and Value of Policy Advice." P.104. 
163 Heywood, Politics. Pp.4-13. 
164 Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. P.328. 
2:  Literature Review 
33 
2.4.4.3 The role of cognitive factors in shaping policy 
Government involves the contest of ideas and beliefs about the role of government itself, about 
what governments should do, and about the way they should do it.165 How these ideas form and are 
applied to public policy arise from combinations of cognitive perspectives and the choices of 
individuals and groups, and from  institutional/process influences.166 Normative positions and values 
drive both the ideas and the policy choices made.167 This shapes how issues are conceived, the forms 
of knowledge produced and used, the type of governing authority established, the techniques and 
other means employed to achieve specific ends sought, and the outcomes and consequences of 
pursuing those ends.168  
Two aspects of cognitive factors within government are relevant for this research. This first is about 
priorities for action - what is important to governments. The second is the reasoning applied to those 
priorities. This section addresses both these aspects. 
The core functions of the state/government in most modern societies involve: national security and 
foreign policy; fiscal, monetary and trade policy; social support, public health, and education; civil 
and criminal justice; and environmental and natural resources policy, which, put in a different way, 
encompass security, justice, redistribution, economic advancement, and environmental values.169 
These functions assume different levels of priority as a result of a multitude of drivers. 
Advocates of environmental values argue that the priority of the environmental function needs to be 
higher/paramount in the long-term interests of human welfare.170 Their criticism of the traditional 
administrative arrangements of governments is that they are fundamentally non-environmental, 
driven by other imperatives and particularly by a paradigm based on economic growth. The result is 
that environmental considerations are traded off in the face of the other imperatives.171 Government 
priorities, from this viewpoint, result in administrative confinement and marginalisation of non-
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dominant interests, problem decomposition, and failures of policy coordination and integration. This 
critique is a component of the rise of modern environmental politics and “Green” political parties.172  
The critique that traditional administration and economic growth per se is non-environmental is not 
universal, however. For example, it is also argued that there is a growing recognition of 
environmental risk. Ideas of sustainable development or ecological modernisation assume that 
governments, citizens, and some economic interests are amenable to incorporating environmental 
perspectives.173 Increasingly, some in government argue that social, financial and natural capital are 
all equally important to prosperity, while others adopt the ‘Green” critique.174 The empirical evidence 
about the nature and type of economic growth and its environmental effect is debated, and will be 
discussed in a later section.  
The point of relevance for this research is that ideologies promoting economic growth are an 
important feature within government.175 This not to argue however, as some of the literature cited 
above does, that it is always paramount. Security, justice, redistribution or environmental priorities 
can override economic considerations from time to time.176 Nevertheless, priorities and perspectives 
of economic growth ideologies colour thinking about the role of government, what government 
action should be, and how it should be done. This affects the nature of engagement with those in 
government seeking to apply other policy choice criteria.This includes environmental values. Indeed, 
all governments interpete and prioritise environmental values in some way, witnessed by the various 
cognitive frameworks adopted by governments’ around the world, such as sustainable development. 
What is not so clear is the degree to which they are valued and what effect they have on agencies 
and policy. This is more of an empirical question and the subject of this research. 
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A second way cognitive factors can have an effect within government is the contention that thinking 
during policy development is pre-structured by established set of ideas.177 This results in the same, or 
similar, “frames of reference” being applied to policy problems, the processes of  policy 
development, and policy instruments. A manifestation of this is the concept of both in policy style 
and policy approaches, discussed in Section 2.4.4.1. Paehkle and Torgerson go further and argue that 
the administrative sphere, both because of conservatism and the dominance of economic growth as 
a value within government is  successful in promoting the established pattern of economic 
development, but has not shown itself to be effective in either restraining or qualitatively redirecting 
that development in a way that meets environmental needs.178  
This chapter described earlier in Section 2.3.2 how policy is shaped by different types of reasoning 
and world views.179 Between ministers and officials, within government departments, within the 
machinery of government, and in the dynamics of policy consideration and decision-making, 
different rationalities about the form of policies, as well as their purpose, come into play.  The degree 
to which some rationalities dominate the administrative sphere of government, the way these may 
be a barrier in advancing environmental normative views or efficiency arguments about integrating 
environmental considerations, can affect the nature of the solution and create variability in 
environmental terms.  
In summary, cognitive features shape environmental policy because of the way values and beliefs 
drive government’s political priorities, and because of established frameworks of ideas operating 
during the process of policy development. 
 2.4.4.4 Summary 
Factors within government that lead to variablity in policy are diverse, complex, and open to 
interpretation. There is a broad field of scholarship and literature on this. In a broad sense it can be 
regarded as a debate about the respective influences of agency and structure. This section of the 
chapter has endeavoured to do justice to the subject by dividing it into institutional (in organisational 
and process terms), agency-centred, and cognitive categories. What is evident is that each category 
alone is insufficient to explain the intricacies of causes of policy variability. On the basis of the 
literature discussed in this section, they operate in combination. Rather than being definitive about 
causal factors at this stage, it seems better to follow the advice offered by Jordan (who has 
researched causes of environmental policy variability in European countries180), and Page (who has 
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researched drivers of policy within the bureaucracy of the United Kingdom and elsewhere181) and 
undertake empirical case studies using these three categories of intra-government causal factors as a 
framework for analysis. There is, however, an important preliminary step. This is to examine a key 
additional factor,  that most literature says conditions how governments work: the influence of wider 
forces in society. 
2.4.5 The influence of wider forces in society 
Diverse political, social and economic forces at the international, national and sub-national level help 
shape what governments do.182 The influences of wider forces are not the direct focus of this 
research, but they shape the system of government and administrative arrangements, influence 
cognitive perspectives, and actual or perceived environmental issues. For these reasons, it is 
instructive to examine what literature has to say may be the most relevant wider national factors, to 
the extent they influence internal government capacities. It draws on studies comparing 
environmental performance of different countries.183  
There are significant differences and unevenness in environmental capacity, policy innovation and 
environmental policy development between seemingly similar countries.184 Comparative studies 
collectively have identified the following variables: levels and nature of economic development; the 
nature of social and economic interests and their relationships to government; constitutional 
arrangements; social, cultural and historical features; levels of knowledge and scientific and technical 
capabilities; and the sophistication of institutional arrangements (including regulatory regimes).185  
There is by no means unanimity about the relative importance of features of national variables. 
Lafferty and Meadowcroft suggest culture and historical determinism are significant variables, 
whereas Jänicke and Weidner say that while culture and historical values are important, more recent 
post-materialist values are more significant.186 Esty and Porter found that richer countries achieve 
                                                          
181 Page, "The Origins of Policy." P.224. 
182 Heywood, Politics. Pp.92-98. 
183 See Jänicke, "National Environmental Planning in OECD Countries: Preliminary Lessons from Cross-National 
Comparisons." Lafferty, Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption 
Societies. Jänicke, ed. Capacity Building in Environmental Policy: A Comparative Study of 17 Countries. Scruggs, 
Sustaining Abundance: Environmental Performance in Industrial Democracies. Connor, Institutional Change for 
Sustainable Development. Dovers, Environment and Sustainability Policy: Creation, Implementation, Evaluation, 
Barry, ed. The State and the Global Ecological Crisis. Christoff, "Green Governance and the Green State: 
Capacity Building as a Political Project." Esty, "National Environmental Performance: An Empirical Analysis of 
Policy Results and Determinants." L. Scruggs, "Democracy and Environmental Performance: An Empirical 
Analysis," in Annual meeting of the Mid West Political Science Association (Chicago: Mid West Political Science 
Association, 2009). 
184 Barry, "W(H)Ither the Green State?." P.286. 
185 See references in Footnote183. 
186 Lafferty, Implementing Sustainable Development: Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies. 
Pp.423-427. Jänicke, "The Political System's Capacity for Environmental Policy: The Framework for 
2:  Literature Review 
37 
better environmental results than poorer ones. They suggest there is a tipping point though. Among 
countries above a certain level of economic development or of similar levels of development, 
national income or developmental stage influences but does not alone determine environmental 
outcomes.187 In contrast, Jänicke and Weidner argue that economic conditions are contradictory in 
environmental terms. In times of economic recession, they say, environmental policy and 
management tend to be constrained. Also, economic growth and strength can enhance technological 
solutions to environmental problems, but they can also create indirect problems such as soil 
contamination, transport pollution, and indirect impacts on water quality.188 Research by Scruggs 
supports a correlation between income and performance, but also an inverse correlation between 
economic growth and lesser performance.189 A counterpoint to the critique of the negative effect of 
high economic growth on the environment are the studies which argue that it is not necessarily 
economic growth per se that is the issue, but rather the nature of that growth. This viewpoint is 
evident in ideas of ecological modernisation and sustainable development and the concept of “strong 
sustainability”.190  
Scruggs’s comparative studies suggest that significant independent variables in national 
environmental performance are: per capita income and economic growth; differences in the political 
geography of countries; organisation of economic interests and their relations with the government; 
and that more centralised, democratic political institutions may produce better environmental 
outcomes than institutions that fragment constitutional political authority.191 This last point is also a 
factor noted by Christoff who found that countries with neo-corporatist and strong state institutions 
with the ability to reach out to a full range of actors seem to have established and maintained a lead 
in terms of environmental performance.192  Scruggs has found alternatively that there is little 
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evidence that variations in public awareness, public opinion or cultural attitudes are robustly 
associated with differences in national environmental performance, in contrast to another view that 
high social attachment to environmental values supports environmental performance.193  
Despite the debates, there appears to be agreement in the literature cited that the national 
conditions that most (my emphasis) affect environmental performance are the levels and nature of 
economic development (including technical and scientific capacity); constitutional arrangements and 
institutional characteristics; and, more arguably, social, cultural and historical features. 
There is an additional consideration, however. It is a situational feature where events can affect 
environmental performance. Events are often sudden, sometimes unanticipated incidents that 
create shocks and lead to new directions. Some events are not unanticipated and can follow a 
pattern but nevertheless also lead to new directions. The most obvious examples of patterned 
“events” are elections leading to change of governments and elected officials. Kingdon argues that 
combinations of national mood and elections are more powerful agenda setters than organised 
interests.194 Events can either work to create new opportunities, or create conditions that hinder or 
assist action.195 Prominent examples of environmental shocks leading to rapid policy changes include 
the discovery (rather accidently) of the ozone hole in the mid-1980s, and the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant partial melt down in the United States in 1979.196 On a very different scale, the 
collapse of the communist system of governments in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s is argued to 
have been a shock that had a positive effect on environmental management in those countries.197 
These events had consequences, usually positive, for environmental performance. Alternatively, 
other events can have negative consequences, such as the way economic downturn might increase 
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the likelihood of relaxed environmental standards, or increase unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources.198  
In summary, comparative studies show how events and wider forces in society create interests that 
condition the nature of environmental issues and policy responses. The implications of the discussion 
in this section are that the intra government factors in policy variability need to be understood 
against a wider background, if we are to develop a comprehensive understanding of environmental 
policy variability.  
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has traversed two fields of study: first, overlapping ideas of policy effectiveness and 
environmental effectiveness, and, second the much broader field of causes of policy variability.  
The first field is important because the research depends on establishing a standard for effective 
environmental policy, against which to assess variability. The focus of the research on policy-making 
rather than policy-implementation, for example, drives it towards policy process categories of 
evaluation. The environmental focus drives it to using established normative understandings about 
the role of environmental values and their integration.  
The second field, about causes of variability, is the central part of the research. Its scholarly canvass 
is very large, and it is complex. What is well traversed is the dynamics of policy-making in general, 
and the various components that drive general policy variability, for example though institutional 
arrangements, differing levels of skill and will in policy-makers, and ways ideas shape how people 
and institutions perceive environmental values and issues. What seems less clear, however, is their 
specific application in the environmental policy sphere. Jordan and Lenschow’s literature review, for 
example, says that in environmental policy answers are unclear to many questions about what 
constitutes policy effectiveness, about relationships between political and administrative influence, 
and about appropriate balance of policy interventions.199 Jordan and Lenschow are reluctant to 
proclaim a “best practice”, but argue for a multi-dimensional approach, involving explanations that 
combine the various elements of drivers of policy formation and how, together, they influence policy 
formation and its variability. Jordan and Lenschow, and others such as Jänicke, also say that because 
of the political dimension of policy-making, environmental policy is situational, providing justification 
for jurisdiction-specific studies, such as New Zealand.200  
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Another area where there seems to be limitations, or at least debate, is the influence of 
environmental agencies and particularly about characteristics that lend themselves to greater agency 
effectiveness in terms of environmental policy. Schout and Jordan say that there may be answers in 
general organisational dynamics literature, and Weale mounts an argument (not uncontested, as 
outlined in Section 2.4.4.2) for separate environmental agencies of sufficient capacity and authority 
to mix it with other agencies of central government. But, Schout and Jordan argue, there is no 
specific blueprint.201 
What this means is that some explanation of variability in environmental policy can be found in the 
various well-known causes described in the literature, but that a more rounded picture lies in 
combining those causes, placing them in a jurisdictional setting, and seeking further empirical 
evidence about administrative features, particularly organisational ones, that enhance or inhibit 
environmental effectiveness. 
Chapter 4 will pull together these factors and develop a framework for analysing cases studies of 
policy responses to environmental issues to test the idea of policy variation-causing combinations. 
But first, Chapter 3 will look at the contextual circumstances of New Zealand to identify additional 
factors that may be relevant.
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Chapter 3 
Players, Processes and Drivers: The Context of National Level 
Environmental Management in New Zealand 
3.1  Introduction 
Public policy varies according to the nature of the political system and its links with society.202 
Consequently, it helps to know about the context of the political system within which policy 
develops. This chapter examines the New Zealand government context for environmental policy. It 
looks at four subjects: macro socio-economic influences and the nature of environmental issues; the 
political and policy-making system and machinery of government; administrative arrangements 
within government that deal with environmental matters; and finally the two key departments that 
deal with environmental issues – the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) and the Department of 
Conservation (DoC). The purpose of the chapter is to provide a context for the case studies that 
follow in later chapters, and also to identify whether there are specific New Zealand features that 
influence environmental policy variability and the role played by environmental departments. 
3.2  Environmental issues and macro socio-economic influences in New 
Zealand 
New Zealand environmental pressures comprise a mix of: 
 Those found in many developed countries (although the intensity of manufacturing industrial 
environmental pressures are comparatively lower because this sector is not such a large 
proportion of the overall economy); 
 Those arising from New Zealand’s particular developmental history; 
  The large size of primary industry/ natural resource use as a proportion of the overall 
economy and; 
 New Zealand’s biophysical uniqueness.203 
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The state of New Zealand’s environment is variable. The country has a reputation for being “clean 
and green”.204 New Zealand’s environmental governance is well rated in some studies.205 Intensity of 
resource use is low by OECD standards. New Zealand’s freshwater and air quality are generally better 
than many other developed or developing countries. There is a large network of protected natural 
areas. But there are qualifications to this reputation. New Zealand has a serious invasive species 
problem. Water quality, indigenous biodiversity, the nature of urban development, energy use and 
consumption, net greenhouse gas emissions, and some environmental aspects of waste minimisation 
and material flows show negative trends. 206  
New Zealand is also different from many developed countries. Its economy is small, strongly 
dependent on primary production, and on its services sector, particularly tourism. It has a small 
industrial and manufacturing sector. New Zealand is also isolated, far from international markets, 
and  depends on international trade to import many manufactured products. Exports contribute 29% 
of GDP and biologically-based exports (from agriculture, forestry, fishing and aquaculture) contribute 
60% of those exports.207Agriculture accounts for 9% of New Zealand’s GDP, ten times higher than 
other developed countries. Internally, dissected landscapes create transport and communication 
challenges for the economy. New Zealand has limited high quality soils (about 5%), despite the 
economy’s agricultural emphasis.208 There are comparatively abundant resources to generate 
renewable electricity, and, to date at least, moderate levels of economic mineral and petroleum 
resource extraction. This context helps provide some explanation for why natural resource issues are 
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a focus of greater environmental debate than, for example, issues arising from the use of new 
technology or transport.209 
It has been suggested that economic growth is the single most important  government priority in 
New Zealand.210 There are examples where social considerations have overridden economic ones, 
such as halting logging of native forests in the 1980s and late 1990s.  211 Nevertheless, the importance 
of the primary sector and other forms of natural resource use and extraction, and reliance on 
international trade (a small producer far from markets) with a capital-light economy, mean that 
these issues can influence New Zealand’s environmental policy agenda, often strongly.  
Distinctive social development characteristics also colour environmental issues in New Zealand. New 
Zealand has a human history that parallels some of the settlement and development patterns of the 
United States, Canada and Australia over the past two hundred years, and yet also has its own special 
features. It is a history of recent successive waves of colonisation followed by adaptation and 
development.212 New Zealand was one of the last places in the world that humans colonized. The 
first human habitation began with Polynesian Maori migration probably in the late 1200s.213 
Population prior to 1830s grew to an eventual pre-European level of perhaps 200,000 within an 
island system roughly the size of Britain or Japan.214 Maori technology was based on stone, bone and 
wood. Fire, used deliberately and accidently, caused widespread ecological change. Agriculture was 
limited by climate and crop type to parts of the North Island and northern South Island. Despite low 
population density and limited technology, Maori settlement was accompanied by widespread 
deforestation and a large number of faunal extinctions, some resulting in food resource depletion.215 
Maori society adjusted to New Zealand environmental conditions and evolved values, standards and 
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behaviour (tikanga) responding to resource depletion, maintenance of food supply, as well as 
protection of human health. Management was kinship and culturally based.216 
Elements of tikanga continue today in Maori society and, as a result of Treaty of Waitangi 
jurisprudence and recent legislation changes, Maori cultural and economic interests have been 
increasingly institutionalised and empowered in modern New Zealand society.217 The degree of “first 
people” empowerment and the extent of restitution for past injustices in New Zealand is 
distinctive.218 
Maori social, economic and customary norms were rapidly supplanted after the late 1830s by 
European (almost entirely British) ones. European immigration, initially from Britain, Scotland and 
Ireland, later in the 20th century from other parts of Europe, and most recently immigration from 
Asia, quickly overtook Maori in numbers and control.219 Population rose to one million by the early 
1900s and to four million by 2000. The new waves of colonisation again dramatically changed the 
face of New Zealand. The landscape was transformed by cities and towns, and by pastoralism and 
more intensive forms of agriculture. Modern infrastructure developed. European (until recently 
predominantly British) institutions of government were introduced, and vast areas of original 
indigenous natural habitats destroyed or radically diminished, with yet more species extinctions. 
The rapid and successive waves of human colonisation have formed a theme in histories of New 
Zealand. How this has affected the way environmental issues are perceived has been the subject of 
an extensive literature. One perspective is that New Zealand was influenced by ideas of frontier and 
adapting to new ecological circumstances.220 Individualism and a spirit of development involving 
unrestrained and often very wasteful use of resources was a feature of New Zealand’s history. Some 
argue this spirit began to wane sometime between the 1930s and the 1980s, while others argue that 
the development ethos still remains embedded today.221 Another view is that New Zealand’s 
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dissected geography, small dispersed communities, and ideas about egalitarianism associated with 
aspects of European migration promoted local participation and community voice in a way 
paradoxically at odds with the ideas of the rights of individuals and property rights.222 Yet another 
observation is that Maori society and tikanga provided examples of how a sense of place, belonging, 
group “ownership”, and special value develop and become part of the basis of environmental 
management. Later migrant society also began to adopt these ideas as they acclimatised to their new 
surroundings.223 Finally, New Zealand’s environmental debates have been dominated historically by 
nature conservation issues, to the extent that other environmental issues tend to become 
submerged.224 Explanations for a focus on nature conservation probably lie in a now-widespread 
understanding of the extent of indigenous biodiversity loss, a special but threatened indigenous 
fauna and flora, relative ease of access and proximity to nature and protected areas such as national 
parks, visually diverse and outstanding landscapes, a high value placed on quality of life and the 
environment, and ideas about common heritage.225  
In summary, New Zealand has a reputation for environmental quality. But this has recently come 
under closer scrutiny, because increases in pressure are resulting in declining environmental 
conditions. There are a number of distinctive domestic economic, biophysical, cultural and historical 
features that seem to colour the way New Zealand society views environmental issues and problems. 
On the one hand, New Zealanders say they have a strong attachment to environmental values, 
particularly when they involve nature conservation, but on the other hand there are countervailing 
developmental characteristics.226 Although there are views that the rise of social concern about 
environmental values is a post-modern phenomenon based in part on growing affluence in society 
(an argument mounted by Jänicke and Weidner227), New Zealand historians and geographers such as 
King, Belich, and Pawson argue that it has deeper cultural roots and has perhaps influenced the 
nature of environmental politics, and to an extent the particularities in New Zealand’s government 
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institutional response and the type of issues that emerge on the New Zealand environmental policy 
agenda. Balanced against the idea of the strength of nature/environmental values is the view that 
New Zealand’s resource-based economy (agriculture and natural resource uses) and its international 
trade dependence leads to oposition to environmental protection measures that constrain resource 
use. 
These drivers give rise to a range of external interests and actors, in a way that occurs in any civil 
society.228 But in New Zealand’s case they tend to reflect the nature-conservation orientation of New 
Zealand’s environmental non-government organisations (NGOs) and the comparative power and 
resources of New Zealand’s agricultural and exporting sectors. Maori represent another distinct 
strand of recently re-empowered interests spanning indigenous peoples’ rights, values, and 
economic considerations. These various sets of interests, growing out of the nature of New Zealand’s 
socio-economic, cultural, and biophysical contexts, contribute to the domestic setting for 
environmental policy and play a role in conditioning how environmental problems are perceived and 
addressed within government. 
3.3 Political system, machinery of government, and policy processes 
Work by McLeay, Mulgan, Palmer, Miller and others describe the nature of politics, institutions and 
policy within government in New Zealand.229 Shaw and Eichbaum have focused particularly on the 
policy process and the role played by New Zealand’s (unwritten) constitution, Cabinet and Prime 
Minister, the Judiciary, and factors such as economic control, the electoral system and triennial 
elections, political parties and interests, and public servants and ministerial advisers.230 They argue 
that the mechanics of policy production is formal and contractually oriented, at least outwardly. They 
note it is based on the concept that the public service is non-partisan, top-down in initiation and 
response, and subject to a range of variable internal and external checks and balances. They 
comment, however, that the reality of a top-down system is not quite what it seems and that, while 
the fiction is that officials advise and ministers decide, other dynamics may be at work.  231 
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3.3.1 New Zealand politics, constitution and implications for environmental policy 
New Zealand politics alternated historically for most of the 20th century between a two party-
dominated centre-right and centre-left divide, with emphases towards individual or collective action 
respectively, and a social culture of equality/security or “fairness” that condition political action and 
government priorities.232 For over a hundred years central government was the dominant actor in 
promoting development, and economic and social wellbeing. This role was partially over-turned in 
the 1980s and 1990s with a more market oriented/smaller government consensus.233 Since the mid-
1990s European-type mixed member proportional (MMP) parliamentary representation altered an 
earlier single party majoritarian politics by introducing the need for a “negotiated” style of 
government.234 The centre right/centre left divide has not fundamentally changed under MMP, 
although there are now a greater number of political parties represented in Parliament.235 
New Zealand’s constitutional context for policy development is distinctive.236 The New Zealand 
system of government derived originally from the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. 
Central government is dominant compared with regional or local government.237 There is a 
unicameral legislature, a strong Executive, and no written constitution. These features are said to 
reduce the venues for sources of new policy compared with other developed countries.238  
Dominance of the Executive in government has been somewhat  tempered by MMP since 1996.239  
MMP has given more opportunity for debating environmental issues, largely because it has 
encouraged representation of a wider spectrum of interests in the political process.240 Public interest 
in environmental matters in New Zealand appears to have grown over the past twenty five years or 
so.241 The MMP system may thus have encouraged a degree of political competition to attract 
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support from environmental interests. Of the current three largest political parties, the centre-right 
National Party promotes a concept of “balancing” economic growth and environmental quality, the 
centre-left Labour Party argues for economic growth and social development  based on a mixture of 
sustainable development principles,ecological modernisation and “green growth”, and the Green 
Party promotes the centrality of “environmental sustainability for all human action.”242 Thus, virtually 
all New Zealand political parties now say they are advocates for the environment, although the 
strength, depth and nature of that advocacy varies depending on Prime Ministerial priorities, prior 
party commitments, interest group pressure, economic conditions, or the success of ministerial 
advocacy.243  
The strength of the New Zealand Executive and dominant role of central government compared to 
other developed countries suggests where there is political will, policy (including environmental 
policy) could be developed quickly. However, there are constraints. First, under MMP, there have 
been as yet no single party majorities. Consequently, many policy proposals, particularly contentious 
ones, require negotiation with minority parties.244 This requirement can work to either strengthen or 
weaken policy proposals depending on the the issue, affected interests, and their relationship with 
junior coalition partners. It has also diminished the ability of public servants to promote new policy in 
a way that was possible under the earlier majoritarian system where once a minister or Cabinet were 
convinced, then the policy was likely to take effect.245 Second, a three year electoral cycle (retained 
as a check on government power) constrains opportunities to introduce contentious policy by 
increasing their electoral risk and tends to favour more easily solved issues.246 The three year cycle 
increases democratic responsiveness. But, because of the need to seek an electoral mandate every 
three years it has been argued this works against addressing isssues of a long-run nature.247 This 
would include environmental problems, because of their inherent long-run characteristics. 
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In summary, a general feature of New Zealand politics and constitutional arrangements as far as 
environmental policy is concerned is that there is a combination of a comparatively strong central 
government and all major political parties saying, with different emphases, they support 
environmental quality. MMP has increased opportunities for environmental issues to emerge on 
policy agendas and can work as either an opportunity or constraint depending on the constellation of 
interests and parties that become involved in policy negotiation. The three year electoral cycle 
means there is a narrow window for introducing new policies, especially those of a contentious or 
long-run nature. 
3.3.2 Intra-Government decision-makers and policy process 
The Cabinet is New Zealand’s senior policy-making body. It is headed by the Prime Minister (usually 
the most important figure in final policy decisions) leading a Cabinet of around twenty two ministers, 
with a small number of junior ministers outside cabinet.248 Ministers are selected from elected 
members of parliament from the parties (including any junior coalition parties) that command a 
majority in parliament.249 The formal mode of operating involves policy decision-making by Cabinet 
and ministers who in turn are advised by public servants from government departments as well as by 
staff that ministers have appointed to their own personal offices.250 This suggests a top-down flow of 
decision-making and formal exercise of authority.251 But other dynamics are also at work. Cabinet 
and ministers are driven by: election and interest/support group commitments and coalition 
agreements; the rules, boundaries and constraints of ministerial and cabinet decision-making; the 
requirements of parliamentary scrutiny; the internal hierarchy of authority amongst ministers 
conditioned by seniority in Cabinet; the policy ideas of the public service itself; and the variable but 
influential characteristics of ministerial personal ability.252 
 New Zealand’s policy system is comparatively small in terms of overall size compared to other 
jurisdictions. It has a reputation for transparency and low levels of corruption.253 Transparency and 
absence of corruption, it has been said, increase accountability and to some extent public trust.254 
Some research also suggests that small scale systems tend more to borrow ideas from other 
countries on how to address domestic environmental problems, and are also more influenced by 
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international environmental institutions.255 Small scale can increase participation and responsiveness 
but can also mean a lack of capacity to address more complex issues and greater potential scope for 
individuals to affect events.256  
Within the policy system, environmental ministers have, because of legislation, greater formal 
decision-making authority than their departments.257 For twenty five years New Zealand has had two 
Cabinet-level ministerial positions dedicated to environmental matters: the Minister for the 
Environment for general environmental matters, and the Minister of Conservation for nature 
conservation (although the conservation portfolio extends beyond nature conservation to include 
some wider environmental responsibilities such as coastal policy).258 The Environment portfolio has 
tended to be a middle ranking position, but has occasionally been on the front bench. The 
Conservation portfolio has tended to be lower ranking. This generalisation changes from time to 
time, however, depending on combinations of portfolios, coalition agreements, or the party seniority 
of the incumbent. Since the early 2000s there have also been associate ministers. More recently a 
separate environmentally oriented ministerial position has been created responsible for climate 
change matters. This suggests that there is some potential for environmental influence within 
Cabinet, simply through numbers of ministers.  
Between 1986 and 2012 there have been eight Ministers for the Environment and eleven Ministers 
of Conservation. The average time for holding either portfolio is two to three years, which 
corresponds with New Zealand’s electoral cycle. Some have held their portfolios longer, however. 259 
Whether turnover in ministers is an issue in how actively environmental policies are pursued, 
compared to any other policies, is not obvious, given that the turnover is mirrored in most other 
Cabinet portfolios also. Some environment ministers have held other more senior roles either 
concurrently or later which arguably (and this probably depends on manifesto commitments and the 
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degree of personal interest in environmental matters) may have benefitted environmental interests. 
Examples include: Geoffrey Palmer who held positions as Minister for the Environment concurrently 
as Deputy Prime Minister in the late 1980s which assisted in the creation of the Resource 
Management Act, New Zealand’s primary environmental management legislative instrument; and 
Helen Clark, a Minister of Conservation in the late 1980s and, when Prime Minister in the 2000s, 
promoted environmental sustainability as a key government policy priority.260  
Within the public service three “central agencies” form a core Executive. The Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), Treasury, and the State Services Commission (SSC). DPMC has 
responsibility for advising the Prime Minister and Cabinet on all policy proposals which are likely to 
have implications for the government as a whole or impinge on issues of political priority or 
sensitivity to the current government or Prime Minister (although the department is not as large or 
as all-powerful as in some other comparable jurisdictions261). Treasury has responsibility for advising 
the Minister of Finance on all proposals with economic, financial, fiscal (expenditure or revenue), or 
regulatory implications. Its fiscal ambit is institutionalised. Treasury consultation is mandatory on all 
policy matters, and in part because of this it is able to exercise considerable influence. Arguably 
Treasury is the most powerful of the three agencies.262 SSC has responsibility for advising ministers 
on general machinery of government issues, on proposals to establish, merge or disestablish state 
sector agencies (other than State-owned enterprises), and on proposals with an impact on 
organisational structures, strategic alignment, and capability. The SSC is also responsible for public 
sector chief executive employment, accountability and departmental performance specifications, 
and workforce or employment relations in the state sector. 263 
Beyond the three “central agencies”, the nature of departmental involvement depends on the issue, 
and departmental responsibilities. There is usually a lead department with some form of 
institutionalised authority and a cadre of other departments with greater, lesser, or perceived 
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interests in any given function or issue.264 How all these departments operate depends on the degree 
of political and policy priorities and/or sensitivity for the government (supported by the Cabinet 
ranking of the minister for the lead department), fiscal implications, and the perceived or actual 
capability and /or capacity of the lead department and/or its senior management.265  
There are four points to make about the policy system that are relevant to assessing what influences 
environmental policy effectiveness. First,  the Prime Minister, Cabinet and ministers dominate formal 
policy decision-making both in theory and in practice.266 Second, the three central agencies are able 
to exercise considerable influence across the board because of their institutionalised authorities.267 
Third, the size of the system, though small, nevertheless still gives rise to formal and informal policy 
subsystems where lead departments can exercise greater or lesser authority depending on capacity, 
capability and reputation or perception of the department, of its Chief Executive, or of departmental 
personnel.268 And even though New Zealand’s policy system is comparatively small, this does not 
mean that  its intra-government processes of developing and promoting policy are not complex nor 
consume considerable energy.  
There is also a significant fifth point about New Zealand’s policy system, and the organisation of its 
environmental policy components. They have been influenced by particular approaches to policy 
responses, and institutional and organisational form. This is discussed next. 
3.3.3 Institutionalised form, and ways of thinking in the public service 
The organisation and management of the New Zealand public sector was overhauled in the 1980s 
and 1990s to create a distinctive model of public management, with long lasting effect. In particular, 
it influenced many (but not all) organisational and institutional components of New Zealand’s 
environmental administration. 
Changes to public sector management occurred in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, including 
New Zealand, and in a form often generically described as New Public Management (NPM).269 The 
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New Zealand variant of NPM was distinctive. It involved theory based on neo-classical economics and 
views that arose from that body of theory about efficiency, principal-agent relationships, and 
accountability. Characteristics of New Zealand NPM included the concept of government as a 
complex series of contractual relationships, contestability of service, transparency of political 
intervention, performance specification, reporting and monitoring, widespread use of formal written 
contracts, and stress on economic incentives and sanctions. There was also a preference for single 
purpose organisations (to avoid perceived functional conflicts), marketisation of government 
services, and a shrinking of state functions.270 The neo-classical economics principles on which the 
reforms were based also incorporated views about the environment and the nature of any 
government environmental action. The core of these assumptions is that environmental problems 
are externalities that can be dealt with by applying principles of exchange and substitution, and that 
government action (or “intervention”, a term used often in such theory) should arise in the event 
that markets manifestly fail to address the problem.271 
The pros and cons of the New Zealand NPM model have been widely debated.272 There is some 
agreement that it improved the efficiency of the public service.273 However, it has also been argued 
that the changes brought an over-emphasis on vertical management at the expense of horizontal 
coordination, lack of strategic focus, and an unintended effect of promoting outputs at the expense 
of capability (the idea that Ministerial interest in outputs and results crowded out ownership and 
capability requirements), probably caused by the model’s inherent contractualism.274 Other critiques 
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also identified issues of equity, due process, democratic responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability.275 
The model of public administration introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been modified 
since, to the extent that the framework of public management in the 2000s has been described as 
qualitatively different from the 1990s.276 Nevertheless, some say that core elements (or at least a 
number) of the 1980s changes remain in the two founding legislative instruments - the State Sector 
Act, and the Public Finance Act.277 By the mid-2000s, however, modifications were introduced 
resulting in a greater integration and alignment of policy and operational functions on both vertical 
and horizontal dimensions, a reassertion of the role of the central agencies to coordinate machinery 
of government arrangements and set goals and standards, a renewed focus on the ethical 
responsibilities of public service, and a pragmatic approach to dealing with structural issues on a 
case-by-case basis.278 These changes may be taken further. A review in 2011 recommended more 
institutional changes, lending weight to the observation about a shift of emphasis to horizontal 
alignment against specific targets, an altered form of central agency coordination and direction, and 
pragmatic structural change.279  
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It might be argued that the New Zealand public service has moved on from the era of NPM, and that 
emphasising it in this research is simply regurgitating old history. However, it would be highly 
challengeable to say that institutionalisation of the 1980’s way of thinking about policy, policy 
instruments, governance, organisational design, and its rationalities had disappeared from public 
administration. Political culture and general cultural values affect the operation of an administrative 
system, and can have long lasting influence on both outputs and internal management of 
organisations.280 At the very least the changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and its type of 
thinking, created environmental policy and institutional legacies that continue on in the 2000s. It was 
partly responsible for elements of the putative design of a policy/regulation/operational split 
between environmental departments described in later in this chapter. It contributed to the highly 
devolved system of general environmental management in New Zealand, and the limited direction 
given to that system.281 It remains evident in policies and instruments, such as general regulatory 
impact assessments and in the structure of important environmental legislation such as the Resource 
Management Act (1991), Biosecurity Act (1993), Fisheries Act (1996), and Hazardous Substances and 
New Organism Act (1996).282 Furthermore, the case studies examined in later chapters occurred at 
least in part during a climate of thinking in parts of a public service conditioned by the ideas 
underpinning New Zealand’s approach to NPM, even though the application of these ideas were 
evolving and changing.  
Further possible legacies from the NPM era, or at least some of its theoretical assumptions, are that 
ideas about what constitutes “good” policy, and how it is formed, may have been embedded in policy 
approaches283. For example, it can be argued that certain assumptions and values become evident in 
vocabulary that “good policy” involves “rational enquiry”, and that policy involves government 
“intervention” based around “intervention logic.” Its theoretical and disciplinary underpinnings 
promoted the primacy of rules, rights and process as the heart of policy prescription.284 However, 
while some of the theoretical underpinnings of the New Zealand NPM model may still influence 
                                                          
280 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. Pp.34-79. 
281 Bührs, "From Diffusion to Defusion: The Roots and Effects of Environmental Innovation in New Zealand." 
P.95. Devolution, however, is also derived from the principle of subsidiarity (action should be taken at the level 
within the institutional hierarchy at which it can be most effective. Connor, Institutional Change for Sustainable 
Development. P.72.) New Zealand’s devolution involved paradoxical sets of arguments between the Treasury 
and local government, where Treasury, while arguing for devolution on theoretical grounds, also advocated 
restraining local government’s functional, regulatory and fiscal powers, whereas local government argued also 
for devolution , but with the necessary powers to undertake “local solutions for local problems” and minimal 
central government direction. See G. Bush, Local Government and Politics in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1995). Pp.301-303. 
282 Bührs, "From Diffusion to Defusion: The Roots and Effects of Environmental Innovation in New Zealand." 
Pp.94-95. For a comparative table of environmental policy instruments employed amongst OECD countries, see 
Jacob, "Instruments for EPI in 30 OECD Countries." Pp.40-41. 
283 See previous chapter, Section 2.4.4.1 
284 Boin, "Institutional Theory and the Public Policy Field: A Promising Perspective for Perennial Problems." 
P.45. 
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policy approaches within parts of the public service, there is also evidence in some departmental 
manuals and guidance of a wider range of ideas about crafting policy.285  
In summary, the New Zealand variant of NPM was distinctive. The changes it brought to public 
administration created certain presumptions in New Zealand’s political/bureaucratic system about 
organisational form, locus of control, and modes of thinking about human behaviour that in turn had 
an influence on policy design and implementation. Those changes brought a sharper focus to 
organisational and institutional purpose. From an environmental point of view it created 
organisations and legislation which were outwardly more “ecologically rational” than those which 
came before.286 However, it also focused on institutions and processes rather than objectives (hence 
it has been argued creating a bias against government plans and strategies287), which in turn linked to 
a view (a constrained one) on the nature and purpose of government action. If solving environmental 
problems required challenging those views, then the ideological and negotiating hurdles for 
proponents of environmental effectiveness became higher. 
3.3.4 Summary 
Features of the New Zealand system of government, and policy-making system that seem most 
relevant to how environmental policy is developed, and its nature are:  
 The three year electoral cycle constraining windows of opportunity for contentious or long-
run policy initiatives. 
 Strong central government meaning policies can theoretically be conceived, developed and 
enacted where there is requisite will and priority (albeit moderated by exigencies of MMP 
and the constraining effect of the electoral cycle). 
 The smaller scale of the system giving rise to the possibility of  greater influence of 
individuals. 
                                                          
285 For a more rationalist approach see  Baehler, "What Are the Limits to Public Service Advising? The "Public 
Argument" Test." Pp. 3-8. And, Scott, "Improving the Quality and Value of Policy Advice." For a colourful 
critique of both rationalist policy advice and the idea about  political neutrality in policy advice see Gregory, 
"Politics, Power and Public Policy Making: A Response to Karen Baehler." Pp.26-32.  
A useful source of references about  different schools of thought on policy is MfE, "Professionalising Policy: A 
Guide for Developing the Craft of Policy Analysis," ed. Ministry for the Environment (Wellington: Ministry for 
the Environment, 2011).  Pp. 97-103. This same reference, on p.97, refers to guides to policy advice and 
analysis (with differing emphases) produced by the Department of Internal Affairs, the Department of Labour, 
the Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of Economic Development, and the Treasury.  
286 Bührs, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? . P.159. 
287 Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis." 
Pp.40-41. 
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 Strong cognitive legacies from the NPM era influencing policy ideas, policy processes, and 
policy instruments. 
 Institutional legacies, again from the NPM era and  particularly prevalent in environmental 
management, influencing how and why environmental policy is developed. 
Some of these features, for example the three year electoral cycle, are well described in the 
literature, as cited above. Others are less researched, for example the influence on environmental 
policy effectiveness of government will and priority, and of scale. Part of the purpose of this study is 
to seek to expand this body of research. The primary focus, however, is effectiveness of the 
administrative apparatus, and in particular departmental arrangements and the capacity of the main 
environmental departments to influence, and be influenced by, the intra-government system. 
Departmental arrangments and the workings of MfE and DoC are the subjects of the next two 
sections. 
3.4 Departmental arrangements 
There are a number of New Zealand government agencies that deal with environmental policy and 
issues either directly or indirectly. Three agencies currently have a direct environmental focus.288  
They are: 
1. The Ministry for the Environment (MfE). MfE is the government’s principal environmental 
policy department, reporting to the Minister for the Environment. It draws on the 
Environment Act 1986 as its founding statute, and the Resource Management Act 1991 as 
cornerstone environmental legislation; 
2. The Department of Conservation (DoC). DoC concentrates on national nature conservation 
and reports to the Minister of Conservation. It manages New Zealand’s extensive 
conservation lands (approaching 30% of the land area) and protected indigenous 
biodiversity. The Conservation Act 1987 is DoC’s  cornerstone legislation; 
3. The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). The EPA was set up in mid-2011. While it may 
be important in the future, it is too early to say yet what policy role it may play. 289 It is a 
                                                          
288 Generically MfE and DoC are departments of state and listed in the first schedule of the State Sector Act 
1988.The EPA is a state entity listed as a crown agent and listed in the Crown Entities Act 2004. 
289 The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) is established under the Environmental Protection Authority 
Act 2011. The Act requires the EPA to contribute to the “efficient, effective, and transparent management of 
New Zealand’s environment and natural and physical resources” (Environmental Protection Authority Act, 
2011, S.12, 1(a)). The environmental Acts under which the EPA has regulatory powers, duties and functions are: 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996; Resource Management Act 1991; Ozone Layer Protection 
Act 1996; Imports and Exports (Restrictions) Act 1988 and Imports and Exports (Restrictions) Prohibition Order 
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government-administered agency operating under a quasi-independent Board. It is not 
classified as a core goverment department, but is part of the wider public sector that carries 
out government functions at arms length from ministerial decision-making. It performs 
environmental regulatory roles but it is not, for example, a hands-on pollution control 
agency. Regional and local councils undertake this activity and a wide range of other 
environmental functions regionally and locally.  
Regional and local government are important components of the overall system of environmental 
policy in implementation terms, and in this sense regional councils in particular might be seen as an 
operational arm of MfE. Nevertheless, in formal constitutional terms they are subservient to central 
government and not responsible for national policy. Their role is geographically determined, and 
functionally focused on planning, environmental regulation, and a range of other functions such as 
providing public transport and emergency management.290  
Two other significant components in New Zealand’s national environmental governance framework 
are the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE) and the Environment 
Court. They are independent of the Executive of government. The PCE audits and reviews the likely 
or actual effect of policy and legislation, with varying effect.291 The PCE reports to Parliament. The 
Environment Court adjudicates on disputes under the Resource Management Act and is an arm of 
the Judiciary. Its judgments interpret legislation and can thus influence the way authorities’ view and 
approach aspects of environmental management.292 
Other government departments perform environmental functions but these are part of their 
portfolio of other functions. The Ministry of Primary Industries promotes economic growth through 
policy, regulation and operations for agriculture, fisheries, food safety, and biosecurity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(No. 2) 2004; and Climate Change Response Act 2002. The EPA must act in a way that furthers any objectives 
(or purposes) stated in these Acts. 
The EPA “end outcomes” are described as: sustainable allocation & management of New Zealand’s natural and 
physical resources for national benefit: harm from biological and chemical agents are effectively managed or 
reduced while preserving opportunities for New Zealanders to benefit from their use: and decreased New 
Zealand net emissions of greenhouse gases below business as usual levels. 
One of the EPA’s functions is “to advise the Minister (EPAA 2011, S.13 (a). See E.P.A., "Statement of Intent: 
2011-2014," (Wellington: Environmental Protection Authority, 2011). 
www.epa.govt.nz/Publications/EPA%20SOI%202011-14.pdf (accessed 1/10/2012).  
290 See Bush, "Local Government."P.164. Bush, in an earlier work, has said, “central government has 
overwhelmingly preferred the twin approaches of negotiation and tempered advice to the mailed fist of 
dictation”, but this may not be how local government always sees it. ———, Local Government and Politics in 
New Zealand. P.175. 
291 Descriptions of the role of the PCE and critiques can be found in T. Bührs, "Barking up Which Tree? The Role 
of New Zealand's Environmental Watchdog," Political Science 48, no. 1 (1996). P.1-28. See also D. Young, 
Keeper of the Long View: Sustainability and the Pce (Wellington: Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2007).  
292 For examples of Environment Court and higher court interpretation of the RMA, see K. Palmer, "An Analysis 
of Recent Case Law Development " Resource Management Theory and Practise  (2005). Pp.182-226. 
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Environmental considerations are part of these activities.293 The Ministry of Health is a policy and 
regulatory department supporting health outcomes for citizens which include environmental 
responsibilities such as drinking water quality and sanitation. Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) is 
an operational and regulatory agency with responsibility for some land management and pest 
control. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment is a policy, regulatory and operational 
department promoting and supporting economic growth and businesses while also encompassing 
functions including oversight of energy generation, use and markets, efficiency and conservation, 
science and research, and hydrocarbon and mineral exploitation standards. The Ministry of Transport 
is responsible for transport policy.294 An additonal agency that performs environmental functions, as 
well as economic efficiency functions, is the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA). It 
encourages, supports, and promotes energy efficiency, energy conservation, and the use of 
renewable sources of energy in New Zealand.295 It is not a policy agency. 
The overall purpose of these departments is not primarily environmental, unlike MfE, the EPA, or 
DoC. Literature suggests that in cases of tensions between their primary purpose and their 
environmental functions there will be trade-offs, and that generally the primary departmental 
purpose will dominate.296 Consequently, although these departments have environmental functions, 
they have an equivocal status in a study of factors that influence environmental effectiveness. While 
they might promote effectiveness in some circumstances, they could also be a constraining factor. 
3.5 Ministry for the Environment and Department of Conservation  
This study concentrates on two departments: MfE and DoC. This is because they both have an explicit 
environmental raison d’être, they deal with environmental policy at a national level, and they have 
been in existence long enough to generate data for research (unlike the EPA).  
3.5.1 The background to establishing the Ministry for the Environment and the 
Department of Conservation 
MfE and DoC were set up in 1986 and 1987 respectively in a major reorganisation of environmental 
administration in New Zealand. Their establishment was a result of a combination of history and 
                                                          
293 MPI, "Ministry for Primary Industries Statement of Intent 2012-2015," (Wellington: Ministry for Primary 
Industries, 2012). Pp.7-8.  
294 Ministry of Health, "Statement of Intent 2012/13 to 2014/15: Ministry of Health," (Wellington: Ministry of 
Health, 2012). LINZ, "Statement of Intent 2012-2015," (Wellington: Land Information New Zealand, 2012). 
MOT, "Statement of Intent 2012-2015," (Wellington: Ministry of Transport, 2012). At the time of writing the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment had not produced a statement of intent. For details of its 
functions see http://www.mbie.govt.nz/what-we-do  (accessed 21/11/2012). 
295 http://www.eeca.govt.nz/about-eeca 
296 Hukkinen, Institutions in Environmental Management: Constructing Mental Models in Sustainability. P.157-
159. T. Bührs, "New Zealand," in Capacity Building in National Environmental Policy: A Comparative Study of 17 
Countries, ed. M. Jänicke, Weidner, T. (Berlin: Springer, 2002). P.336. 
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experience of environmental management up to the 1980s, political debate and lobbying, and a 
wider process of government reform. 
Up until the 1980s New Zealand had developed a rather complex web of environmental 
administration. It had evolved over a period of at least fifty years, rarely as a focus in its own right, 
but usually as an add-on to developmental functions. Within central government, a cadre of 
knowledge and expertise existed  in a number of departments like the New Zealand Forest Service, 
Lands and Survey Department  and Ministry of Works and Development. Those departments were 
dominated by their development-oriented components. In addition there was a small and 
comparatively powerless Commission for the Environment (set up in the 1970s), numerous regional, 
local government, and special purpose bodies with environmental functions, all working with issue-
specific statutes, and overseen and partly subsidised by central government.297 The later part of this 
period, from the 1960s to the 1980s, witnessed growing concern nationally and internationally about 
decline in environmental quality, and within New Zealand discontent amongst environmental NGOs 
and an increasing section of the wider public about the role of the government as a resource 
developer compared to that of protector of the environment.  298  
Between 1984 and 1991 what began largely as a conservation/environment-oriented change became 
part of a much wider process of government administration reform.299 This wider process was based 
on neo-classical economic theories of administrative efficiency and organisational form described 
earlier in the chapter. It was driven, and given effect to, by a small group of politicians at the centre 
of government, and by officials, largely in the Treasury. 300  
MfE came into existence in 1986 combining roles of the Commission for the Environment, and parts 
of the Ministry of Works. DoC was formed in 1987 combining parts of the Department of Lands and 
Survey, the New Zealand Forest Service, and the Department of Internal Affairs (Wildlife Service and 
Historic Places).  
                                                          
297 Bührs, Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? R. Galbreath, Working for 
Wildlife: A History of the New Zealand Wildlife Service (Wellington: Bridgit Williams books & Historical Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1993). M. Roche, Land and Water: Water and Soil Conservation and Central 
Government in New Zealand 1941 - 1988 (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1994).  ———, "The State 
as Conservationist, 1920 - 60: 'Wise Use' of Forests, Lands, and Water.," in Environmental Histories of New 
Zealand, ed. Eric Pawson (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002).  Bush, Local Government and Politics in 
New Zealand. Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. 
298 ———, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. Pp. 168-204. 
299 Boston, Public Management; the New Zealand Model. P.84. Whitcombe, "Policy, Service Delivery and 
Institutional Design: The Case of New Zealand's Social Sector Government Agencies, 1984 - 2007". P.97. 
300 For context and drivers of the public administration changes, see Boston, Public Management; the New 
Zealand Model. Also Whitcombe, "Policy, Service Delivery and Institutional Design: The Case of New Zealand's 
Social Sector Government Agencies, 1984 - 2007". P.77-91. 
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The work of the two new departments was based on two pieces of legislation applying to managing 
general environmental effects - the Resource Management Act (1991); and setting out how public 
protected resources should be managed - the Conservation Act (1987).  
Together, these two departments, MfE and DoC, and their legislation, formed a long-lasting 
institutional and organisational core to New Zealand’s central government environmental 
administration. 
3.5.2 Roles, priorities, and design 
MfE 
MfE is New Zealand’s principal environmental policy agency, with a wide policy ambit. It was 
established by the Environment Act (1986). The functions of MfE are to advise the government on all 
aspects of environmental administration.301 In exercising that function, the Environment Act says 
that: 
…in the management of natural and physical resources, full and balanced account is taken of the 
intrinsic value of ecosystems, of all values that individuals and groups put on the quality of the 
environment, of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, of the sustainability of natural and 
physical resources, and of the needs of future generations.302 
MfE’s statutory functions have endured with few changes over a period of twenty-five years. 303  
MfE’s internal priorities are set formally through a process of interactions with its minister, at least 
annually, and published for parliamentary scrutiny, a system standard to the public service. The 
system might seem top-down, as in fact it is partly designed to be in order to action the 
environmental priorities of the government and/or the minister. 304 In practice, and in part also 
through design, it involves a form of bargaining and persuasion between views of the Ministry and 
the minister.305  
                                                          
301 Environment Act 1986, S.31. 
302 Environment Act 1986, Preamble. 
303 MfE’s 1999 Brief to Incoming Minister said MfE was the government’s principal adviser on environmental 
issues. See MfE, "Brief to Incoming Minister," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 1999). 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-oct99.pdf (accessed 1/10/2012). Its 2011 Statement of 
Intent said MfE was the government’s primary adviser on New Zealand environmental matters and 
international matters that affect the environment. See ———, "Statement of Intent 2011-2014." 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/soi/2011/page2.html (accessed 1/10/2012). 
304 Treasury, "Preparing the Statement of Intent: Guidance and Requirements for Departments," (Wellington: 
Treasury, 2012). Pp.11-12. 
305 See for example, MfE’s annual Statement of Intents May 2003 to May 2012 
(http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/soi/ (accessed 15/10/2012).Shaw, Public Policy in New Zealand: 
Institutions, Processes and Outcomes. P.104. 
Evidence of the influence of views promoted by departments can harder to discern, but a useful way to 
examine these is in the briefs written at the time of changes of ministers or governments. In MfE’s case see, for 
3:  NZ Context 
62 
Government environmental strategies have also existed from time to time. In  formal terms, 
government  strategies should  have greater impact than internal departmental priorities because 
they usually apply across government. Two prominent examples were Environment 2010 in 1995, 
and The New Zealand Sustainable Development Strategy in 2003. Neither, however, survived changes 
of government in 1999 and 2008.306  
Design of MfE flows in part from its functions and priorities, and in part from the conceptual basis of 
New Zealand’s 1980’s public administration model. The policy/regulation/operation organisational 
split of much of New Zealand’s governmental environmental administration, and devolution of many 
environmental functions to territorial regional and local government, means that MfE is a relatively 
small department. Although policy has been the primary focus of the Ministry between 1986 and the 
present, from time to time its managers have interpreted how it worked differently. For example, in 
the mid-2000s MfE described itself as “an organisation that works effectively with others to achieve 
the sustainable development of New Zealand” rather than primarily a provider of policy advice.307 
Since 1987 MfE has organised itself around teams of staff arranged  in terms of functions, topics, or 
perceived client groups, depending on the management fashion of the time.308 Much of its work 
takes place in Wellington, appears to be behind the scenes, relies on ensuring it has a cadre of skilled 
personnel, and consumes considerable energy in persuasion and bargaining to create conditions 
whereby others act.309  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
example, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-incoming-minister-2008/index.html  (accessed 
15/10/2012). 
306MfE, "Environment 2010 Strategy: A Statement on the Government's Strategy on the Environment," 
(Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 1995). DPMC, "Sustainable Development Programme of Action," 
(Wellington: Department of Cabinet and Prime Minister, 2003).  
These two examples have been criticised as too fragmented or insufficiently institutionalised for long term 
environmental effectiveness. Long term environmental strategies are seen in environmental literature as one 
basis of consistent national environmental performance. Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A 
Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis." P.35-36. Connor, Institutional Change for Sustainable 
Development. P.222. K. Bosselmann, "Why New Zealand Needs a National Sustainability Development 
Strategy," (Auckland: Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2007). P.19.  
307  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-oct05/briefing-minister-oct05.pdf  P.4. (accessed 
5/7/2013) 
308 As examples of how MfE has organised itself, see MfE, "Annual Report 1998-1999," (Wellington: Ministry for 
the Environment, 1999).Pp. 55-59. ———, "Annual Report 2005-2006," (Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment, 2006). Pp.72-79.. ———, "Annual Report 2010-2011," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 
2011). Appendix B. 
309 See for example ———, "Brief to Incoming Minister." P.6. 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-oct99.pdf (accessed 21/11/2012). 
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DoC 
DoC is principally a nature conservation agency, and is responsible for managing large areas of public 
land and marine areas designated as protected areas, and historic sites. 310 The functions of DoC are: 
To manage for conservation purposes, all land, and all other natural and historic resources, for the 
time being held under this Act, and all other land and natural and historic resources whose owner 
agrees with the Minister that they should be managed by the Department; 
 To preserve so far as is practicable all indigenous freshwater fisheries, and protect 
recreational freshwater fisheries and freshwater fish habitats; 
 To advocate the conservation of natural and historic resources generally; 
 To promote the benefits to present and future generations of; (i) the conservation of 
natural and historic resources generally and the natural and historic resources of New 
Zealand in particular; and  (ii) the conservation of the natural and historic resources of New 
Zealand's sub-Antarctic islands and, consistently with all relevant international agreements, 
of the Ross Dependency and Antarctica generally; and (iii) international co-operation on 
matters relating to conservation; 
 To prepare, provide, disseminate, promote, and publicise educational and promotional 
material relating to conservation; 
 To the extent that the use of any natural or historic resource for recreation or tourism is not 
inconsistent with its conservation, to foster the use of natural and historic resources for 
recreation, and to allow their use for tourism; 
 To advise the Minister on matters relating to any of those functions or to conservation 
generally.311 
Conservation is defined as: 
… the preservation and protection of natural and historic resources for the purpose of maintaining 
their intrinsic values, providing for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public, 
and safeguarding options for the future.312  
DoC’s functions, like MfE’s, have been enduring. The processes for establishing priorities are similar 
to MfE’s, with the exception that DoC, and the Minister of Conservation, can be advised formally on 
policy and departmental priorities by the New Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), a statutory 
entity designed to represent a range of interests in the management of New Zealand’s natural 
heritage.313 
                                                          
310 DoC was originally planned to be general heritage protection, management and advocacy agency. In the 
early 1990s the Historic Places Trust, a statutory entity under its own Act but overseen by the Department of 
Conservation, reverted to a more independent status, and in 1999 a Ministry of Culture and Heritage was 
created as a lead department for cultural heritage. DoC’s advocacy function flowed from an environmental 
planning advocacy role undertaken before 1987 by Ministry of Works Water and Soil conservation arm. Young, 
Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. P.210-211. “Born with a mission”, A short 
history of the Department of Conservation: 1987-2007, http://www.doc.govt.nz/publications/about-doc/a-
short-history-of-doc/born-with-a-mission/ accessed 21/5/2013. 
311 Conservation Act 1987, S.6. 
312Conservation Act 1987, S.2.  
313 See Conservation Act 1987 S. 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), for functions, powers and membership of the NZCA.  
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DoC’s design comes in part from the nature of its functions. However, it was not shaped in the same 
administrative style as MfE, even though it was created at the same time. 314 It was, and remains, a 
mixed policy/regulation/operations department with in-house operational, technical and scientific 
capacity, and a nation-wide presence. 
The implications of functions, priorities and design for the effectiveness of MfE and DoC are, first, 
that their organisational and functional endurance provide opportunity to pursue issues over time. 
Persistence, so some literature suggests, along with consistency and institutional knowledge, feature 
in successful environmental policy.315 A second implication is that their environmental focus lessens 
the likelihood that they will internally trade off environmental priorities against other priorities. In 
this sense the two agencies appear more ‘ecologically rational’ than other mixed functional 
departments in New Zealand, or examples of comparative environmentally-oriented departments in 
Australia or Britain.316 However, while the NPM thinking may have created a more environmentally 
rational organisational design, the dominance of a political and administrative paradigm of the 
benefits of a minimal State sector associated with NPM also affected departmental priorities. The 
argument is that NPM’s focus on outputs, combined with the less-State ideational orientation, 
devalued developing capacities for long term strategy or government planning.317 
A third implication relates to the different design features of the two departments. MfE is designed 
on NPM lines as a policy department (although the purity of that design ideal is questionable as the 
Ministry, through its relationship with its Minister, has some regulatory and intervention abilities318). 
DoC is functionally integrated. Those in favour of policy/regulation/operations splits argue they 
provide greater clarity of thinking and help avoid capture by interests. A counter argument is that 
                                                          
314 The reasons for this are probably the combination of an accident of timing of the creation of DoC early in 
the administrative reforms of the 1980s/1990s, the level of public support for conservation and organised 
conservation NGO campaign to create DoC, the form of existing conservation management resources of the 
parent departments, and the large extent, specific nature, and overwhelming State-centred characteristics of 
protected lands and endangered species management in New Zealand. See Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A 
History of Conservation in New Zealand. P. 206-211.  
315 Connor, Institutional Change for Sustainable Development. P.77& 202. Dovers, Environment and 
Sustainability Policy: Creation, Implementation, Evaluation. P.161. 
316 In Britain the Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is responsible for policy and 
regulations on the environment, food, and rural affairs (http://www.defra.gov.uk/ accessed 15/10/2012). In 
Australia the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Populations, and Communities (DSEWPC) 
deals with environment protection and conservation of biodiversity, air quality, national fuel quality standards, 
land contamination, meteorology, administration of the Australian Antarctic Territory, and the Territory of 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands, natural, built and cultural heritage, environmental research, water policy 
and resources, ionospheric prediction, co-ordination of sustainable communities policy, population policy, 
housing affordability, and built environment innovation. See Administrative Arrangements Order, p.36, 14 
September, 2010 (http://www.dpmc.gov.au/parliamentary/index.cfm accessed 15/10/2012). 
317 Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis." P.38 
& 41. 
318 For example, the Minister has intervention powers under the Resource Management Act, and not all of 
these are delegated to the EPA. 
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such splits detract from double-loop learning (combining learning both from designing polices, and 
implementing them), create insularity, and detract from integration.319 Superficially this might 
suggest that MfE would, because of its more singular role, be better able to develop policy 
frameworks than DoC. But DoC might, through its experience and technical expertise, develop 
frameworks that are ultimately more effective.320 However, drawing such a comparison may be 
difficult given that MfE’s broad policy focus is more extensive and arguably more challenging than 
DoC’s because of the wider range of interests that are affected, whereas DoC’s operational role has 
technical and implementation challenges that MfE does not face. This is not to say, however, that 
some of the detailed technical aspects of environmental problems either department seeks to 
address, in nature conservation or waste management for example, may be any more or less 
complex conceptually.  
3.5.3 Funding and staffing 
Levels and adequacy of funding and staff have been an issue for both MfE and DoC. Participating in 
policy processes is time consuming and resource intensive, particularly where engagement with 
interest groups and the public occurs. Similarly, operational environmental management is resource 
intensive when it requires action on the ground; for example in New Zealand to combat invasive 
species..  
In 1999, MfE had approximately 115 staff and appropriations of $28.3m. In 2008, it had staff of 330 
and appropriations of $120.2 m (without including $749m Kyoto liability estimates). In 1999, DoC had 
approximately 1400 permanent staff and appropriations of $199.5m. In 2008, it had 1827 permanent 
staff and appropriations of $444m.321 It has been argued that for the period between 1987 and at 
                                                          
319 The first view draws on public choice theory. See Gorringe, " Economics for Policy: Expanding the 
Boundaries." Scott, Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges. For the alternative critique 
see R. Gregory, "Getting Better but Feeling Worse? Public Sector Reform in New Zealand," International Public 
Management Journal 3 (2000), R Norman, Gregory R, "Paradoxes and Pendulum Swings: Performance 
Management in New Zealand's Public Sector," Australian Journal of Public Administration 62, no. 4 (2003). 
Peters observes that this division of views comes from process tensions between advisory (‘staff’) and 
operational roles (‘line’). He says the tension is as old as government, occurs between departments and within 
departments, and engenders conflict between those who see themselves doing the ‘work’, and those who 
‘merely’ plan. Such tensions can create policy coordination challenges and give rise to perennial efforts at 
horizontal policy coordination. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. Pp.145-146 & 149. ———, "Concepts and 
Theories of Horizontal Policy Management." 
320 There could also be elements of a difference between “staff” and “line” roles of the two organisations (see 
previous footnote).  While MfE more closely fits the ‘staff’ descriptor, and DoC the “line” descriptor, elements 
of both roles are found in each organisation, particularly in DoC. 
321 Historic vote information, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/votehistory.  DoC, "Annual Report 1999-
2000," (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2000). MfE, "Annual Report 1999-2000," (Wellington: 
Ministry for the Environment, 2000). DoC, "Annual Report 2008-2009," (Wellington: Department of 
Conservation, 2009). MfE, "Annual Report 2008-2009," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2009).  
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least the late 1990s the financial resource available to both departments was inadequate for what 
they being asked, or expected, to do.322  
There are a number of perspectives on adequacy of resources. Lack of resources can set 
organisations up to fail.  Alternatively, some argue that departments need do only what they are 
funded to do.323 Furthermore, departmental claims of under-resourcing could be evidence of budget 
maximising tendencies.324 Despite theoretical arguments, a number of high profile resource-related 
controversies in the late 1990s resulted in increased operational funding for DoC. 325 Also from the 
late 1990s, MfE became involved with larger policy and semi-operational programmes that similarly 
attracted more resources eventually.326 Coupled with this was a period of buoyant economic 
conditions in New Zealand from the late 1990s to 2008. During this period, staff numbers increased 
and budgets for both departments more than trebled.327 Although tasks increased, it is a fact that 
resources were nowhere near as constrained in the mid-2000s as in the 1990s. 
3.5.4 Leadership and culture 
Literature argues that leadership and culture are important influences on performance and 
effectiveness, but that this is hard to show empirically.328 
The following section highlights some characteristics, and published information (admittedly very 
limited) that may be significant for leadership and culture in MfE and DoC. 
First, New Zealand public service Chief Executive appointments are not made by politicians or 
ministers but by a statutorily independent State Services Commissioner (although Cabinet has a right 
of veto). And the Chief Executive is then the employer of all staff in their departments. Consequently, 
                                                          
322 P. Ali Memon and Harvey C. Perkins, "Environmental Planning and Management: The Broad Context," in 
Environmental Planning and Management in New Zealand, ed. P. Ali Memon and Harvey C. Perkins (palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press, 2000).P.18. Ericksen, ed. Planning for Sustainability: New Zealand under the RMA. 
P.235. Bührs, "New Zealand's Capacity for Green Planning: A Political-Institutional Assessment and Analysis." 
P.38. Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. P.211. 
323 P. Hartley, Conservation Strategies for New Zealand (Wellington: NZ Business Round Table, 1997). P.398. 
Scott, Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges. Pp.39-42 & 140. Scott says the reason for 
this is one of efficiency, whereas others see it also one of control. Heywood, Politics. P.385. Peters, The Politics 
of Bureaucracy. P.13.   
324 This line of argument is advanced for “contractual” government and public choice theory. M. Olsen, The 
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Interest Groups (Cambridge, Massc.: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government.  
325 These included native forest die-back probably from introduced possum browsing, and the collapse of a 
viewing platform in Punakaiki National Park killing fourteen people. Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of 
Conservation in New Zealand. P. 215-216 
326 See MfE, "Annual Report 1998-1999." P.2. and ———, "Annual Report 2005-2006." P.2.  
327 DoC, "Annual Report 1999-2000." MfE, "Annual Report 1999-2000." DoC, "Annual Report 2008-2009." MfE, 
"Annual Report 2008-2009." 
328 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. McMahon, The Environmental 
Protection Agency: Structuring Motivation in a Green Bureaucracy: The Conflict between Regulatory Style and 
Cultural Identity. Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. P.79. 
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unlike some other jurisdictions such as the USA, there is a higher degree of formal separation of 
departmental staff from the immediacy of political imperatives. Second, in twenty-five years of 
existence MfE and DoC have had five Chief Executives each, suggesting some lengthy periods of 
management stability. A degree of separation from immediate political concerns and management 
stability might create conditions to pursue longer term environmental objectives, or the time to 
create the frameworks that support positive environmental outcomes. Alternatively, this might 
create barriers to new thinking about different ways of addressing environmental problems. Third, 
DoC and,to a lesser degree, MFE are large departments and consequently leadership and decisions 
are exercised at many levels, not simply by the Chief Executive.329 A fourth point is leadership within 
MfE seems to focus on the fostering of excellence in ideas and the powers of persuasion and 
bargaining, whereas in DoC it tends to focus on operational excellence and management of affected 
interests.330 This is something of a generalisation and similar qualities may well be found in both 
organisations. Nevertheless it is also a reflection of  the nature of each department’s work, and what 
is culturally valued. 
Leadership can create or harness culture, but culture itself is not necessarily a product of leadership. 
Culture can arise and persist independent of leadership.331 Culture in MfE and DoC has been 
commented on anecdotally332 but the closest that approaches to an academic analysis is Johnston’s 
characterisation of alternative management discourses and the ways these discourses are embedded 
differentially in New Zealand’s environmental legislation, referred to in Chapter 2. Johnston’s 
argument is that the MfE has tended to be imbued with a communitarian, pluralist culture drawn, he 
argues, from the Resource Management Act and local government legislation (although it might be 
argued there is also a market-oriented rationality given the RMA’s role in regulating property rights), 
whereas DoC’s culture is influenced by its operational role and the preservationist ethos of the 
Conservation, National Park, and Wildlife Acts. Johnston would argue that this gives rise to an 
administrative efficiency rationality based in a technical expert’s view of system dynamics, with 
elements of a pluralist and communitarian discourse where this complements the internal technical 
                                                          
329 Based on my own experience and discussion with present and past DoC and MFE Chief Executives, CEO 
leadership can be an important variable factor in the nature of each department’s policy approach but it is 
uncommon for the CEO to always impose their own views. In my opinion, some external observers attribute 
more influence to direct roles played by department CEOs than is in fact the case. 
330 This observation is based on comparison of DoC and MfE internal management guidance documents. See 
MfE, "Professionalising Policy: A Guide for the Craft of Policy Analysis," (Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment, 2011), ———, "Professionalising Policy: Cost Opportunity Risk Benefit Analysis; the Cobra Policy 
Guide," (Wellington: Ministry for the Envrionment, 2011), DoC, "General Managers Handbook," ed. 
Department of Conservation (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2001), ———, "Managers Handbook," 
ed. Department of Conservation (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2009). 
331 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. P.101. 
332 For example, R. Kerr, "Market Mechanisms and Conservation," in Environmental justice and market 
mechanisms (Auckland: New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1998). P.2. “DoC loo culture of extravagance,” 
14/1/2006, Infonews, http://www.infonews.co.nz/news.cfm?id=12586 (accessed 14/10/2012). 
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worldview.333 Johnston’s view supports the literature cited in Section 2.4.4.1 about departments 
having shared decision premises that influence how they see issues and how they respond.  
3.5.5 Summary 
MfE and DoC were set up as explicit environmental departments with explicit statutory 
environmental roles and functions as their primary purpose. They were products of their time, 
influenced in design by a view of the role of government and how government should be organised 
that was dominant in the late 1980s. They were poorly resourced in the 1990s in terms of what they 
were expected to do, but this changed in the 2000s. There is some evidence from the literature, 
admittedly limited, that suggests their institutional settings have an effect on internal culture. What 
will be tested in the following case studies is the extent to which  these features influence their 
abilities to produce environmentally effective policy frameworks. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The examination of New Zealand’s government system and its links with society presented in this 
chapter suggests there are elements potentially favourable to advancing environmental values, that 
there are potentially constraining components, ones that are neutral, and that all three are 
interlinked. 
What are possible favourable factors?  
1. Taking the view of Jänicke and others that openness in decision-making helps a nation’s 
environmental capacity, New Zealand’s relatively transparent, non-corrupt and responsive 
government system should support its ability to make environmental policy. This is however, 
a general feature that applies to all policy-making, not just environmental policy. 
2. Environmental interests are represented in Cabinet decision-making, which the literature 
says should be advantageous environmentally. While some may argue the seniority of such 
representation is not as commensurate with the importance of environmental concerns as it 
should be, there is representation by at least two ministers nonetheless.  
3. As a result of the the NPM changes of the 1980s, New Zealand has two (and possibly three if 
the EPA is counted) central government departments formally accountable for advancing 
environmental interests, without other conflicting responsibilities.This is probably an 
institutional advantage environmentally. 
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4. New Zealand’s environmental legislation was integrated and not fragmented during the 
period of this study. Many (e.g. Bartlett, Bührs, Memon and others) argue this is a potentially 
positive environmental feature.  
5. New Zealanders, according to public attitude surveys, support environmental values, but not 
unreservedly. Support for environmental values also appears in most political party 
manifestos (although to different levels and with diferent emphases). Mixed member 
proportional representation has increased representation of those who promote 
environmental values. These features should influence government ideological orientations. 
However, there are also conflicting social values which may override environmental ones, 
hence the degree of attachment to environmental values may be ambiguous in terms of their 
effect on government action. 
What are possible constraining factors? 
1. The New Zealand government policy system is small and hence may lack capacity to deal 
with complex environmental issues.  
2. The New Zealand economy is dependent on the use of natural resources, and hence gives 
rise to powerful interests that may constrain policies to address environmental effects of 
that use. 
3. New Zealand has a three year electoral cycle which, although possibly positive from a 
democratic responsiveness point of view, constrains long term policy development either 
because of processes involved in reassessment, or lack of cross-party support. This is, 
however, also a possible neutral factor in that it is a recurrent structural feature that applies 
to all policy development. It cannot of itself explain variability in performance between 
governments or departments. 
4. Environmental government departments are not as powerful as the three central agencies or 
the economic departments. This is an institutional constraint. 
5. A policy approach developed in the era of NPM continues to influence how government 
departments approach government action generally, and action on the environment 
specifically. It is argued that this policy approach tends to be cautious about government 
interventions and predisposed to voluntary action or market mechanisms as policy 
prescriptions. It is more likely a constraining factor in that it made developing some policy 
options more difficult. In circumstances where voluntary or market based prescriptions could 
be environmentally effective, then they had an easier ride through the policy development 
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process. Where other prescriptions were needed, and ran counter to the prevailing policy 
approach, then there were higher institutional and ideational hurdles to jump.  
What are possible neutral factors? 
1. The concentration of power in central government in New Zealand compared with other 
similar developed countries is significant but probably a neutral factor in the sense it can 
work positively or negatively in terms environmentally effective policies. Whether this factor 
works positively, negatively or neutrally depends, however, on government priorities, and on 
government will and skill (particularly timing in relation to the electoral cycle).  
 
What do the sum of these features say about the New Zealand context? This chapter suggests it  is 
ambiguous in terms of how environmental policy comes to be developed. On the one hand, there is a 
moderately favourable public climate of support for environmental measures, possibly a strong one 
when it comes to nature conservation. The intra-government administrative capacity to develop 
environmental policy is sizeable relative to the overall machinery of government in that there are 
two environmentally oriented ministers at the Cabinet table and  two departments dedicated to 
advising on and promoting environmental policy. Added to these features, the locus of policy 
decision-making rests primarily with the Prime Minister, Cabinet, ministers and the public service 
(compared with other jursidictions where other branches of government  or extra-government 
interests have a stronger formal role). With requisite priority, will, and skill, the result presumably 
could be rapid and effective policy. Together these features suggest there is potential for 
environmental policy effectiveness.   
On the other hand, constraining and neutral factors mentioned above also have to be considered. 
Within government, economic and resource-use interests (particularly those of primary industries),  
are generally in a powerful position. A structural feature, the three year electoral cycle, is a potential 
constraining factor in long term environmental policy development (although serving other purposes 
in the absence of a written constitution). The small size of the New Zealand policy system means 
individual people can in theory have a greater effect than in larger systems, depending on their skills. 
The nature of that effect depends on the orientation of their ideas. At the same time, small size may 
also mean less resources, and hence less diversity of ideas. 
These are preliminary explanations for why there might be variability in New Zealand’s 
environmental policy. There is, however, nowhere near the depth of research on the subject 
compared, for example, with studies in Europe cited in Chapter 2.This is something this study will 
seek to remedy. How the study will do this is explained in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Analytical Framework, Methodology, and Rationale for Case Study  
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to provide explanations for the variable nature of environmental 
policy in New Zealand over the past twenty five years, and the contribution to variability from 
government, its processes, and government environmental departments. Variability in 
environmental policy is not confined to New Zealand. It occurs in other countries, even where there 
is strong pro-environment political commitment.334 Many sources of policy variability have been 
identified in literature about government policy in general and environmental policy specifically, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. What is less well-known is how these sources work together, and what 
difference jurisdictional characteristics make.335 This research aims to contribute to a better 
understanding of how these features operate, and their effect. 
This chapter sets out the framework that will be used to undertake the research. The first part of the 
chapter describes features that have been selected to demonstrate environmental policy variability 
and factors that seem to account for that variability, and why they have been selected. These 
features are then turned into a series of research questions to be used to interrogate information in 
case studies. Next, the chapter describes research methodology. Finally, it sets out what subjects 
have been chosen as case studies to help address the research questions, and why. 
4.2 The analytical approach 
Underlying this research is a political science perspective that decision-making processes and 
outcomes are shaped by political factors related to state capacity and subsystem complexity.336  
This study investigates the effect of drivers of environmental policy within government arising, 
according to the literature, from institutional features (emphasising administrative and 
organisational features that enhance or inhibit environmental effectiveness), the role of individuals 
(agency), and cognitive perspectives. The intention of this research is to investigate the relative 
importance of links between these intra-government factors, with a preliminary proposition that 
some combinations are likely to be more significant than others. 
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Chapter 2 reviewed literature about what constitutes policy effectiveness and environmental 
effectiveness, and sources of variability. It discussed how one might establish a standard to measure 
policy variability based on ideas about policy effectiveness and environmental effectiveness. The 
chapter then went on to show that elements that cause variability are well traversed in literature, 
but what combinations apply in particular circumstances, and what the effect is, will still benefit from 
more study.  
Chapter 3 reviewed the New Zealand context for environmental policy development. The preliminary 
conclusion is that the system for government policy development appears to have capacity to 
develop, change and adopt policy quickly despite certain specific constraints, such as the three year 
electoral cycle. Furthermore, on the face of it, New Zealand seems to have at least adequate intra-
government administrative capacity to develop environmental policy, relative to its overall 
machinery of government, but that it is generally small scale (with the advantages and draw backs of 
small scale) compared to other developed countries. 
This section set outs how the ideas about environmental policy effectiveness and variability will be 
used to examine a set of case studies about environmental policy development in New Zealand. 
4.2.1 How to measure variability: the dependent variable 
 At its core, this study is about sources of variability in environmental policy arising from the policy-
making process. It is not a direct evaluation of environmental policies per se. But, in looking at causes 
of policy variability we need to assess variability against a measure of policy effectiveness. Policy 
theory, particularly policy evaluation, offers ideas about policy effectiveness. Environmental theory 
offers ideas about environmental effectiveness. This study uses intersecting components, drawn 
from the ideas of policy design and evaluation, and from environmental ideas about what is likely to 
increase the environmental success of policy.  
Policy literature suggests that policy effectiveness depends on the characteristics of the policy, 
assumptions about the policy goals, rules and tools, resources for implementation, and degree of 
support.337  
Environmental literature tends to come at the subject of effectiveness from a cognitive perspective, 
stemming from normative views that human welfare depends on environmental quality, or empirical 
views that environmental quality improves efficiency and coherence in policy-making. There is a 
large measure of agreement that environmental effectiveness in government policy arises from the 
priority given to environmental values and whether environmental values feature in belief systems, 
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assumptions, knowledge and information. How people involved with decision-making perceive that 
priority determines whether, and to what degree, those values are integrated into and across policies 
and institutions.338  
An analysis of environmental priority combined with characteristics of policy-effectiveness should 
predict the likely effectiveness of policy in environmental terms.339 However, carrying out analysis on 
this basis would require an extensive detailed evaluation of policies, something that a number of 
commentators say is a demanding and difficult exercise.340 As noted above, this is not the primary 
focus of this study. Its focus is on intervening causal factors within a government system that 
influence environmental agencies and environmental policy efforts. Schneider and Ingram suggest it 
is sufficient to identify those features that seem most critical to understanding the effect of causal 
factors.341 Because this is an environmental study as well as a policy-making one, dependent 
variables should include a predictor of likely environmental effectiveness. Because it involves policy 
forming, it should include a predictor of potential policy effectiveness arising from the policy 
formation. 
1. To assess environmental effectiveness, the case studies will qualitatively assess what priority 
and weight was given to environmental values in the development of policy, and the extent 
to which those values were either: 
a. Integrated internally in the environmental policy domain. This is based on the idea that, 
because of likely multiple causes, environmental policies should endeavour to 
complement each other and create synergies. 342 Assessment would involve looking at 
the extent to which an environmental policy is aligned with other environmental policy 
efforts. There may be circumstances where an environmental policy can be effective 
independent of other policy efforts, but only where causes can be effectively addressed 
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by an isolated course of action without a need to invoke changes in other areas.343 
Assessment in this case would look at the clarity of objectives in the policy, and whether 
the causes can indeed be isolated. Or, 
b. Integrated externally across other government policies. This is based on the idea that 
environmental policy should be a component of traditionally non-environmental policy 
dimensions in order to achieve comprehensive effectiveness. 
2. Assessing policy effectiveness needs indicators of what seems most critical to understanding 
causal factors (Schneider and Ingram’s criterion). Because this study isn’t a post hoc 
assessment of outcomes, it takes us back to basing assessment on structural logic and 
political architecture, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
In terms of structural logic, Grant provides eight possible criteria for evidence of effective 
environmental policy: clear authority; rules and laws; sufficient resources and incentive 
structures; behaviour changes; intellectually robust remedies; remedies that advance 
objectives without disadvantaging excessively those relevant to the policy; alternatives being 
worse; or else serving symbolic goals.344 Of these, behaviour changes and the effect of 
remedies require post hoc assessment, but the others seem applicable as indicators of 
potential policy effectiveness. Schneider and Ingram argue that the most important elements 
of policy effectiveness are the policy tools and the behavioural assumptions on which they 
rely, and what they describe as the implementation patterns (meaning whether the policy 
should have strong directive institutions and clear accountabilities, or rely on maximum 
leeway to generate locally applicable solutions and/or support and further knowledge).345 
The structural logic of the policy (especially rules and tools and implementation patterns) 
seems on the face of it to provide an indicator of potential policy effectiveness. But care is 
required because there is a vigorous debate about what constitutes effective policy rules and 
tools, and effective means of implementation.346 This risks diverting attention away from 
reasons for policy variability into evaluating the policies themselves, which is not the focus of 
this research\.  
A policy can be logically coherent, however, but still be ineffective because of political 
architecture in terms of strong or weak opposition or support. In the face of prevailing strong 
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opposition or without support (or the prospect of support), a policy is unlikely to be enduring 
and thus less effective. A caveat is that policy almost inevitably affects peoples’ preferences 
and values.347 Hence policy, even if it is only symbolic, frequently gives rise to opposition. 
From an assessment perspective, it is sufficient, however, to make at least a qualitative 
assessment of the support basis of a policy when it was adopted. 
Thus, indicators of causal variables of policy effectiveness, for this study, will focus on 
structural logic and political architecture of the policy, in terms of assumptions, rules,and 
tools, and support. 
Formulated as questions, analysis of dependent variables for this research involves asking: 
Question 1.  
What priority and weight was given to environmental values in the outcome of the development of 
policy, and how integrated were those values, either internally or externally?  
Question 2.  
Did the policy process result in tools and rules to back up the policy? What was the nature of those 
tools and rules?  
Question 3. 
What basis of support was there for the policy? 
4.2.2 The role of time as an indicator 
The Introduction noted that development of specific environmental policies in New Zealand tend to 
take a long time between when they became priorities and when any significant product emerged. Is 
this important? One line of literature suggests that policy change usually (but not always) involves 
incremental policy learning and this takes time.348 Policy development can take time also depending 
on the complexity of the issues and the capacity of a policy system. So, time may be an indicator of a 
policy system’s ability to produce effective policy and the influence of sources of variability. 
However, time, while not an agent of variability in itself, can mean that the longer the policy 
response takes, the stronger the likelihood that the problem will persist and possibly get worse.349 
The longer the time taken, the more opportunity there is for the issue to become more complex and 
                                                          
347 Dovers, Environment and Sustainability Policy: Creation, Implementation, Evaluation. P.30 
348 Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through." The alternative, and rarer form of policy change occurs 
suddenly when alignment of change inducing features creates windows of opportunity for change 
(Baumgartner, Agendas and Instability in American Politics.) 
349 Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development. P.124. 
4: Analytical framework, methods, and case study rationale 
76 
for interests to harden.350 Time is also significant if windows of opportunity emerge. Policy change 
may be missed if opportunities aren’t taken. When they are, it is likely the time taken to develop or 
adopt policies will be shorter.351 Thus time seems important in the effectiveness of a policy system, 
and an indicator that sources of variability are at work. If a policy system consistently takes a long 
time to develop policy in the face of known problems it suggests that there are underlying causes 
that are leading to ineffectiveness in the system. 
Therefore, a question that will be asked in the case studies is, 
Question 4.  
What length of time elapsed between when the policy became a priority and when a meaningful 
policy response emerged? Was this significant in policy variability? 
4.2.3 Sources of variability: independent variables 
The study is looking for explanations of variability in New Zealand’s environmental policy 
development and what role the main environmental departments had in this. The focus of the study 
involves some explicit choices about independent variables based on ideas about what drives 
development of government environmental policy.  
As noted in Chapter 2, Scharpf says there are three sets of variables that will affect the capacity of a 
policy system to come up with effective policy responses: 
   - The nature of the policy problem, 
   - The orientation of the policy actors, 
   - The characteristics of the institutional settings.352  
Again in Chapter 2, three fields of scholarship that elaborate Scharpf’s proposition were discussed: 
ideas about public policy dynamics involving the influence of ideas, interests, institutions, power, 
decision-making and policy style; ideas about organisational performance, particularly performance 
of government departments; and linked ideas about environmental problem complexity and wider 
drivers of environmental performance at a state level. 
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From this one can identify five sets of significant factors helping to explain environmental policy 
variability:  
1. Institutional features (I Factors): decision-making rules, policy approaches, policy domains 
and networks, and power relationships among departments and with ministers (rules of 
engagement), and departmental capacities. 
2. Agency features (A Factors): policy entrepreneurship, leadership, skills in policy-making, and 
degree of synergy between officials and ministers. 
3. Cognitive features (C Factors): dominant cognitive frameworks within government and how 
these are interpreted. 
4. Complexity features (W Factors): the characteristics or “wickedness” of a given policy 
problem /policy area. 
5.  Contextual features (D Factors): developments or events arising from wider contextual 
circumstances. 
Chapter 3 described the New Zealand situation. It concluded that the national context creates 
particularities that influence what issues feature on the environmental policy agenda and how they 
are perceived and addressed (i.e. D conditions W). In addition, the political system increases the 
significance of the cognitive factors within government because of the comparatively greater 
concentration of power in the New Zealand system than in other similar countries. There may be 
greater scope for the exercise of agency because of the smaller political system (noting the point 
made in Chapter 3 about the tentativeness of this assertion). Finally, the institutional structure of the 
New Zealand political system increases potential organisational influence (compared with federal or 
corporatist institutional arrangements, for example). 
Therefore, the independent variables applied in the study are intended to ensure that institutional, 
agency and cognitive factors identified in the wider literature are considered. The detail of each 
variable, though, is designed to incorporate features that arise from the New Zealand context. 
Consequently, the independent variables that will be used as part of the framework for analysis are:  
1. Institutional drivers (Factor I) comprising the environment departments’ capacities (built on 
their roles, internal strategies, resources, design, and cultures), and policy-making rules of 
engagement (incorporating decision-making rules, approaches, and inter-agency dynamics); 
2. Agency drivers through the influence of individuals (Factor A) in terms of will and skill; 
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3. The views in government (Factor C) about the relative priority of environmental policy and 
the role of government, and how these are interpreted in developing policy.  
These factors describe what the study calls “internal factors of government”, operating in 
combination to influence: 
 the degree of priority for environmental values in policy and how integrated those values 
are, either internally or externally. 
 The structural logic and political architecture of the policy, in terms of assumptions, rules, 
and tools, and support. 
 How long it takes to develop policy. 
These “internal factors of government” do not work just in isolation, though. They are linked to each 
other, and to other wider intervening factors arising from their general complexity (Factor W) and 
national context (Factor D). How these intervening variables are addressed in the analysis is 
discussed below.  
The suite of intervening, independent and dependent variables, and their relationships are 
represented in Figure 4.1. When this framework is used in the case studies, the intervening variables 
will be weighted according to their degree of influence depending on whether they were small, 
moderate or large; the independent variables according to whether they enhanced environmental 
policy effectivness in a small, moderate or large way; and the dependent variables according to 
whether the result was small, moderate or large. 
Figure 4.1 Framework for analysing intra-government factors influencing potential environmental 
policy effectiveness 
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The framework presented here has parallels with one developed by Nilsson and Persson.353 They 
described drivers that shaped environmental policy at a national level in Sweden and applied it to a 
case study of energy policy. A model they developed emphasises the importance of institutional 
effects of policy-making rules and assessment processes, and belief systems, as independent 
variables. It includes background factors such as problem characteristics, the international policy 
context, and political will as intervening variables (they called these background variables).354 The 
Nilsson and Persson model recognises similar influencing features (institutions, agency, and cognitive 
effects) used in this model, but the difference is that the one developed for this research places more 
emphasis on the role of intra-government features, and particularly intra-departmental institutional 
effects. The reason the models are different reflects contrasting approaches to policy development in 
Sweden and New Zealand.355 New Zealand’s approach is dominated more by the central government 
Executive (Cabinet and the central bureaucracy) compared with Scandinavian collaborative 
governance. There, government departments focus on policy development process as much as 
developing policy substance.356 In New Zealand, policy ideas and policy development are seen more 
as the prerogative of central government.357 
In order to give shape to the internal forces of government, as I have described them, a series of 
questions will be asked under each category of independent variable. The questions focus on those 
features that appear to be the most significant sources of variability, according to general literature 
and the review of the New Zealand context. The questions about institutional features are designed 
to illustrate what effect departmental capacity and the machinery of government have on 
environmental policy. The questions about agency are designed to distinguish the influence of 
individuals. The questions about cognitive features are designed to bring to light the effect of ideas 
within government on environmental policy.  
The questions and sub questions are: 
                                                          
353 Nilsson, "Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration." Pp. 333-359. 
354 Ibid. P.354. 
355 G. Salmon, "Governance of the Rural Environment - Are Existing Approaches Working?," in Conflicy in 
paradise: the transformation of rural New Zealand (Auckland: Environmnetal Defence Society, 2008), G. 
Salmon, Zilliacus, K., Scherzer, J., Barlund, H-B., "Collaborative Governance on Environmental Policies Affecting 
Rural Landowners: Comparing Nordic and New Zealand Practises.," in UNITAR Conference on Environmental 
Governance (Yale: Ecologic, 2008). 
356 Nilsson, "Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration." P. 348-349. Salmon, "Collaborative 
Governance on Environmental Policies Affecting Rural Landowners: Comparing Nordic and New Zealand 
Practises.."  
357 New Zealand experiments with collaborative approaches to policy development, but this is not the norm. —
——, "Collaborative Governance on Environmental Policies Affecting Rural Landowners: Comparing Nordic and 
New Zealand Practises.." 
 For a flavour of New Zealand’s approach to policy advice and policy development, and the resources devoted 
to it, see Scott, "Improving the Quality and Value of Policy Advice." 
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Institutional features  
 
Based on the ideas that government departments and formal and informal processes within 
government affect policy, how did institutional factors influence departmental capacity and 
performance? 
Question 5. 
a) Were there intra-departmental institutional effects? 
i. Were policy priorities influenced by role or mandate and if so how? 
ii. What effect did the organisation’s functions have on policy assumptions, design and 
objectives?  
iii. Did organisational structure help or hinder? 
iv. Did the departments have enough resources to develop policy? 
v. How did organisational culture affect policy assumptions and objectives? 
b) How did the rules about policy development, and interagency power relationships, influence 
policy priorities and policy prescriptions? 
Agency features 
 
Based on the idea that individuals influence policy through the choices they make, how did policy 
initiative, skill in operating in the system, and synergy between officials and ministers affect what 
happened? 
Question 6.  
a) Did individuals create or capitalise on opportunities to develop policy that was advantageous 
environmentally?  
b) Is there evidence of leadership by MfE and DoC staff that had an effect on effective policy 
development? 
Cognitive features 
 
Based on the idea that values and beliefs drive government priorities and how these are interpreted 
into policy, what influence did government priorities have and did types of reasoning applied to 
those priorities have any effect? 
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Question 7. 
a) What priority did governments give to environmental matters in the period under study? 
b) Was there a prevailing view about how the government should respond to environmental issues? 
c) What type of reasoning was applied to addressing environmental issues before and after they 
became part of the policy agenda? 
4.2.4 Intervening variables 
There is a risk of myopia in simply looking at the internal forces of government without 
acknowledging other influences. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, environmental policy is not 
developed in a vacuum. It is subject to drivers besides those within government. Therefore analysis 
should consider the influence of wider national or international contexts, and the fact that some 
issues are more complex than others. Context and complexity create different combinations of 
technical, social, economic, or cultural barriers to resolution. This is the reason the framework 
includes  background or intervening variables, in particular complexity of the policy problem, and 
developments and events that arise in the wider New Zealand socio-cultural-economic context. A 
way of measuring the influence of complexity in a policy problem is to assess, 
1. the conflict potential and,  
2. understandings and visibility of the problem.358  
Each case study will contain a section that discusses context and complexity, and an assessment in 
terms of conflict potential and understandings. In this way we can create a picture comparing the 
complexities of each case study. The literature says that the more complex the issue, the stronger 
the likelihood for lower levels of policy success. There is also another, empirical, factor. Events occur 
that impede or advance policy opportunities,  as described in Chapter 2 and 3. The influence of 
events on each case study will also be discussed as part of the analysis. 
 
Question 8. 
What level of challenge did context and complexity present and how important was this in 
influencing the internal forces of government? 
                                                          
358 This method is used by Nilsson and Persson, based on a model used commonly in risk management, and also 
in behavioural political science literature. Nilsson, "Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration." 
P.346. And M. Douglas, Wildavsky, A., Risk and Culture (Berkley: University of California Press, 1982). Verweij, 
"Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate Change." 
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4.2.5 Summary 
This section has set out how I intend to go about investigating the influence of internal forces of 
government on environmental policy in New Zealand. I have developed a framework that combine 
existing ideas about what constitutes potential effective environmental policy and about sources of 
variability arising from and during policy development. The framework provides the basis for 
questions used in the research. The next sections of this chapter describes the methodological 
approach. 
4.3 Methodology, methods and research perspectives 
Seeking answers to the questions set out in the previous section involves investigating the detail of 
intra-executive workings on environmental public policy. The objective is to explain why some things 
happened the way they did, then analysing the implications, and what they mean for the pursuit of 
environmental effectiveness. Both the drivers and dynamics of public policy making are complex. 
Attributing policy changes to actions in the public service rather than elsewhere is made more 
challenging by the multi-dimensional causes of policy development.359 Endeavouring to understand 
the extent and nature of intra-executive influences on environmental policy involves, for this study at 
least, qualitative and interpetive analysis. Thus the research has a constructivist orientation 
(involving interpretation and judgement), rather than a purely positivist one (presenting revealed 
“facts”). 
Interpetative analysis offers an array of methodological options and critical theory.360 
Labels such as frame analysis, ethnomethodology, discourse analysis (with subdivisions named after 
its various proponents: Foucault, Laclau, and Mouffe, Potter, Fairclough, Gee), narrative analysis, 
genealogical analysis, hermeneutics, (with or without the the adjective “philosophical”), 
phenomenology, structuralism and post structuralism, and practise theory indicate an enormous 
variety of approaches to interpetation in social research.361 
Wagenaar, who is the source of the previous quote, advises researchers embarking on qualitative 
research to be conscious of this methodological landscape, exercise caution about adopting any one 
                                                          
359 J. Boston, "The Challenge of Assessing Systemic Change: The Case of Public Sector Management Reform," in 
Learning from International Public Management Reform, ed. L. Jones, Guthrie, J., Steane, P. (Oxford: 
JAI/Elsevier Science, 2001). 
360 See Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy. N.K. Denzin, Lincoln, Y.S., "Introduction," in The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, ed. N.K. Denzin, Lincoln, Y.S. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005). H. Wagenaar, Meaning in 
Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2011). 
361 ———, Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis. P.7. 
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perspective unthinkingly, and to be clear about what perspective, or perspectives are being taken 
and why.362 
It will be evident  from cited literature and discussion in preceding chapters that this research has a 
structuralist orientation. The analytical framework set out in this chapter has at its core, in the 
independent variables, two basic elements of agency and structure and how those two elements 
interact.363 The institutionalised nature of government is a further reason for a structural basis to this 
study. I am conscious, however, that that in any interpretative research an overly structural view 
risks downplaying the human agency effects and the meaning people apply in policy development 
that other interpretative approaches can reveal.364 Consequently, in setting out to make “sense” of 
the evidential basis of this study, I recognise the role of language, discourse and how my own 
perspectives and the methods I use can influence this study. 
There are evidential challenges in undertaking this research. Much of what happens is hidden from 
public view. In addition, there are internal incentives for both the public service and politicians to not 
identify the role played by the public service. After all, a popular perception is that politicians are 
elected to govern and public servants serve. To highlight any alternative realities may merely 
increase accusations of government by bureaucracy, with potentially negative consequences for both 
politicians and the bureaucracy, at least in democratically elected systems of government.365 
 
The research methods I employed are quite standard as a way of addressing the evidential challenge: 
first, the analytical framework provides consistency and structure to the questions I have posed 
about causes of policy variability and environmental policy effectiveness. It also gives a conceptual 
and theoretical basis for enquiry, but in addition the framework is a form of method in that it creates 
boundaries for data collection and analysis. The second method involved case studies (Their rationale 
and selection are discussed in Section 4.4). The case studies were based on written sources and, to a 
much more limited extent, recollections of some key participants in the cases. 
Giving an evidential base to the case studies involved gathering information from a range of primary 
sources: in particular from departmental files in MfE and DoC; from publicly available Cabinet 
documents; from published departmental reports; and from the government website archiving 
ministerial press releases and some ministerial speeches. This form of research involves requesting 
file lists; using judgements based on file headings to select files that deal, or will likely deal, with the 
                                                          
362 Ibid. P.8. Wagenaar himself is attracted to grounded theory as a research technique in the sense that 
grounded theory is rooted in empirical enquiry and builds a theoretical perspective through iterative 
interaction between data and ideas. P.260. 
363 Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
364 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: Sage publications, 1996).P.4. Denzin, "Introduction." P.3. 
365 Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy. P.196. 
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subjects of the case studies; requesting access to those files; and when this has been obtained 
systematically going through each file deriving information, usually in a chronological order, about 
who said what (and some detail about what they said); and collating this, in my case in notes and on 
a card reference system. Secondary sources of published papers, books, and reports with data, 
observations, and analysis are also used. Finally, individuals were approached for comment or 
recollections about specific actions or events. As a source of information, this last method was 
informal and certainly not comprehensive. But it proved helpful in filling in some gaps. More 
importantly it provided a degree of confirmation from officials involved in the case studies about 
whether the draft narratives were consistent with their recollections.  
The particular data collection methods I employed were influenced by my training as an historian and 
mirror those I used in postgraduate research in my Master thesis on the origins of New Zealand’s 
territorial involvement in Antarctica from 1920 to 1960.366 Government documents, and particularly 
the use of departmental files and Cabinet papers provide a valuable window into the actions and 
thinking that takes place within departments, and also provide further perspectives on ministerial 
and Cabinet dynamics. However, they come with a caveat. The analytical framework and questions 
provided a systematic structure for the enquiry. Use of written documentary sources, and 
referencing government files means that the research, or this type of research, is repeatable in that 
others can search the same material. Nevertheless, a researcher has to be conscious that, first, they 
are looking at material that reflects a departmental perspective and that there are other alternative 
perspectives. Second, this sort of research involves interpretation. And it is here that the more 
overtly qualitative element of the research comes into play. What approach I took , and the 
perspectives involved in this, require explanation. 
I have already said this research has a strong structuralist orientation, largely because structures 
(especially institutions) are a particular feature of government. However, it also involves a degree of 
language analysis in that it looks a what people said (especially through the documentary record), 
why they said it, and the effect of language and power. Consequently, the study touches on what 
might be loosely described as analysis of language and discourse, but it does not employ formal 
discourse analysis in a methodological sense. 
It is at this point that I need to reflect on my own perspectives. Literature about intepretivist 
approaches counsels that researchers should be self-critical of their perspectives.367 I am aware of my 
own potential bias as a participant in, or a direct observer of, the events that were taking place in the 
case studies. The role of the participant observer can be valid, as long as the observer applies  self 
                                                          
366 H.F.M. Logan, "Cold Commitment: The Development of New Zealand's Territorial Role in Antarctica 1920-
1960" (University of Canterbury, 1979). 
367 Mason, Qualitative Researching. Pp.146-147. 
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reflection and is conscious of the possibility of bias.368 Nevertheless, being an ex-insider also provides 
some advantages and can provide invaluable insights.369  As a public servant, I knew how file systems 
worked and had experience in the art of reading files. This involves, for example, recognising source 
policy drafts, points at which those drafts began to evolve and recognising, either through language 
or interdepartmental or ministerial correspondence, the drivers of change. There can often be an 
enormous amount of superfluous material that can bog down the inexperienced. Nevertheless, 
experience is not everything. An undergraduate or recent graduate researcher can develop these 
skills by immersing themselves in departmental file systems, as I myself did for my Masters research. 
What it requires is perserverence, forensic skills in requesting either the most relevent files, or if 
there are access issues, tangental files that throw light on the subject. 370 Analysis of Cabinet papers, 
for example, is enhanced by knowing that these documents usually represent the end product of an 
exhaustive and exhausting process of debate and compromise at many levels and that drafting, 
initially at least, often occurs deep within the bureaucracy at often quite junior levels. However, this 
is not always the case, and it is useful to have some understanding of different degrees of 
intervention at different levels, an understanding of who were active ministers and who were not, 
and seeing hints of the sources and hence degree of activism of ministers, advisers and departmental 
officials in the type of language or phrases used in reports. Similarly, using press releases and 
ministerial speeches as sources is valid but must been seen in the light of the purpose of the release 
or speech. From a ministerial and departmental perspective they can be designed to convey “good” 
news, disguise or head off “bad” news, update the public or interest groups on what has been going 
on or is about to occur, or in the case of some speeches, represent either the genuinely held view of 
the speaker or the speech writer (these are often not the same people). For example, it useful to 
have some knowledge of whether a particular minister either drafted or had a strong hand in drafting 
the speeches they presented, the views of departments, or the general line of the government or its 
non-departmental advisers. 
Finally, my selection of those I sought personal comment from was conditioned by my own 
experience about who were likely to have a general overview of the types of policy development 
covered by my case studies. However, even this is not unusual. Any researcher is likely to ask “who 
will have detailed information about a particular issue they are studying?” Hence requests for 
information, or interviews about a policy development case study, can likely be influenced by the 
researcher’s own view about who were significant players. While this may carry risk of bias, or non-
                                                          
368 M.P. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd Edition ed. (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage 2002). 
P.4. 
369 R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Method, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage publications, 2014). P.116. 
370 In the case of my Masters research some important files dealing with British Imperial Conferences in the 
1920s and 1930s were closed to access, but key documents from these conferences dealing with Antarctica had 
been copied to the New Zealand Marine Department files, and these were open to access. 
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replicability, provided the information from interviews is used simply as another source of 
triangulation that complements other information, then it doesn’t necessarily invalidate the 
interviews as a source of research information. Another point is that this research is not interview-
based. It is primarily document-based. 
In summary this research is structuralist in orientation, it is qualitative in method, it is influenced by a 
participant observer perspective, and it draws heavily on a documentary evidential  base. Deciding 
on the analytical value of such an evidential base is almost always a matter of interpretation, but that 
is the nature of qualitative research.  
4.4 Case studies and their rationale. 
Case studies provide data to test propositions, and address research questions. The case study 
method is an established way of undertaking research where an indepth examination of events is 
used, instead of large samples or quantitative measurement of a small set of variables. 371  Using 
more than one study provides opportunities for comparison and assists in generalising research 
findings. There is, however, risk of selection bias. Therefore, what are the criteria used for selection 
of case studies? 
1. They focus primarily on environmental problems, so we can look at questions about 
environmental policy effectiveness.  
2. They are the subject of public policy development at a central government level and debate 
both within government and outside, and have different results in terms of policy product. 
This provides an opportunity to test ideas about policy development, variability and causal 
factors. 
3. The case studies span governments of different political persuasions and provide an 
opportunity to examine what difference government priorities made. 
4.  MfE and/or DoC play significant roles, providing information about organisational attributes 
and influences. 
5. They involve a multitude of competing interests and are subject to the vicissitudes of 
intervening events, allowing us to weigh the influence of complexity and the wider New 
Zealand socio-economic context. 
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These general criteria can be applied to a number of environmental initiatives by central 
government. What were these initiatives and why have some been selected for study ahead of 
others? 
Answering this question involved using Briefs to the Incoming Minister (BIM) for the Environment 
following general elections between 1999 and 2011 and looking at what these documents said about 
policy priorities. There is risk in this approach in that it could simply reveal the biases of agenda 
setting. Nevertheless BIMs are supposed to be departments’ best endeavours to identify 
dispassionately what they see as the major policy issues.372 They can, of course, involve  agenda 
setting, self interest, or interest group influence. Nevertheless, looking at a number of BIMs over 
time helps winnow out outliers and identify common themes, either for ongoing issues, or where 
officials may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that some issues no longer deserve priority. 
In 1999, MfE’s BIM identified nine issues: loss of indigenous biodiversity; land use and water quality; 
response to climate change; waste management; urban sustainability; cost effective environmental 
regulation (RMA and HASNO); biotechnology and genetically modified organisms (GMOs); the marine 
environment; and Treaty of Waitangi implications for environmental management.373  
In 2002, the BIM identified waste management: energy and transport impacts; oceans management; 
agriculture, horticulture and forestry impacts on land use and water quality; urban development; 
tourism impacts; the environmental regulatory regime; monitoring and reporting; indigenous 
bioversity decline; and biosecurity risks.374 
The 2005 BIM described what MfE was doing more than identifying specific environmental issues, 
unlike preceding BIMs or ones that followed. However, it is possible to discern from the document a 
focus on urban design, air quality, waste, rural land use effects on soils, water and biodiversity, 
oceans management, climate change, and hazardous substances and pollution.375 
                                                          
372 SSC, "State Servants, Political Parties and Elections: Guidance for the 2008 Election Period," ed. State 
Services Commission (Wellington: State Services Commission, 2008). P.29. 
373 MfE,”Briefing to the Incoming Minister”, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-oct99.pdf 
(accessed 14/4/2013) P.3. 
 374MfE, “Briefing to the Incoming Minister 2002”,  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-
jul02.pdf (accessed 14/4/2013) Pp.8-18. 
375 MfE, “Briefing to the Incoming Minister 2005”, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-
oct05/briefing-minister-oct05.pdf (accessed 21/4/2013) 
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Three years later, the 2008 BIM identified climate change; freshwater quality: RMA implementation 
issues; issues arising from Treaty of Waitangi concerns; decline in indigenous biodiversity; and 
pressures on the marine environment.376 
In 2011, the BIM identified freshwater management issues; climate change; marine issues; 
indigenous biodiversity loss; RMA implementation issues; and Treaty of Waitangi concerns.377  
A similar group of issues is evident in the various subjects reported on by the PCE between 1998 and 
2008.378  
Common threads running through these lists are; 
 The environmental regulatory regime (especially the operation of the RMA). 
 Implications for environmental management arising from giving effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi and resolving Treaty claims. 
 Response to climate change. 
 Decline in indigenous biodiversity. 
 The impact of land use on water quality. 
 Waste management issues (although these did not feature in the later list of priorities. 
 Environmental effects in the marine environment 
At various times other issues were present but did not appear consistently in the briefings, which is 
not to say that the actual issue was not significant or did not endure, but that from a departmental 
perspective they did not make it onto the briefing priorities. 
For the purpose of this study three of the enduring issues were selected as case studies. These are 
the loss of indigenous biodiversity, decline in freshwater quality, and environmental effects in the 
marine environment. These issues meet the five criteria described above. However, why these three 
and not the others? First, for simple reasons of manageability, three studies were seen as sufficient 
for triangulation purposes. Of the other topics, waste management involved only MfE and not DoC. 
The regulatory regime topics were of a different nature. The Treaty of Waitangi issue is more about 
                                                          
376 MfE, ”Briefing to the Incoming Minister 2008”, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-
incoming-minister-2008/briefing-environmental-sustainability/index.html (accessed 14/4/2013) Paragraph 16. 
377 MfE, “Briefing to the Incoming Minister 2011”, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-
incoming-minister-2011/nrs-bim-2011.pdf (accessed 14/4/2013) Pp.6-16. 
378 See PCE, “All publications”,  http://www.pce.parliament.nz/publications/all-publications/ 
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human rights than a specific environmental issue in itself although it has environmental management 
implications. The RMA and environmental effectivness is a very large subject.379 It may well prove 
suitable as a case study to address the questions raised in this research but for reasons of size and 
longevity it would require study in its own right to do it justice. Finally there is the case of climate 
change. This has proved problematic. Initially, it was intended to include it as an additional case 
study. Some data was collected along with some preliminary analysis as part of this research. It 
certainly meets the selection criteria, especially in complexity. Compared to the selected case studies 
more has been written about climate change policy analysing both development (perhaps rather 
cursorily) and policy implications (in considerable depth).380  The problem with climate change is that 
it is a huge subject, like the RMA. The CEO of MfE commented that to do justice to a study of how it 
developed would require looking at the files of more than ten different departments over a period of 
twenty years, a daunting task.381 
Consequently, reasons for choosing the case studies of freshwater, oceans management and 
biodiversity are that each met all five choice criteria, they are manageable in terms of scope and data 
collection, and they were the subject of government policy attention throughout the period of study 
between the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
So far, the study has set out the focus for research on environmental policy variability, reviewed 
relevent literature, looked at the New Zealand context, and, in this chapter, established an analytical 
framwork, research questions, and methodology. The next three chapters cover the case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
379 See for example Connor, Institutional Change for Sustainable Development. Pp.87-131. 
380 See R. Chapman, Boston, J., Schwass, M., ed. Confronting Climate Change (Wellington: Victoria University 
Press,2006), M.R. Harbrow, "Trends in New Zealand Climate Change Policy" (Massey University, 2007), T. 
Bührs, "Climate Change Policy and New Zealand’s ‘National Interest’: The Need for Embedding Climate Change 
Policy into a Sustainable Development Agenda. ," Political Science 60, no. 1 (2008), Boston, "The Complicated 
Politics of Climate Change.", Bertram, The Carbon Challenge: New Zealand's Emission Trading Scheme, G. Kelly, 
"Climate Change Policy: Actions and Barriers in New Zealand," International Journal of Climate Change Impacts 
and Responses 2, no. 1 (2010). And numerous articles on climate change in Policy Quarterly, particularly 
Volume 4, number 4. 
381 Paul Reynolds pers com 
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Chapter 5 
Case Study: The Development of an Oceans Policy 
5.1 Introduction 
Between the late 1990s and 2012 New Zealand sought to establish an integrated regime to manage 
environmental effects of activities in the oceans surrounding New Zealand. In late 2012 an Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Environmental Effects) Act was passed aiming to protect New Zealand’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) from the potential environmental risks of activities like petroleum exploration, 
seabed mining, and marine energy generation and carbon capture developments. This work began 
around 1998, with an original timetable for completion in 2000. This chapter details the progress of 
efforts to achieve some form of integrated environmental management of New Zealand’s EEZ over 
the past decade and a half. In particular it focuses on the period between 1999 and 2003 when it 
seemed possible a more comprehensive regime might eventuate compared to the 2012 legislation. 
The purpose of this chapter, like the other case studies, is to shed light on government dynamics that 
were at work as policy developed and to assess what happened using the analytical framework and 
questions set out in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Oceans management around New Zealand: context and complexity 
In the 1990s New Zealand’s various regimes for managing marine resources and marine activity were 
fragmented and not integrated. They had either inconsistent or non-existent  environmental 
principles. At the same time there was evidence of environmental impact, largely as a result of 
fishing and fishing methods, and a potential risk of further impact as these and other forms of natural 
resource use and marine transportation activities increased. In addition, there was an international 
dimension arising from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). New Zealand 
ratified UNCLOS in 1996. UNCLOS requires states to establish effective marine governance, including 
obligations to preserve and protect the environment, in order to lay claim to their surrounding EEZ 
and continental shelf.382 
New Zealand is an island nation. It has a distinctive marine biophysical setting.  The nearest large 
landmass, Australia, is 1800 kilometres away. Warm and cold temperate waters of the Pacific Ocean 
and Tasman Sea around New Zealand contain rich and varied biophysical features. New Zealand is 
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surrounded by a very large continental shelf, fifteen times the size of its landmass. The EEZ is the fifth 
largest in the world.383 
The seas around New Zealand are a source of livelihood, transport, commerce, and recreation. 
Fishing is the dominant economic activity in New Zealand’s maritime area, with fish exports worth 
$1.2 billion.384 It expanded from the 1970s from a local fishery to a major exporting activity involving 
deep-water fishing. In the 1980s and 1990s, under the Fisheries Act 1996, a fishing regime was put in 
place based on fish stock management. Quota were set for species harvest (Quota Management 
System QMS), and individual quota (Individual Transferable Quota ITQ) were allocated and then 
transferred or traded within an overall limit for each fish stock , governed by provisions in the 
Fisheries Act to limit environmental impact.385 Fisheries management was the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Fisheries (Minfish) in the period covered by this study. It is now part of the Ministry for 
Primary Industries (MPI). 
Aquaculture was traditionally a small activity, but has grown at 11.7% per year after 1985.386 
Aquaculture was managed spatially under the Resource Management Act (RMA), but approved 
operationally under the Fisheries Act. The RMA only applied to 12 nautical miles from the coast. 
Aquaculture management was overseen by the Ministry for the Environment (MfE), the Department 
of Conservation (DoC), Minfish, and regional councils. 
Offshore oil and gas exploration and production has been underway in New Zealand from the early 
1970s, with oil becoming an increasingly important export commodity. New Zealand historically has 
had limited seabed mining, for iron sands and building materials, although the possibility of new 
ventures has been in prospect since the 1970s.387 There were no formal legal requirement for 
environmental assessment for offshore exploration beyond the twelve mile limit. Management in the 
offshore areas was overseen under the Crown Minerals Act by the Ministry of Commerce,388 and 
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under the Transport Act 1996 by the Ministry of Transport. In the inshore area, oil, gas and mineral 
exploration was covered by the RMA, and subject to environmental assessment. 
New Zealand’s economy relies on overseas trade, and the majority of imports and exports are carried 
by sea. Environmental protection and liability for impacts from the effects of marine transportation 
and infrastructure drew on international conventions, the Maritime Transport Act 1996, and the 
Biosecurity Act 1993. The environmental provisions of this legislation were largely untested in the 
1990s.389 
The onshore sources of pollution of the marine environment and its effects  were managed under 
the Transport Act 1994 by the Ministry of Transport and Maritime New Zealand,  and the  RMA  and 
specific RMA regulations by regional councils.  
Formal spatial protection for conservation purposes could be sought under the Marine Reserves Act 
1978, and provisions under the Fisheries Act 1996. The tests required to establish marine reserves 
were onerous. Apart from one large reserve around the Kermadec Islands north of New Zealand, the 
number and extent of marine reserves in the 1990s was very small. Prior to the 2000s there were few 
areas protected under the Fisheries Act. Legislation prevented deliberate harming of protected 
species (almost exclusively marine mammals and seabirds) but protection from accidental killing, for 
example through fishing activities, was not so explicit. Protected species management was the 
responsibility of DoC, but control of accidental killing from fishing was regulated under the Fisheries 
Act and overseen by Minfish.390 
Environmental and some recreational NGOs were critical of New Zealand’s management of its seas, 
especially environmental impacts of fishing, aspects of aquaculture, and more recently offshore 
mineral and oil and gas exploration. They had a combative relationship with the fishing industry and 
Minfish.391 
Maori claimed customary rights and interests in the coastal and marine area, and asserted ownership 
rights, based on fishing tradition, other resource use, and cultural associations.392 The Maori 
argument was based on both customary and indigenous peoples’ rights, and Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Waitangi signed in 1840 giving Maori exclusive possession and rangatiratanga over their lands, 
forests, fisheries and taoanga. Some literature asserts also that New Zealand communities, not just 
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Maori, generally display cultural and historical attachments that may influence attitudes to marine 
management, because of their proximity to the coast.393 
From a policy-maker’s perspective it might appear that the policy issue was simply one of adjusting 
New Zealand’s institutional arrangements to meet the requirements of UNCLOS, including its 
environmental requirements. The conflict potential did not appear especially high. Although conflict 
might be expected in the fisheries arena, Maori interests in the 1990s were nascent (but didn’t 
remain this way as the following narrative will show), there were potential economic and 
environmental  gains to be made from actioning UNCLOS, and value in providing certainty with 
environmental standards (presumably provided those standards were not seen as overly onerous 
from an industry perspective). In contrast, however, there were significant knowledge gaps regarding 
marine ecosystems. In addition,  understanding  about the lack of integration of environmental 
standards and conflicting requirements of various pieces of legislation was low - other  than among a 
small groups of officials, NGOs, and some industry interests. Nevertheless,  in the late 1990s, it might 
have been predicted that,  provided the conflict potential could be kept within bounds, the low 
visibility of the issue might not have increased complexity but actually supported prompt policy 
development. This did not happen however. The next section traces the development of an oceans 
policy between 1998 and 2012. 
5.3 Developing oceans policy: government responses and initiatives 
5.3.1 Background 
Demand for change in policy about New Zealand’s ocean management  came in the late 1990s. It 
originated from two directions, and involved a number of main actors. Different government 
departments were considering  concurrently two different issues: policy requirements following on 
from ratification of UNCLOS in 1996, and how to deal with overlaps between the RMA and the 
Fisheries Act. The former involved the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), economic 
ministries, and Land Information New Zealand (LINZ , responsible for surveys and boundary 
delimitation). The latter was driven by the Minister for the Environment, Simon Upton. He had taken 
over chairing the UN Committee on Sustainable Development at the very same time as the UN had 
declared 1998 as the International Year of the Oceans. He was aware of how other countries were 
developing new approaches to oceans management. He was also aware of the issues involving RMA 
and Fisheries Act overlaps. Upton tasked officials from MfE, DoC and Minfish to review ocean 
management arrangements and recommend how governance provisions might be improved, with an 
environmental perspective in mind.  
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Meanwhile, two countries with circumstances similar to New Zealand had already provided examples 
of post-UNCLOS regimes. Canada passed an Oceans Act in 1997. Australia developed an oceans 
regime by late 1998. Australia’s regime was especially important. New Zealand’s and Australia’s EEZs 
intersect at three points. Australia had developed a coherent strategic planning and management 
framework quickly.394 It comprised a formal oceans policy, processes for implementation through 
regional marine plans, and an organisational structure of a Ministerial Oceans Board (disestablished 
in 2005), a statutory National Oceans Office (integrated into the federal Department of Environment 
and Heritage in 2005 as its “marine division”), regional marine plan steering committees, and a 
National Oceans Advisory Group. 395  
5.3.2 Initiation 
In chronological sequence, a group of officials from MfE, DoC and Minfish undertook a review for 
Upton (the review, though independent, informed work being undertaken in drafting a New Zealand 
Biodiversity Strategy).396 Environmental NGOs ran a conference, and promoted better environmental 
protection of the EEZ.397 The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE) began an 
investigation of New Zealand’s marine management arrangements.398 Officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Treasury and LINZ  promoted a survey of the continental shelf as a 
condition of ratifying UNCLOS. 399 A government funded conference, aligned with the continental 
shelf delineation, promoted offshore mineral resource exploration and exploitation.400  
Work on policy, which had started with an environmental initiative, began to emphasise the 
economic opportunities. John Luxton, Minister of Food, Fibre and Biosecurity, speaking on behalf of 
Upton, said,  
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The marine environment is a precious and finite resource. When we use it, we should be looking 
to be as efficient as possible so we can generate maximum returns for our economy with the 
minimum of impact on the environment.401 
On the same day, the Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, announced she would personally lead the 
process of developing an “Oceans Strategy.” DoC would later that year describe it as “the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s (DPMC) marine management and oceans policy 
project.”402 The Prime Minister said she expected the strategy to be completed in 2000.403 
Thus work on an oceans policy was progressing with speed. Prime Ministerial leadership gave the 
policy development work increased priority, especially as it was run from DPMC, a department that 
carried the authority of reporting to the Prime Minister.  It had a twin economic and environmental 
objective (with the former emphasised more than the latter in formal government announcements). 
It might have been expected that in these circumstances a policy would be produced  in short order. 
But at this point things reached a turning point, because in November 1999 a general election 
occurred and the government changed. 
5.3.3 Change of government and policy reassessment 
The Labour Alliance coalition that formed the government after November 1999 did not come with a 
defined position on oceans policy. It did not appear in Labour’s manifesto, for example. 404 However, 
both MfE and DoC briefings to their new ministers emphasised that addressing the fragmentary 
oceans management regime was a priority. 405 There appears to have been no immediate formal 
review of policy direction, however. Rather, it was a case of policy inertia but with a significant 
difference in that an environmental initiative became the vehicle supporting further work. The New 
Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was approved by a new Cabinet in January 2000 (although drafted 
under the previous government, with its main goals and objectives largely unchanged). One of the 
many actions in the strategy called for more comprehensive policy objectives and defined 
departmental responsibilities to better manage environmental effects in the oceans. The strategy 
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retained earlier administrative arrangements, at least in the interim. DPMC continued to be the 
leaddepartment. 406  
Meanwhile, in December 1999, the PCE released a report on the management of New Zealand’s 
marine environment. The report said current marine management structures were arbitrary, 
fragmented, and lacked a coherent overarching strategic focus that would integrate diverse interests 
and values. It recommended reviewing the adequacies of the current legislative and policy 
framework to ensure integrated management of coastal and marine areas, giving high priority to 
identifying and protecting a selection of seamounts for information and ecological research 
purposes, and establishing a Coastal and Oceans Task Force to develop an overarching strategy for 
the sustainable management of New Zealand's marine environment.407 
Thus the new Labour-led government was in part steered into agreeing to continue with oceans 
work, though with no evidence that it was disinclined to do this.  
Some literature on New Zealand’s oceans policy development says that policy work effectively got 
underway only after 1999 and that the PCE report was the most influential factor. In fact, the 
evidence is that work had already started within departments in late 1998, the previous government 
had given a commitment to produce an oceans policy, and departmental views also had some 
influence in addition to the  PCE report.408  
Accompanying the Biodiversity Strategy, in May 2000, was a large budget allocation. There were two 
decisions in that budget that affected oceans policy: the first was $2.5 million to fund the 
development of ocean policy over three years; the second made Minfish responsible for the funding, 
thus transferring financial responsibility for the process from DPMC.409 These decisions also had 
another effect. The Minister of Fisheries was Pete Hodgson. He had been the opposition 
spokesperson on environmental matters. Although not Minister for the Environment, he played a 
prominent role in environmental policy development in the years after the 1999 change of 
government.410 Cabinet decisions in March 2000 about the Biodiversity Strategy had identified the 
Minister for the Environment as responsible for marine action. In July 2000, however, Hodgson 
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became lead minister of an ad hoc group of six ministers with delegated responsibility for developing 
an oceans policy.411 
Therefore, while there is evidence for continuity between 1999 and 2000, there was a definite 
altered emphasis to policy work. In July 2000, Cabinet, besides agreeing to a ministerial group, also 
agreed that an oceans policy should identify clear goals and principles within a framework that 
managed human impacts on the marine environment, as foreshadowed in the Biodiversity 
Strategy.412 In other words, the policy should have an overriding environmental imperative, rather 
than the more development oriented imperative evident in previous policy direction. Furthermore, 
environmental officials had a senior lead minister with environmental leanings, there were resources 
to pursue a policy, and there was a Cabinet mandate, all of which suggest ocean policy would emerge 
in the near future.  
5.3.4 An oceans strategy: “good process” and the possibly comprehensive 
framework: 2000-2003 
Between 2000 and 2003 a framework for oceans management did emerge, roughly in accord with 
the timetable planned in the 2000 budget. It was not plain sailing, however. 
Hodgson was a hands-on minister. He played an influential role in the progress of the oceans policy 
in the early 2000s, promoting what he called “good policy process.” 413 He was wary of departmental 
agendas. Hodgson created an extra-departmental secretariat (comprised of departmental and local 
government secondments) reporting directly to him, rather than departments, and led by a Minfish 
secondee.414 The secretariat leadership adopted a process-driven and staged approach to the policy 
development.415 A public consultation process was agreed in July 2000, based on a ministerial 
advisory committee, but it took until March 2001 to appoint the committee.416 The committee 
reported on 30 September 2001, having completed an extensive and expensive (approximately $1.5 
million) nationwide consultation programme. Its report, entitled Healthy seas: Healthy society, 
contained aspirational statements about the desire for clean, productive and accessible oceans and 
                                                          
411 Risk, "An Oceans Policy for New Zealand: Why, What, How?". P.299. 
412 Cabinet paper CAB (00) M23/2c. See also Foster, "New Zealand's Oceans Policy." P.475 
413 “Good process will be essential to getting this together”. See speech to New Zealand Marine Sciences 
Society, Waikato University, 30 August 2000, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/managing-our-oceans 
(accessed 20/11/2012).  
414 Lindsay Gow pers com, “He (Hodgson) was concerned about sectoral and departmental capture and related 
agendas biasing policy analysis of important cross sectoral issues such as oceans policy.”  
415 See C.M. Risk, "Oceans Policy" (paper presented at the Wellington District Law Society, Wellington, 8 May 
2002)..———, "An Oceans Policy for New Zealand: Why, What, How?".  
416 The Committee was chaired by ex-Governor General Dame Cath Tizard and comprised David McDowell, 
David Anderson, Mac Beggs, Mark Bellingham, Rikki Gage, Abigail Smith and Wally Stone.  
5: Oceans policy 
99 
noted the need for an inclusive, integrated and comprehensive management regime.417 It was 
criticised as being too general.418  The oceans secretariat concurrently produced five working papers 
between July 2000 and June 2002, dealing with process in fine detail.419 
At the same time tensions had been building within the bureaucracy. These were acknowledged in 
the first suite of secretariat papers (released in March 2002) which referred to,  
…lack of integration between legislation, policy, decision-making, and activities in the marine 
environment and, ...1.Differing, and sometimes conflicting, philosophical drivers and objectives 
across key statutes governing oceans management. 2. Some statutory gaps, particularly outside 
the 12 nautical mile limit. 3. Implementation difficulties, or a failure to implement current laws in 
an integrated and collaborative way by different agencies. 4. The need for better information.420 
The internal image of the oceans work wasn’t helped by pressure to deliver more resources to a 
secretariat that for all intents and purposes operated as an independent unit under the direction of 
Hodgson. There was also a somewhat combative relationship between the secretariat leadership and 
departmental officials.421 While the secretariat reports helped support later work, nevertheless, 
there was scepticism amongst departmental officials about the increasing scope of the policy work, 
and some frustration ministerially about slow progress.422  
Hodgson had begun to realise that he needed to revert to senior public service oversight if he was to 
deliver something on oceans policy. Furthermore, senior public service managers were never entirely 
comfortable with being responsible for a specific area of policy development which they felt should 
lie with sector-specific agencies. From a departmental perspective things were getting rather messy, 
with confused accountability between the oceans secretariat, Minfish, DPMC, and MfE.  Hodgson 
agreed with representations made by the head of DPMC and a deputy State Services Commissioner 
that funding and leadership of the oceans work should be allocated to MfE. 423 In June 2002 Hodgson 
contacted the Deputy Secretary for the Ministry for the Environment, Lindsay Gow (then Acting CEO 
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but just on the verge of handing over to a new CEO) and asked him to lead interdepartmental 
work.424 Hodgson asked for the work to be located within MfE, but not dominated by MfE staff.425  
 Thus, later in 2002, the locus of support for ocean policy development shifted from a semi-
independent secretariat to more senior public service-led operation hosted by MfE. Staff were 
seconded from five agencies (MfE, DoC, Minfish, MED, and TPK) with MfE and DoC contributing the 
substance of the operation. It was overseen by a steering committee of senior public servants from 
MfE (Gow, Acting CEO and subsequently deputy head), DoC (Johnston, second tier general manager), 
Minfish (Crothers, Deputy Secretary), and MED (Perkins, third tier manager), accompanied on the 
committee by slightly more junior Treasury, Te Puni Kokiri and DPMC officials.426 In Gow’s view, the 
more solid cross departmental underpinning combined with the leadership and technical and 
analytical abilities of the people involved allowed the policy work to progress more effectively. 
The new interdepartmental team (although still calling itself an oceans secretariat) embarked on 
what they called a stock take with internal papers, a suite of consultant reports, and a second round 
of consultations (this time just with key stakeholder groups) and submissions in March 2003. All this 
was aimed at reporting to Cabinet with a draft oceans policy by July 2003. 427 It was during this period 
that a working draft of an oceans policy was crafted ready to submit to Cabinet. It included plans for 
a comprehensive new framework to integrate and unify the governance of all activity in the EEZ. 428 
This effort had not been achieved without internal debate between officials, largely between the 
environmentally-oriented arguments put forward by DoC and MfE representatives, and the rights-
based economic arguments from MED, Treasury, and Minfish representatives. In order to preserve a 
degree of unity and cross-departmental support, the new proposed regime endeavoured to 
accommodate existing institutions.429 But what was different and significant environmentally was 
that these would be subject to an overarching set of principles based on environmentally sustainable 
management. By June 2003, officials had agreed on a comprehensive new oceans regime. This was to 
involve an Oceans Act, an Oceans Minister, a national oceans plan, and an oceans agency - all 
relatively similar to the institutions Australia had put in place five years earlier, but akin to the way 
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the RMA was designed. The primary objectives of the regime were to sustain the health of ocean 
ecosystems, and meet Treaty of Waitangi and international obligations. Its secondary objectives 
were to provide for public use, access and enjoyment, provide for public return, and provide for 
enhanced environmental enjoyment. Decision-making principles were to be transparent and 
participatory, managing within constraints of uncertainty, respecting existing rights, interests, values 
and future options, and avoiding, remedying, or mitigating environmental effects. The oceans plan 
would contain baseline ecological standards, and set national priorities, processes and tools for 
resolving competing uses. Maori were to be involved at all levels of decision-making. It was proposed 
to seek Cabinet approval after a joint Ministerial consideration in July 2003 and pursue a work plan 
to implement the regime by 30 June 2004. 430    
Literature on the 2003 period seems to assume that it was just a stage in the policy development 
process.431 However, it is argued here that the policy was close to approval. Officials, coordinated by 
MfE with significant DoC and Minfish input, had achieved agreement on what the framework should 
be. They had the support of the key minister and, although speculative, it is entirely possible 
Hodgson might have carried it through to Cabinet approval. Thus, it seemed that New Zealand was 
about to create a new framework for managing its surrounding oceans and continental shelf. It was 
one based on integrated environmental principles and one that would be comprehensive, in that it 
applied to all marine activities. 
5.3.5 The Foreshore and Seabed Issue and Aftermath 
On 19 June 2003 the Court of Appeal issued a judgement saying that there was a possibility that 
Maori customary title might extend to areas of the foreshore and seabed.432 The case had arisen 
from a local Maori claim to inshore coastal space for aquaculture in the Marlborough Sounds. The 
government reacted and almost immediately announced it would legislate to clarify public 
ownership rights to the foreshore and seabed. Maori reacted angrily. There was widespread 
polarised political debate.433  
Lindsay Gow says that until June 2003, a trusting and effective working relationship had been 
progressively built with all sectors but particularly with Maori.  The Government’s response to the 
Seabed and Foreshore issue severed all the trust that had been built.  It made it impossible to 
continue the working relationships.  In fact, so severe was the effect, he says, that officials 
                                                          
430 MfE file PD OC 02-02-01. Memo to Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Oceans Policy, 24 June 2003. 
431 Vince, "New Zealand's Oceans Governance: Calming Turbulent Waters." Pp.415-416. McGinnis, "Oceans 
Governance: The New Zealand Dimension - Summary Report." P.23. 
432 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (Ngati Apa). 
433 J. Ruru, "A Politically Fuelled Tsunami: The Foreshore/Seabed Controversy in Aotearoa Me Te Wai 
Pounamu/ New Zealand," The Journal of the Polynesian Society 113, no. 1 (2004). 
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recommended to the Minister that the project as designed and as operating had to be terminated.  
Without Maori involvement and trust, it could not continue in its multi-sectoral and inclusive form.434   
The effect on oceans policy of the foreshore and seabed debate was that work was effectively halted 
at a political level, and the inter-departmental oceans team was effectively disbanded although work 
by officials limped on behind the scenes for a few months. In November 2003, MfE recommended 
work be delayed, a small team in MfE progressed an Oceans Act “as far as possible in-house”, and 
“assist with other projects within MfE that are currently under pressure because of lack of resource 
(i.e. aquaculture).”435 In December 2003 the Cabinet Business Committee agreed that further 
consideration and consultation on the draft oceans package be delayed until the foreshore and 
seabed issue was sorted out and that only some “small amount of policy work” would  continue.436 
The “small policy work” involved options for assessing and approving environmental effects of 
proposed activities in the EEZ.437 Workshops were held in 2004 about information requirements and 
on managing environmental effects in the EEZ. 438 The results of both of these sets of workshops, 
however, were not published until June 2005. Ministers meanwhile grappled with the political fallout 
of the government decision to legislate for Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed. The 
intellectual capital accumulated over the past four years amongst officials was dispersed and 
dissipated. Crucial cross disciplinary and cross agency work and understanding was lost.  Immediate 
future work did not have the degree of focused senior officials’ attention as had occurred in 2003. 
Reorganisations in MfE, DoC and Minfish meant that restarting any new work would take some 
time.439 
The foreshore and seabed issue, meantime, became an intense political event. In November 2004, 
legislation was passed declaring the foreshore and seabed to be crown land. This was accompanied 
by major public controversy. A new Maori political party was created and became a feature on the 
                                                          
434 Lindsay Gow pers com. 
435 MfE file PD OC 03-B-0343 Memo to Minister Responsible for Oceans Policy 
436 Cabinet committee paper  EDC Min (04) 9/4 
437 The work was deemed necessary because “there is currently no formal process requiring companies to fully 
assess the effects of their activities” (Cabinet committee minute EDC (04) 57). This situation was not remedied 
until August 2011. CAB Min (11) 19/7 B,  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/cab-min-11-19-7B.pdf 
(accessed 24/8/2012) 
438 These workshops concluded that umbrella legislation should be drafted “over the next 2 or 3 years” and in 
the short term the oil and gas industry in particular should negotiate “industry wide voluntary agreement”. The 
report of the 2004 workshops finished by saying, “Work on developing any legislation can begin once Oceans 
Policy resumes and Cabinet approval has been sought.” Vince, "New Zealand's Oceans Governance: Calming 
Turbulent Waters." P. 417, 
439 Key leadership personnel moved on. “After some circling round, the decision was taken to quietly disband 
the operation, though its demise was not admitted publicly for some time. It was never restarted in its original 
form, and the only work done subsequently was to look at environmental regulation in the EEZ. As they say the 
rest is history.” Lindsay Gow pers com. 
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political stage. Although Maori interests had been recognised and acknowledged in earlier oceans 
work, the debate meant that in future it would become an integral part of oceans governance.440 
5.3.6 Oceans policy: the slow march to a compromise - 2003 to 2012 
Although the foreshore and seabed issue had almost halted policy work, it hadn’t been forgotten by 
some outside interests, in particular the environmental NGOs. The Green Party and the National 
party spokesperson for the Environment portfolio, Nick Smith, regularly questioned what the 
government was doing about oceans policy.441 
In March 2005, Pete Hodgson commented in a speech that he was looking at getting the oceans 
“project” going again.442 In July, the Cabinet Business Committee considered a paper on Oceans 
Policy: Framework for future programme.443 In November, the government revealed to an NGO 
conference that policy work had recommenced. It was announced in a speech delivered by an MfE 
official on behalf of the Minister for the Environment, David Benson Pope. 
I want Oceans policy to be a flagship of sustainable development in action and a means of 
optimising the value of our oceans to New Zealand. By value, I mean economically, 
environmentally and culturally.444 
But, in fact, the words in the speech suggested a scope that was far more expansive than what was 
actually occurring. A Cabinet paper and minute in December 2005 set the tone for the work in the 
future. It was to focus on “fixing the most pressing problems.”445 There is little evidence of a desire 
by most departments to resurrect the earlier framework. The language of “fixing” correlated with a 
new philosophy promoted within MfE.446 Politically, Cabinet seems to have shied away from a 
comprehensive framework for oceans management in view of the controversy arising from the 
seabed and foreshore controversy. Some sort of regulatory regime was a more minimal way of 
achieving a commitment to an oceans policy without too much angst.  
                                                          
440 Ruru, "A Politically Fuelled Tsunami: The Foreshore/Seabed Controversy in Aotearoa Me Te Wai Pounamu/ 
New Zealand." Pp.57-72; Vince, "New Zealand's Oceans Governance: Calming Turbulent Waters." P. 416. 
441  See for example Hansard 2006 question No. 6390. Hon Dr. Nick Smith, “What is the timeline for the 
completion of the current stage of the oceans policy project, and what are the next steps?”  
http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Business/QWA/c/e/d/QWA_06390_2006-6390-2006-Hon-Dr-Nick-Smith-
to-the-Minister-for-the.htm (accessed 21/11/2012) 
442 Launch of Oceans Survey 20/20, 16 March 2005; http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/ocean-survey-2020-
launch-speech (accessed 21/11/2012) 
443 Cabinet committee paper CBC (05) 82. 
444 David Benson-Pope, “Seachange 05 Oceans Policy Recommenced”,  
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/seachange-05-oceans-policy-recommenced (accessed 21/11/2012). 
445 Cabinet committee paper CBC (05) 280, and committee minute CBC Min (05)19/5. See 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/oceans/current-work/cabinet-paper-eez-effects-legislation.html (accessed 
21/11/2012).  
446 MfE, "Annual Report 2002-2003," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2003). P.2. This language 
coincided with the arrival of a new CEO. The language of “fixing” may reflect a then-current view amongst 
central agencies that MfE was too policy-centred (Lindsay Gow pers com). 
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The narrower focus, the centrality now of Maori issues, and the evident caution of ministers and the 
bureaucracy, came together in a Cabinet paper in October 2006, confirmed in a Cabinet Minute in 
December 2006.447 The thrust of the policy was to concentrate on gaps and inconsistencies in the 
regulation of environmental effects in the EEZ and develop a legislative option to address these (but 
in the short term MfE and the minerals industry agreed on a short term option of voluntary 
measures448). Cabinet agreed with officials’ recommendations that policy and any new legislation was 
not intended to change existing fisheries, transport, maritime safety, and protected species 
legislation. Resource ownership and allocation issues were also excluded. 449 In these cabinet papers, 
it is evident the one agency, Minfish, continued to promote an integrated approach. It was recorded 
in the cabinet paper that Minfish thought there were benefits if the EEZ legislation set environmental 
standards that were binding on all legislation and activities operating in the EEZ, including the 
Fisheries Act 1996.  The Ministry for the Environment considered this was beyond the scope of 
existing Cabinet directions, and that it would complicate implementation of the EEZ legislation.450 
The MfE view was the one adopted by Cabinet. Contention and controversy were avoided, and 
existing institutional interests were largely left alone. Nevertheless, final direction on the shape of 
policy took another year. 
During much of 2007, officials, led by MfE, hammered out a discussion paper451 and analysed 
submissions. Once again, there was comparative leisure in the speed of policy development. At the 
same time the Environment Minister’s attention was on other matters, notably political controversy 
involving his interaction with his department.452 
But, finally, a crucial decision point was reached. A new minister, Trevor Mallard, held the 
Environment portfolio. The Labour-led government committed itself to a policy platform that 
emphasised environmental sustainability as a priority. 453 In December 2007, a paper was presented 
to Cabinet entitled “Proposal for Exclusive Economic Zone Environmental Effects Legislation.”454 The 
                                                          
447 Cabinet committee paper CBC (06) 37/1E and Cabinet minute Cab Min (06) 47/4B. 
448 Vince, "New Zealand's Oceans Governance: Calming Turbulent Waters." P.417. 
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paper was not confirmed by Cabinet till June 2008. Nevertheless, after ten years, an oceans policy 
seemed likely to emerge, albeit more narrow and modest than the one proposed earlier.  
New Zealand’s “oceans policy” was now not an overarching environmental framework as proposed in 
2003. Rather, it was designed to manage environmental effects in the EEZ, where these were not 
covered by existing legislation, an approach designed to not disturb existing arrangements and 
interests.  
The legislation proposed in June 2008 was to be similar to the RMA in the sense that it was principle 
based and proposed using a statutory policy statement to express goals, priorities and objectives. It 
also intended to use the RMA-like consents process based on a precautionary principle (but only for 
those activities not covered by environmental provisions of other legislation). Appeals could be made 
to the Environment Court. Environmental consent processes were to be run by an “EEZ 
Commissioner” (again, similar to RMA resource consent processes) based in MfE. Probably most 
critical was the purpose of the legislation. It was “to provide for uses of EEZ resources, and to 
regulate the effects of those uses in order to protect the environment and to ensure any uses (or the 
effects of those uses in the case of non-renewable resources) are environmentally sustainable”. The 
Minister for the Environment was invited to report to the Cabinet Legislative Committee by the end 
of July 2008 with the intent of introducing a bill into Parliament before the end of August 2008. 455 
The 2008 decisions had avoided conflict with the powerful fishing lobby. They had strengthened 
Maori rights and interests. They had not addressed some environmental NGO concerns about 
conservation and creation of further spatial protection zones.  Nevertheless, an oceans policy was 
agreed by the government 
But it didn’t happen as intended. Drafting of legislation took longer than expected. By the time a near 
final draft was complete in late 2008 a general election had been called for November. In accordance 
with convention, parliamentary bills were postponed.  
The 2008 election resulted in a change of government and brought to power a National Party-led 
centre-right coalition. There were at least three features of this change that affected oceans policy 
work. First, the National Party-led government differentiated itself from the previous Labour Party-
led government by giving priority to economic development and downplaying environmental 
sustainability. Second, the new government involved a coalition with, among other minor parties, the 
Maori Party, which had been founded on opposition to the Labour Government’s handling of the 
foreshore and seabed issue (and a perceived link between that issue and oceans policy). Third, the 
                                                          
455 See page 5 of Cabinet minute (11) 19/7B, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/cab-paper-eez-
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5: Oceans policy 
106 
economy began to decline from late 2008, and the government looked to promote new economic 
activity, including in the EEZ. Nevertheless, departments argued that New Zealand’s oceans 
governance still needed to be overhauled.456 They were supported by the new Minister of the 
Environment, Nick Smith. He had long experience in environmental matters. He resurrected the work 
on oceans policy, but not immediately.  
In April 2010, Nick Smith said in a report to Cabinet that an EEZ bill had been, “partly drafted by the 
previous government. In principle, I support the underlying policy for the EEZ bill.” He went on to say 
Cabinet would consider EEZ policy in late 2010. 457  Also in 2010, the government actively sought, and 
received, applications for new offshore deep-water oil and gas exploration, which triggered a 
reaction from environmental NGOs about the apparent lack of enforceable environmental 
regulations.458 In October 2011, a large container ship, the M/V Rena grounded in the Bay of Plenty 
causing New Zealand’s largest oil spill. Gaps were found in New Zealand’s marine management 
regime for clean-up liability, and environmental assessment and protection procedures in the EEZ – 
gaps that, ironically, had been identified in the very early stages of the oceans policy process as far 
back as 1998.459 The government response was to resurrect the 2008 work to “fix the gaps” in New 
Zealand’s EEZ legislation. The result was a redrafted 2008 EEZ bill with the Minister, Nick Smith, 
saying: 
I propose proceeding with the legislation (approved in 2008) but changing decisions to reflect this 
government’s different priorities with greater emphasis on supporting economic development 
opportunities and minimising compliance costs.460 
The increased emphasis on economic objectives was accompanied by a change in the tone of advice 
some departments gave to ministers. Whereas in 2008 combined departmental briefings (the 
“natural resources“ group) to the incoming government emphasised environmental integrity as an 
                                                          
456 Marine issues were a priority for the grouping of departments dealing with natural resources in 2008 and in 
2011. The 2008 briefing to the incoming government from the natural resources grouping of departments 
stressed the lack of outcomes or strategy to guide how the marine environment is managed. The briefing 
argued that it compromised the ability to ensure environmental integrity while providing for different uses and 
values (See “Briefing to the incoming government 2008: Environmental sustainability,” 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/all/files/BIM_environmental_sustainability_0.pdf). 
457 Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee March 2010. www.mfe.govt.nz 
458 See McGinnis, "Living up to the Brand: Greening Aotearoa's Marine Policy." Pp. 17-28 
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ocean policy priority, by 2012, briefings from the same group of departments emphasised rights and 
responsibilities and benefits and costs.461 
The EEZ bill, when introduced into Parliament in 2011 caused a barrage of criticism from 
environmental NGOs, academics, and the PCE.462 The purpose of the EEZ Bill originally was to 
“achieve a balance between the protection of the environment and economic development in 
relation to activities in the exclusive economic zone.” The bill was altered before its final reading to 
introduce a stronger environmental purpose.463 The revised purpose was to “promote the 
sustainable management of the exclusive economic zone”, using the definition of sustainable 
management set out in section 5 of the RMA. The aim of the Act, as set out in its explanatory note, 
was to fill gaps in the environmental management regime in the EEZ. Existing laws such as the 
Fisheries Act 1996 would continue to operate largely as at present. Activities covered by the EEZ Act 
included seabed mining, some aspects of petroleum activities, energy generation, carbon capture 
and storage, and marine farming. The note also said the Act gave effect to New Zealand’s obligations 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to manage and protect the natural 
resources of the EEZ. 464 
And so, after a period of fourteen years, New Zealand finally arrived at a form of oceans policy. It had 
been a lengthy and tortuous mix of near success and policy paralysis. Does it, as one commentary 
says, help illustrate the complexities of policy development, lack of sectoral integration, and changes 
in policy direction? 465 
                                                          
461 The 2012 briefing promoted enacting enabling legislation for the EEZ to regulate the environmental impacts 
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464 Bills Digest, Digest No. 1923: Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 
2011.  
465 Vince, "New Zealand's Oceans Governance: Calming Turbulent Waters." P.412. 
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5.4 Discussion 
The narrative of New Zealand’s oceans policy shows, in summary, a period of policy-forming taking 
place comparatively quickly over a period of four years, and the completion and near approval of a 
comprehensive strategic environmental framework for oceans management around New Zealand. 
The proposed strategy was derailed by a related coastal and marine management issue of Maori 
rights. A long tail of policy development followed, drawing on the previous work but conditioned by 
political and bureaucratic caution arising from the way Maori rights had overturned the original 
proposed policy. After the M/V Rena disaster in 2011, however, policy work sped up. Even then, a  
less comprehensive policy in environmental terms emerged compared to that envisaged in 1999 and 
certainly in 2003. What can we make of the factors that influenced these various permutations of 
New Zealand’s oceans policy? 
Issues associated with developing a more integrated approach to oceans management were not 
especially complex, initially. What complexity there was early on arose from tension between 
commercial and environmental interests. This was manifest in the ideological toing and froing 
between economic objectives (which assumed dominance in 1999) and environmental objectives 
(which assumed dominance in 2000). Awareness and visibility of the policy problem was not very 
high at the start, and only became more so after the report of the ministerial advisory committee in 
2000 and the policy work undertaken at the same time. The development of better knowledge and 
awareness seems to have helped reduce conflict potential over policy prescriptions within the 
machinery of government, in that it identified problems to be addressed, but paradoxically, 
increasing the visibility of the issues in the wider public arena may have contributed to raising the 
conflict potential. Where the oceans policy became more complex was after the foreshore and 
seabed controversy. The controversy did not arise from the proposed oceans policy itself. 
Nevertheless, it elevated the conflict potential hugely. This event awoke nascent Maori concerns 
about their rights. These were successfully translated onto the political stage, resulting in lower 
political priority for an oceans policy where it risked exacerbating Maori concerns. The influence of 
events is also apparent as a result of the 1999 and 2008 elections, in that 1999 increased an 
environmental emphasis and 2008 decreased it. The grounding of the MV Rena in 2011 (combined 
with growing interest in offshore oil and gas exploration) were events that increased the policy 
priority, but this didn’t necessarily translate into significantly greater environmental priority owing to 
an emphasis in government on economic values compared to environmental ones. Events thus 
increased complexity. Together, these intervening variables affected cognitive features within 
government, increased the priority of political rationalities over environmental ones (as well as 
economic ones), and constrained the influence of institutional and agency features. 
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In examining the intra-government sources of environmental policy effectiveness (the dependent 
variable), it is instructive to contrast the policy that nearly emerged in 2003, with the one that 
emerged by 2012. 
In terms of environmental effectiveness the 2003 policy would have established environmental 
values as the principal priority, and, by saying that other legislation had to give effect to this 
principle, would have firmly integrated environmental values into the way New Zealand authorities 
approached ocean’s management. The 2012 EEZ legislation established environmental values as a 
priority, but it perpetuated a sector-based approach rather than an integrated one, hence decreasing 
its environmental effectiveness. 
In terms of potential policy effectiveness, the 2003 proposal set out clear authorities, law, rules, 
tools and means of implementation, via a proposed Oceans Act, strategic direction through a 
national oceans plan (a form of mandatory national policy statement), and an oceans minister and an 
oceans agency to carry out oversight and policy coordination. It is, of course, difficult to judge the 
support base for these proposals because they were never finalised. Clearly there was some support, 
given the findings of the Ministerial Advisory Committee, the consciousness raising effect of their 
public hearings around the country, and the calls for better oceans management from the PCE, 
environmental NGOs, and from some in the petroleum and mining sectors who wanted more 
certainty about rules that applied to their activities. In contrast, the fishing industry was cautious at 
best, and as events transpired, Maori support was highly conditional.  
The 2012 legislation was less integrated both internally and externally, in that while it established the 
EPA as a regulator, its role was confined to those activities not already controlled under other 
legislation, and was more limited in its rules, tools and implementation compared with what had 
been proposed in 2003. It had a support base in industry and Maoridom because it either met or 
avoided impinging on their interests. It had (just) satisfied environmental groups by changing the 
purposes of the legislation at the last minute, but its lack of overall integration caused those who 
wanted a firmer environmental focus to oceans management to be qualified in their support. 
The influence of intra-government features (the independent variables) on the 2003 ocean policy 
proposal and the 2012 approach are revealed to be different in effect. 
In both cases agency was a significant driver, especially from a number of influential ministers: Upton 
in 1998 by getting oceans management on the policy agenda and driving an environmental emphasis; 
Hodgson in continuing the drive between 2000 and 2003 with a policy-process emphasis; Mallard in 
2008 with a political emphasis to deliver on promises to produce some (any) sort of policy; and Smith 
in 2009 to 2012 because he promoted the value of an oceans policy and to deal with the political, 
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environmental and financial risks arising from the M/V Rena disaster.466 Leadership within the 
bureaucracy was evident in the period between 2002 and 2003, particularly from senior managers of 
MfE. Otherwise there is no evidence that it was consistently strong. In fact, in the mid-2000s it was 
minimal. 
 Evidence a strong positive environmental institutional effect is apparent in the period between 2001 
and 2003. For much of the rest of the time it was comparatively limited. There is evidence that the 
institutional arrangements up until 2002 served to delay things, not deliberately, but by emphasising 
policy processes at the expense of policy substance, and awkward organisational arrangements with 
the policy run in effect from DPMC in 1999 and for nearly two years by an ad hoc arrangement 
involving Hodgson’s office. Between 2002 and 2003, however, environmental and policy 
effectiveness were enhanced by re-organised arrangements which focused resources, gathered 
together officials of both seniority and capability, and an assigned leadership role for MfE. After 
2003, there was limited environmental institutional drive unless prompted from a political level. The 
last minute changes to the legislation in a more environmental direction in 2012 were the result of 
external lobbying, not a concerted institutional drive from departments or ministers. 
Cognitive features - views and priorities about environmental values and how these are interpreted - 
emerged in what was described above as the “toing and froing” between economic and 
environmental objectives. Economic values came to the fore in 1999 and seemed on track to focus 
on opening up opportunities for offshore oil and gas exploitation and seabed mining, although 
acknowledging the environmental protection dimension. Environmental values came to the fore in 
2000 and prevailed until 2003. Political priorities dominated until 2008, although an environmental 
dimension remained alive. Economic priorities reasserted themselves after 2008, even more strongly 
than they had in 1999. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe how much time was involved in producing any oceans policy. It 
took about fifteen years. Australia and Canada had produced similar policies much more quickly. 
These provided models which New Zealand could have copied without embarking, as it did, on 
developing a policy from first principles. Furthermore, by not pressing forward with more urgency, 
oceans policy became subject to the exigencies of events, and led to greater complexity. This brings 
into question both the capacity of the departments charged with developing this particular policy (an 
institutional feature), and a proposition advanced in some New Zealand literature that the 
centralised nature of the New Zealand government system means that, potentially, it can produce 
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between 1998 and 1999, and as opposition spokesperson for environmental matters between 2000 and 2008, 
he had promoted an oceans policy, from an environmental perspective. 
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policy quickly.467 These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 8 dealing with the overall analysis 
of what the case studies show. 
 
In conclusion, actors (agency) and their views (cognitive perspectives) were the key factors that 
explain the more limited oceans policy that emerged in 2012, which in turn were very strongly 
conditioned by events, especially the foreshore and seabed controversy. This introduced significantly 
greater non-environmental complexity to dealing with oceans management. 
However, in the 2003 proposal, institutional features, especially roles (acting as advocates), 
resources (seniority and numbers of staff), the way they organised (structure), views and priority 
applied by MfE and DoC (and Minfish), provide a contrasting set of key factors that would probably 
have explained a stronger environmentally oriented oceans policy if in fact it had eventuated. 
Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the 2012 policy are represented in 
figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 Oceans policy 2012 influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate A or large A) 
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Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the 2003 policy are represented in 
figure 5.2.  
Figure 5.2 Oceans policy 2003 influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate A or large A) 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study: Addressing the Loss of Indigenous Biodiversity 
6.1 Introduction 
Declining indigenous biodiversity is a significant persistent environmental problem in New Zealand. 
This case study examines efforts by central government from 1990s to 2000s to establish a national 
framework designed to address the problem. It summarises the challenges and complexity of the 
issue, then relates chronologically how a national strategy for biodiversity was developed within 
government, and  followed by discussion using the questions set out in Chapter 4. 
6.2 The biodiversity issue: context and complexity 
How challenging is the indigenous biodiversity issue in New Zealand? 
The extent of biodiversity in New Zealand is significant by world standards in terms of numbers of 
unique species and ecology. It is also under pressure and declining.468 
Isolation of New Zealand from other landmasses for over sixty million years has led to a distinctive 
flora and fauna. There are over 2000 species of terrestrial endemic plants, a far greater but as yet un-
quantified number of terrestrial endemic invertebrates, and an indigenous vertebrate fauna 
dominated by birds and amphibians.469 Humans arrived in New Zealand probably about 800 years 
ago, in the last stage of human global expansion (apart from Antarctica). The result was enormous 
change to New Zealand’s indigenous ecology, widespread habitat loss, and species extinctions. 470  
Current pressure on indigenous biodiversity comes from predation and competition from invasive 
introduced species, land-use pressure and water quality decline, and marine resource exploitation.471 
Nevertheless, massive habitat destruction that occurred in earlier times has been halted. 472 New 
Zealand has created an extensive network of legally protected areas encompassing nearly 30% of the 
country. Many protected areas include remote regions. While New Zealand has tended to separate 
                                                          
468 Myers, "Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities." Pp.853-858. 
469 Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. See Young’s Chapter 1 for a 
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470 McGlone, "Dating Initial Maori Environmental Impact in New Zealand." Pp.5-16.  
471 MfE, Environment New Zealand 2007. P.313 & 349. 
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“protected” landscapes and uses from “productive” landscapes and uses, there are also many easily 
accessible protected areas close to major towns and cities.473 
A range of interests are involved in nature conservation, with different, sometimes conflicting, 
motivations.474 These include: advocacy in support of nature conservation by environmental NGOs;  
Maori cultural associations with species and places, and grievances arising from  land acquisitions by 
the Crown (particularly those in the 19th and early 20th century);475 use by outdoor recreation groups; 
concerns of rural land-users about weeds and pests spilling over from protected areas and regulation 
of landowners’ use of resources; territorial local government and regional councils exercising their 
land management functions and representing constituent views; and tourism industry desires to use 
protected areas and at the same time acknowledge their  attraction for their customers and as a 
marketing brand. 476 
Separation between so-called “protected” and “productive” landscapes, a large number of interests 
partly or actively supportive of nature conservation, the degree of ambiguity between Maori cultural 
support of nature conservation and grievance about loss of land, concern from land-users about 
actual and perceived constraint on use of resources because of nature conservation policies, and 
mixed motivations of the tourism industry all create complexity in addressing nature conservation 
issues in New Zealand.  
Thus, New Zealand’s nature conservation challenge is at one level a biophysical problem (particularly 
the effect of invasive species). Understanding of the causes and extent of biodiversity decline is 
incomplete. New Zealand’s ecology is highly diverse and complex, and how it works is not well 
understood.477 Protecting biodiversity from invasive species  across a wide range of ecosystems is 
expensive, and the results of management actions are not guaranteed.478 At another level there are 
human complexities that provide opportunities for action, but also constraints. At heart it is a tension 
between cost and values: the costs arising from protecting biodiversity in large areas of unpopulated 
biodiverse natural landscape in public ownership under taxpayer-funded government agency 
management; and differing value perspectives arising first from debate about how to manage the 
                                                          
473 PCE, "Weaving Resiliance into Our Working Lands," (Wellington: Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2002). P.15. 
474 ———, "Creating Our Future: Sustainable Development in New Zealand," (Wellington: Parliamentary 
Commissioner fro the Environment, 2002). Pp.15-22. MfE, Environment New Zealand 2007. Pp.353-356. 
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publicly held lands, and second how to encourage protection and enhancement of biodiversity on 
privately owned land and in populated areas.479 
 In summary,there are gaps in the scientific knowledge of cause and effect of biodiversity decline. 
Biodiversity protection in New Zealand is costly, in that it requires significant management 
intervention. There is support for management action on the basis of cultural attachment and some 
recognition of economic value from activities such as tourism and marketing of national image. There 
is opposition to intervention where this impacts either on economic opportunity or individual or 
group rights, particularly rural property rights.480  
Taken at face value, biodiversity issues present a moderate degree of complexity, rather than either 
a low level or a high level. The problem of biodiversity decline is publicly visible, but knowledge about 
means to address it is variable. There is considerable room for potential conflict, largely as a result of 
a clash of values about the means of addressing biodiversity decline. New Zealanders’ attachments to 
environmental values find their principal expression in nature conservation, and hence policies to 
enhance biodiversity protection, while they are likely to find support in principle, can also be the 
subject of passionate debate over ways and means.  
The next section records efforts to develop a new national framework to address the problem of 
biodiversity decline. 
6.3 Developing a biodiversity strategy: 1992 – 2000 
Between 1992 and the early 2000s efforts were made to develop goals and actions to respond to 
decline of indigenous biodiversity. This section charts the course of how this policy was developed 
and what happened within government. 
6.3.1 The early phase 
Biodiversity protection as a way of thinking about nature conservation began to gain currency in 
official circles in New Zealand because of two lines of influence: one was international; the other 
came from within the scientific community and the Department of Conservation (DoC). 
In the 1980s the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had begun to focus on biodiversity 
loss. In June 1992 a Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was opened for signing at the UN 
Convention on Environment and Development (the “Earth Summit”) at Rio de Janeiro481. New 
Zealand was a signatory to the Convention, and ratified it in 1994. Article 6 of the Convention, 
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General Measures for Conservation and Sustainable Use,  called on governments to “develop 
national strategies, plans or programmes” and to “integrate…the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies". Australia 
and the United Kingdom had produced nationally based biodiversity strategies by 1993 and officials 
in Wellington were aware of these examples.482  
At the same time domestic  influences emerged. First, in DoC, departmental biologists and ecologists 
advocated a change to the basis of nature conservation priorities, from species orientation to placing 
greater emphasis on habitat and wider ecological functioning and protection.483  Second, as a new 
department created in 1987 (see Chapter 3), DoC’s internal policies and programmes continued to 
draw on the priorities and norms that had existed prior to 1987.484 DoC had wide responsibilities but 
in a time of fiscal constraint it had a reducing budget.485 Consequently, the idea of biodiversity 
decline and biodiversity protection provided a theme that could potentially unify internal 
conservation programmes and at the same time assist in justifying ongoing government investment 
in conservation efforts. DoC, and the Ministry for the Environment (MfE), were looking to create new 
strategic directions and policies following the government structural and institutional re-
organisations of the 1980s. In DoC’s case these took the form of internally generated priorities based 
on ecological conservation. They were expressed in a draft statement of intent labeled Atawhai 
Ruamano: Conservation 2000 that introduced the idea of biodiversity protection and ecosystem 
restoration as strategic departmental priority.486  
Actions flowed from these lines of influence. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), 
assisted by DoC, received Cabinet agreement in 1993 to ratify the CBD. Officials recommended that 
“a New Zealand strategy for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity might be 
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desirable”, and that an ad hoc working group of officials convened by both MFAT and DoC would 
consider “implementation issues”. The departmental recommendation to Cabinet said that 
ratification had no immediate financial implications.487 DoC’s International Section sketched out a 
draft strategy, proposed to seek cabinet approval, and planned completion by late 1995.488 Second, 
within DoC, an emphasis on protection of indigenous biodiversity and in-situ management rather 
than sustainable use or ex-situ options emerged from internal debates between the department’s 
policy units.489 The Department used Conservation Week in July 1994 to promote publicly its ideas 
about the decline of indigenous biodiversity. At the same time DoC chose, deliberately it is claimed, 
to separate the issues of biodiversity protection from access to genetic resources.490Also at the same 
time, DoC advocated that addressing decline in indigenous biodiversity deserved a high place in New 
Zealand’s wider environmental policy priorities, a view supported by MfE. Protecting indigenous 
habitat and biological diversity and representative examples of all indigenous ecosystems, and 
enhancing the net total area of New Zealand’s remaining indigenous forest and vegetation became 
one of the five main goals of the government’s environmental strategy, Environment 2010. The 
document said the government would produce a national strategy on biodiversity and prepare a 
national policy statement under the RMA on biodiversity.491 
The various strands of development towards a biodiversity strategy, and advocacy by the 
Department, might suggest a strategy would have developed quickly. For example, DoC’s 
international section had hoped to have a document completed by late 1995, but this didn’t occur. 
Why it didn’t happen in the period between 1993 and 1995 is not exactly clear. Evidence on the files 
and the views of one participant suggest that possible reasons are the lack of a clear Cabinet 
mandate (which might suggest DoC didn’t make full use of the formal policy system), lack of (or not 
giving priority to) financial resources necessary to develop a strategy, or a degree of incoherence 
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between various policy branches within DoC.492 Furthermore, in May 1995, DoC senior management 
and the Minister of Conservation became diverted to responding to a major disaster when a DoC-
built viewing platform collapsed in Paparoa National Park killing fourteen young people. This event 
destabilised leadership. A consequential reorganisation resulted in some key staff associated with 
development of a biodiversity strategy leaving the department.493   
6.3.2 Renewed efforts post 1995 
Momentum to produce a biodiversity strategy picked up in late 1995. However, it would take 
another four and a half years until one was finalised. The events of that period, between 1995 and 
2000, provide insights into the way New Zealand policy-making dynamics and intra-government 
interests and forces can come to bear on environmental policy. A first phase involved getting to a 
draft strategy. 
In November 1995, DoC sought, and received, approval from Minister Denis Marshall to proceed with 
a formal strategy, citing earlier Cabinet approval. No evidence of formal cabinet approval seems to 
exist.494  In the following five months DoC combined with MfE and embarked on a standard inter-
departmental process, using as justification the 1993 ratification of the CBD and the CBD exhortation 
to signatories to produce such strategies. Fifteen other departments were contacted, a process 
mapped out for them, and drafting begun on a Cabinet paper. DoC’s statutory advisor, the New 
Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), was briefed.  A group of non-government representatives 
was proposed to advise on suitable principles drawn from Maori, conservation, fishing, forestry, 
agriculture, commerce, science, and local government interests.495 In the 1996 Budget DoC received 
$410k over two years to fund public input into a biodiversity strategy. Also, DoC had a new acting 
Minister, Simon Upton (who continued to hold the Environment portfolio). He was driving the 
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Environment 2010 agenda, including its biodiversity objectives. He pressed for progress.496 DoC now 
planned to get a draft discussion document to Cabinet by December 1997 and a draft strategy for 
public release by February 1998.497 
At this time, the first salvos of a prolonged inter-departmental debate about process, content, 
management, and funding of the strategy began.  In May 1996, the Treasury officer responsible for 
overseeing Vote-Environment wrote to DoC saying that a draft should be developed in-house first. It 
should begin, Treasury felt, with what New Zealand was already doing via its legislative framework 
and active management, then clearly identify public aspirations for further biodiversity protection 
(based on robust empirical data), a vision,  pressure points and a best mix of regulatory reform, 
operational services, capital and infrastructure needed to manage pressure, all within available 
funding using well established analytical and policy development processes and models.498 The 
language of the memo reflects a difference between one view about how policy should be developed 
(a controlled closed rational-comprehensive process) and another, a public-engaged approach, one 
DoC and MfE had already set in motion.  
At this stage, in late 1996, the new timetable for producing a biodiversity strategy began to drag out. 
There was a general election in late 1996, followed by extended negotiations with the minority New 
Zealand First party to form a coalition. Upton retained the Environment portfolio. A new Minister, 
Nick Smith, was appointed to the Conservation portfolio in January 1997. Smith announced in a 
speech immediately after his appointment that completing a biodiversity strategy was one of his ten 
key priorities for his time as Minister.499 
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Following the Minister’s speech and the direction he gave, DoC proposed to get the draft done by 
June 1997, submissions analysed and an action plan done by March 1998, a draft strategy released in 
July 1998, and “gazettal” in March 1999.500 This pushed the timeline for completing a strategy out 
nearly a year from the one proposed in 1996, and nearly three years from the original in-house DoC 
plan of 1993. At the same time, DoC asked for, and received, some more money in the 1997 Budget 
to complete the strategy. The iterative requests for more resources and changing timelines seemed 
to lend weight to the Treasury’s concerns about just how well DoC and MfE had thought through the 
process of producing a strategy. And in the event, the new timetables were not met. 1997 involved 
change of personnel in DoC as part of the post Cave Creek reorganisation. There was a new senior 
management team in the department. Development of the strategy involved inter-departmental 
debate about content, discussions with the Minister of Conservation about process, workshops, peer 
reviews, and production of a working draft by December 1997.501 
That working draft occasioned a crisis in relationships between Treasury and DoC officers.  In January 
1998, Treasury officers produced eight pages of comment on the draft strategy. They didn’t like it 
and felt it shouldn’t be released in its present form. In their view the draft gave no idea about the 
level of government financial commitment. They also commented that it failed to provide a basis for 
making choices as to how resources should be allocated to biodiversity activities. They felt the draft 
was only good as a consciousness raising document and therefore any actions proposed by the draft 
should be deleted.502  
Treasury officers were not alone in their criticisms. On 21 January environmentalist Guy Salmon 
wrote to Treasury, copied to the Minister for the Environment, saying,” I find the strategy an 
intensely disappointing document” and that “I suggest a fresh start is made with new personnel” .503 
His comments were passed on by Upton to the Minister of Conservation. 
DoC discovered in February that the Salmon critique had been commissioned by Treasury without 
DoC’s knowledge. Furthermore, not long afterwards (early March) Treasury had drafted a briefing for 
their Minister critical of progress and the lack of a ‘rigorous framework’. DoC and MfE complained to 
the State Services Commission (SSC) about what they regarded as lack of openness in the policy 
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development process. SSC mediated and said all three departments should get a joint departmental 
paper to Ministers of Conservation, Environment and Finance, saying, “Our main concern is the 
impact of your recommendations (Treasury’s) which would have the effect of taking the initiative 
away from departments who have already accepted the need to address these issues you are 
raising.”504 In this regard, DoC’s senior policy manager, Keith Johnston, had stepped in to oversee the 
strategy development process, joined by a senior manager from MfE, Craig Lawson. Over the next 
few months staff were seconded from Treasury, the PCE, and Ministry of Fisheries (Minfish) to form a 
secretariat, reporting to an inter-departmental steering group chaired by Johnston.  Johnston and 
Lawson picked up on Treasury’s comments and got Treasury to fund a study of marginal valuation of 
biodiversity. They also sought advice from the Ministers of Conservation and Environment jointly. 
Smith was reported as saying he wanted the strategy completed and out with the public, not endless 
officials’ processes. Upton said the strategy needed a more convincing philosophical base. In his view 
it should be based on a cultural rationale for biodiversity, not an intrinsic one. The two departments 
were to speed things up, but the ministers told them not to shy off debating issues more strongly 
with Treasury officials.505 
The strategy was redrafted again with more specific action plans. In particular it adopted the idea of 
“goal levels” with explicit actions and funding levels for each goal level. The objective was to allow 
the government to make decisions on how much work it would agree to and how much each goal 
level would cost. It also meant that Treasury had fewer grounds to criticise the strategy conceptually, 
once they had accepted the view that decline in indigenous biodiversity was an issue. In late May 
1998 the Conservation and Environment Ministers were updated on progress. A file note records the 
ministers were happier.506 
At the same time a second strand to a biodiversity strategy was emerging. This related to addressing 
decline of indigenous biodiversity on privately owned land. Environment 2010 had suggested in 1995 
that this could be promoted through the RMA using a National Policy Statement (NPS) on 
biodiversity. Upton in particular promoted an NPS. He felt an NPS would lessen regulation, increase 
certainty, and lower costs.507 There was an added context at this time. A number of high profile 
arguments were going on about district councils seeking to regulate (or deliberately choosing not to 
regulate) the protection of significant areas of indigenous vegetation on private land through their 
land use plans. This in turn led to legal challenges in the Environment Court involving on the one 
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hand environmental advocates and on the other affected landowners.508  The issue had raised 
concerns from farmers, traditionally National Party supporters. The farmer lobby group, Federated 
Farmers, opposed an NPS. Their position was that voluntary approaches were preferable. They 
argued that rather than national direction, it was over to the community to determine any values 
that should be attributed to significant natural areas. Federated Farmers said, “With limited 
resources, the community will prioritise, such that protection will be afforded to those sites that the 
community deem to be most significant.”509 Officials, led by MfE, nevertheless worked on early 
stages of a biodiversity NPS. 
On 25 September 1998 Keith Johnston told the inter-departmental steering group that it was 
anticipated that in the week beginning 5 October a draft Cabinet paper, consultation plan, regulatory 
impact statement, and a draft strategy would be completed and, pending Cabinet approval, the draft 
strategy might be released in early December.510 
This signaled the final stage before some key Cabinet decisions. Departments stated their positions. 
Minfish was supportive because they were getting recognition of the significance of marine 
biodiversity. MAF, which had been playing a relatively muted role to date, began to take greater 
interest and argued that the draft didn’t acknowledge sufficiently the role of introduced biodiversity, 
good management practices in agriculture, or sustainable forest management.511 The Ministry of 
Commerce felt the draft was light on “use” values. Te Puni Kokiri (the Maori development agency) 
was concerned about Maori claims to indigenous flora and fauna (the Wai 262 claim), the views of 
some iwi about DoC management, and rights of indigenous people. Treasury reiterated its concerns 
about fiscal and economic implications. A DoC official noted on the file wryly that, “saving 
biodiversity causes bureaucratic stress and shortage of breath and...”512 
In the event, a draft biodiversity strategy was considered by the Cabinet Economic Committee on 5 
November, and on 11 November the  Cabinet Business Committee decided that the draft strategy 
should be released for four months of  public submissions. Key decisions to emerge were: the 
strategy should aim to stabilise biodiversity loss (in other words, officials had recommended, and 
Cabinet had agreed, on a specific target level, with the resourcing requirements that went with that 
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level of target); there should be consultation over the patenting of biodiversity in conjunction with 
consultation over the strategy (raising the risk of Maori opposition); and officials should look at 
landowner concerns about compensation for biodiversity protection (suggesting that landowner and 
Federated Farmers lobbying had had some effect). Nevertheless, the Prime Minister signaled her 
intention to be associated with the strategy herself.513 
At this point, discussions between officials and with ministers showed up different views about how 
the strategy might be implemented, as well as some political nervousness about landowner reaction 
hinted at in the Cabinet decision. 
On 13 November a workshop had been held at MfE on sustaining biodiversity on private land with 
Australian specialist, Mike Young. He advocated an approach to private land biodiversity protection 
involving a mix of regulation, incentives, education, signaling, and subsidiarity while expressing 
caution about too much “high level government intervention.”514  
On 18 November the Minister of Finance met with the Minister of Conservation and officials and 
raised Treasury views about fiscal implications of increasing efforts to address indigenous 
biodiversity loss, risks posed by farmer lobby opposition, plus another risk that local and regional 
government who might be expected to play a role would say this was all a matter for central 
government to manage, and fund.515 
At the same time a Treasury briefing note entitled “Biodiversity Strategy: roles and responsibilities 
and reallocating of existing funding” suggested a contestable system of allocating biodiversity 
funding independent of existing agencies along the lines of a funder /provider split. Treasury now 
estimated the cost of the draft strategy over 20 years at $720 – 944M (this was described as a “fiscal 
risk”). They said,  
Biodiversity conservation needs to be integrated into everyday decision-making. The role of 
central government will be to co-ordinate the strategy and provide the initial investment in 
information and management systems to enable measurable improvements in biodiversity 
effectiveness and efficiency. Implementation will not necessarily be undertaken completely by 
central government. Instead, the aim will be to transfer responsibility for implementation to local 
government.516 
There followed briefings to their ministers from DoC and MfE on sustaining biodiversity outside 
protected areas, and on an NPS and incentives. DoC and MfE also set out in writing for both their 
                                                          
513 Cabinet committee minute CBC STR (98) M36/7. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 41. 
514 Notes from Mike Young workshop. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 40. See also N. Gunningham, Young, M., 
"Towards Optimal Environmental Policy: A Case of Biodiversity Conservation," Ecology Law Quarterly, no. 24 
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ministers arguments why one or the other should lead in producing an NPS. MfE’s argument was that 
the RMA (from which NPSs originated) was their responsibility; they had greater expertise in how it 
worked, and better relationship with key stakeholders.  DoC argued that it had produced the only 
existing NPS to date, felt MfE would be “neutral”, would treat DoC as just another stakeholder, and 
the result would be an NPS which didn’t do much. This exchange was interesting because two 
government agencies were so open with both each other and their respective ministers about what 
they thought about the other agency. The result was Ministerial direction about the division of 
labour between DoC and MfE. An officials’ project team was proposed on the NPS led by MfE, while 
DoC would continue to lead the overall strategy.517 In addition, both agencies recommended an 
external advisory committee on biodiversity protection on private land, arguing it could be an 
informal or formal board of enquiry, or an advisory body. Upton plumped for the advisory committee 
model.518 Officials also raised the idea of boosting existing private land conservation funding bodies 
like the Nature Heritage Fund, Nga Whenua Rahui and the Queen Elizabeth 2 Trust (a land 
covenanting body) to address the issue of compensation via incentives. All these interactions were by 
way of seeking to satisfy the Cabinet concerns about the strategy, the NPS, and the landowner 
compensation issue. 
In the event, the approach worked. While the evidence suggests the government had concerns about 
political risk, the strategy also appeared to have political attraction. Both of the current and previous 
National Government Prime Ministers in the 1990s, Jenny Shipley and Jim Bolger, had associated 
themselves with some conservation initiatives.519 Prime Minister Shipley herself launched the draft, 
unchanged, in January 1999 saying,  
Recently I announced the ten Strategic Priorities for my Government. One of these Strategic 
Priorities, alongside our social and economic goals, is to: ‘Turn the tide on the decline of 
indigenous biodiversity, by concerted action to protect habitats and control introduced pests.520 
In a speech in April, Upton said, 
For most developed countries, on-going industrial pollution and the need to clean up a legacy of 
toxic and hazardous waste are at the top of the agenda. By contrast, we are only lightly 
                                                          
517 Joint briefing note MfE/DoC to ministers 23 December. DoC file BDY0003 Volume 42. DoC had produced the 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement in 1994. 
518 This was the origin of a Ministerial Advisory Group. See later in the Chapter. 
519 Shipley promoted the idea of a major new national park on Stewart Island and Bolger, for example, was 
supportive of initiatives to end native logging in the Central North Island. ”National Park proposed for Stewart 
Island/Rakiura” http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/national-park-proposed-stewart-island-rakiura (accessed 
5/5/2013). Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of Conservation in New Zealand. Pp.224-225.   
520 “The draft New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy”, 20 January 1999, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/draft-
new-zealand-biodiversity-strategy (accessed 8/8/2012). 
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industrialised. It is, rather, the destruction of habitat and the species that once lived here that is 
our developmental legacy.521 
Having the Prime Minister and ministers officially launch the draft strategy was useful for officials in 
that it increased its political priority. The trick now was to get it to a final approval stage. 
6.3.3 Getting from a draft to a final strategy 1999 – 2000 
A New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was approved and officially launched in March 2000. The period 
between the public announcement of a draft strategy, in January 1999, and a final strategy launch, 
fourteen months later, involved public engagement, re-drafting, negotiations between officials and 
with ministers, lobbying, and a change of government. These influences affected in different degrees 
the timetable, orientation, and content of the strategy.  
During 1999 two intersecting strands of policy development related to the biodiversity strategy were 
progressed. The first was the overall strategy itself (led by DoC). The second was how best to 
advance protection of biodiversity on private land (led by MfE). 
The draft strategy was subject to a round of public consultation accompanied by public submissions. 
The consultations involved fifty meetings and attracted 7,800 submissions, of which 437 were 
substantive.522 The overall feedback from meetings and submissions called for stronger commitment 
to reversing the decline in indigenous biodiversity and raising the goal level above the objective in 
the draft of “stabilising” decline.523 DoC and MfE reflected this feedback in a revision of the draft, 
completed by August 1999. This occasioned further inter-departmental debate, which took place 
against a background of an impending general election, and a desire by the Ministers of Conservation 
and Environment to have the strategy completed and approved before then. 
Some officials felt that Cabinet shouldn’t consider approving the document, as major policy, so close 
to an election, but MfE, also representing DoC and with Ministerial support, argued otherwise.524 
Debate also took place about content. MAF officials expressed unease at the way the revised draft 
appeared to be being rammed through and thought the document too ‘protectionist’ and too 
oriented to indigenous biodiversity. Te Puni Kokiri repeated the comments it made in 1998 that the 
draft should strengthen the Maori role, direct management agencies to enhance their relationship 
                                                          
521Biodiversity and the role of biosecurity, 8 April 1999, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/biodiversity-and-
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522 DoC, "New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy." P.136.  
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Significant in the public consultation was engagement with Maori through nationwide hui, and an influential 
one involving the Maori Queen and Tumu Te Heu Heu at Hopu Hopu. 
524 This particular debate occurred in the Officials Economic Committee, which had the responsibility of 
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with Maori, more consistently implement and state that the Treaty of Waitangi was the overarching 
principle under which the Strategy was developed, and to provide an avenue for active Maori 
participation in biodiversity management. Minfish asked for changes to expand the marine theme.525 
The biggest difference conceptually came in the views of the Treasury officials. They were no longer 
critical of the overall principles behind the strategy. Now they focused on what they regarded as 
structural matters. On 17 September a Treasury official wrote to DoC saying, 
The quality of the overall strategy from a biodiversity perspective is good. In particular the 
interventions around the goal levels have been extensively peer reviewed by technical workshops 
during the consultation process and appear to be of a reasonably high standard. 
But Treasury now had concerns that the regulatory impact assessment was inadequate; roles and 
responsibilities were too central-government orientated; management, governance and 
accountability structures were not yet developed; costings had increased since estimates in 1998 and 
were very vague; and “we have no means to assess efficiency or effectiveness.”526 
Furthermore, they were concerned about how the goals had been changed. Shifting goal levels from 
“a minimum set of representative populations of indigenous species in selected habitats” (which was 
consistent with a goal of stabilising decline) to “populations across their natural range” (which had 
been done to reflect the weight of public submissions and was consistent with a goal of halting a 
decline) would greatly increase costs, they said. Treasury noted that the previous estimates for 
stabilisation were $37-45 M per annum over 20 years but these had now grown to $45-55M per 
annum over 20 years. What in fact DoC and MfE had done in the new draft was indeed shift from the 
“stabilisation” goal, but also they had altered the wording of the original “halting “goal. The new 
draft now committed to “restoring and protecting remaining representative habitats and 
ecosystem”, which was less ambitious than committing to “populations across their natural range”. 
However, it allowed ministers to describe the goal as “halting” without the full cost of maintaining 
and restoring all remaining natural habitats as described in the draft goal objective for “halting.”527 
Treasury was also critical of some language in the draft. For example, they also took issue with the 
draft’s statement that intervention was a core government role. In their view “as previously 
discussed with DoC and MfE”, the criteria should be identification of market failure, and where 
government intervention provided a positive net benefit. If the intervention met the two criteria 
then it was a core government role. If it did not meet the market failure criteria then it was not a 
core government role and should not be undertaken.528 Treasury officers, in proposing this, had 
revealed their policy prescription for the delivery of biodiversity protection, based in neo-classical 
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economic theory, less state intervention and application of market principles. As a general 
prescription, however, it was beginning to be questioned in some New Zealand policy circles.529  
By the 23 September Treasury officials’ views had firmed up such that they wanted MfE to be the 
lead agency for the strategy. They wanted the Minister of Finance to be on any Ministerial oversight 
team. They favoured reconsidering how the funding should be administered. They felt funding, and 
funding levels, should be “neutrally evaluated” to determine whether this would provide for more 
effective long-term management of biodiversity assets on particular important sites than the current 
arrangements. “How those interventions are managed and who implements them should be based 
on who can most efficiently and effectively do so on a case-by-case basis. This will often not be 
central government” and, “the Biodiversity Strategy is about managing biodiversity trade-offs at the 
national, regional, and local level and between alternative economic uses.” Finally, in their view, the 
strategy needed “concrete realistic proposals including funding.”530 
The inter-departmental debate reflects the process of bargaining and negotiation that was going on 
in the bureaucracy amongst mid-level officials, the various ideological orientations of the 
departments, and a degree of tactics and maneuvering. All this was taking place in a climate of 
urgency with the election due. Furthermore, the second strand of the strategy, dealing with 
biodiversity on private land, was increasing the tempo. 
Simon Upton had appointed a ministerial advisory committee (MAC) in early 1999 to look at the issue 
of private land biodiversity protection. The committee’s brief was to recommend ways to promote 
effective and sustainable management of biodiversity on private land. By September 1999, and after 
discussions with various interested parties, it had prepared a draft report and discussion document 
that promoted national and local accords on biodiversity, a national policy statement, non-statutory 
guidance, and government action and incentives.531 The advisory committee’s report was due to be 
considered by a Cabinet committee at the same time as the revised draft of the strategy. 
The draft biodiversity strategy and the advisory committee’s report were considered together by the 
Cabinet Economic Committee on 11 October, with split recommendations about the strategy from 
officials.532 The committee recommended Cabinet approve the strategy. They noted it would cost 
$45-55 M per annum (DoC and MfE’s preferred funding level) to be met either by savings or a new 
budget bid next year. It supported DoC’s and MfE’s proposal to raise the goal level. But it also 
supported the Treasury recommendation that a Ministerial oversight team should include the 
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Minister of Finance, and that MfE should be the lead agency, not DoC.  The Cabinet committee 
watered down Treasury’s recommendation for independent oversight and evaluation, benchmarking, 
and contestability of funding. The committee instead  “invited” the Minister for the Environment to 
report back on how the strategy would be implemented to ensure funds are used efficiently and 
effectively on priority activities, on approaches to encouraging broad community participation, on 
best mechanisms to coordinate central and local government and the community, on approaches to 
encourage innovation, on monitoring and evaluation, and on realistic funding proposals that could be 
considered against other priorities as part of the government’s overall budget process. It also 
recommended the report of Upton’s ministerial advisory committee (MAC) be released for public 
submissions.533 
Thus, after nearly five years of preparation and debate, a strategy was nearly complete.  With some 
redrafting, a final document, including a foreword for signature by the Prime Minister Jenny Shipley, 
was prepared for full Cabinet consideration in early October. 
In the meantime, the President of Federated farmers had written to the Prime Minister, repeating 
concerns expressed in 1998. These were that:  
1. The consultation process had been inadequate. It was an attempt to ‘sell’ the document. No 
link between the desire of individuals to conserve and a commitment to bear the cost. 
2. The policy framework was based on regulatory control and DoC’s command and control. 
3. There were no links to mechanisms for trade-offs. 
4. There was not enough about the government’s resource commitments  
5. It didn’t have enough on use or development of resources. The legitimate value for 
biodiversity is one which optimises the social, economic and cultural needs of the 
community. 
6. It needed to provide a net benefit. It cannot be at the expense of economic and social goals. 
“Strategy must explicitly acknowledge that biodiversity values need to be balanced and 
prioritised with economic and social values”. 
7. The government must fund and communities be allowed to continue to prioritise relative to 
local social and economic constraints. 
8. It must give more emphasis to QE 2, Streamcare and Landcare groups, supported by 
landowners. The emphasis needs to be on non-regulatory methods. 
9. Landowners must be recognised as the key to achieving desired outcomes on private land. 
10. Secure property rights are essential. 
11. The federated farmers were opposed to an NPS and only support a light one if the 
government provided funding. A consistent approach to significance is needed but local 
communities need to be allowed to prioritise. 534  
In the event, Cabinet deferred approving the strategy or releasing the MAC report, noting that 
representations had been received from Federated Farmers.535 Simon Upton met with Federated 
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farmers in an effort to placate them and reported back to Cabinet. But on 1 November Cabinet 
formally decided to defer further consideration of issues until early 2000; in other words, after the 
election.536 
The November 1999 General Election resulted in a centre-left coalition of the Labour Party and the 
minority Alliance Party forming the government. They also established an agreement of support with 
the Green Party, but that party decided to remain outside the government. The new government was 
presented with an opportunity to take advantage of the proposed biodiversity strategy and a 
programme that had already been extensively debated and worked through. It was one that was 
broadly compatible with the sympathies of the new government. What appeared to happen is that 
both external interests, and those inside government advocating the strategy, seized the initiative. 
DoC and MfE recommended to their new ministers that the strategy should be approved and the 
advisory committee’s report released. DoC emphasised the importance of the strategy, and that it 
should be funded by an additional $45m per year over 20 years.537 Environmental NGOs immediately 
lobbied the new Minister of Conservation, Sandra Lee, asking for copies of the draft.538 They wrote to 
her in January 2000 wanting the strategy made more ambitious, and what they called “Treasury 
speak” language removed. Suggestions of a funder-provider organisational model was, they said, 
“dangerous and should be rejected.”539 In December and January there was a flurry of activity around 
process and strategy content. The new Minister of Conservation pressed for action. DoC in particular, 
but also MfE and Minfish, seemed to respond quickly. Lee’s Office wrote to the Prime Minister’s chief 
of staff saying Lee wanted to re-submit the strategy to Cabinet in January 2000 as a matter of 
urgency saying it was a critical issue for the Conservation portfolio.540 While the Cabinet Office 
thought there should be another round of departmental consultation, DoC successfully argued 
otherwise.541 On the issue of who should lead the strategy, Environment or Conservation (recalling 
the previous October Cabinet decision that it should be the Minister for the Environment), DoC was 
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able to convince MfE that it should be the senior minister – who happened in this instance to be Lee. 
Hence DoC cemented its role as the lead department.542  
There then followed a series of meetings between ministers and officials and some departmental 
exchanges prior to a cabinet committee paper being submitted in late January 2000. Treasury 
officials thought it was premature to send the papers to Cabinet so soon in view of the October 1999 
decisions.543 Their concerns about how the strategy should be implemented and ensuring funds were 
used efficiently and effectively, as well as “realistic funding proposals”, were retained in the paper, 
but the Cabinet paper now noted that instead of an option of funding the strategy from 
departmental baselines (one of the options agreed in October), funding should “should take priority 
for additional environmental expenditure.”544 
At the end of January 2000  the Cabinet Business Committee recommended releasing of the New 
Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, but asked the Ministers of Conservation, Environment, and Forestry to 
revise some wording “ to align it with current Government policy.”545 
At a Cabinet meeting on 31 January the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was approved. It was 
launched officially in March 2000.546 However, two significant issues remained outstanding: funding; 
and the policy work started on biodiversity protection on private land.  
The goal level and actions approved by Cabinet had been costed. Furthermore, Cabinet had already 
agreed to recommendations that the strategy should have first call on any new environment funds. 
What happened between February and May 2000 was that operational departments bid for new 
resources, and were successful.  A total budget package was agreed on 15 May 2000.547 In bald terms 
it involved $187 m over five years. The largest proportion went to DoC for weed and pest control, 
species recovery, and habitat security/restoration. Minfish received substantial resources for marine 
management. Other  initiatives involved funds to support biodiversity protection on private land, 
resources for new information systems, and funding to produce an oceans strategy (see Chapter 5), 
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and a new strategic approach to biosecurity, all of which were regarded as important to help halt the 
decline in indigenous biodiversity. 
Besides the budget, there were also the private land issues that the ministerial advisory committee 
had been established to address. The initial report from the committee, although held over from 
October 1999, was released for public input in March 2000. It was followed by extensive 
consultation.548 This provided an outlet for concerns about the strategy and an NPS expressed to the 
previous National Party-led government. The draft report by the advisory committee had 
recommended an NPS. Their final report recommended against one.549 The committee argued that 
voluntary measures and guidelines were better, and that information, education and financial 
incentives would deliver just as good results. MfE reported that “Local Government is divided on the 
merits of an NPS”. A letter from Hobbs to Lee said: 
promulgating an NPS does risk igniting fears of increased regulation amongst landowners and 
increased central direction among those parts of local government fiercely protective of local 
discretion. The possibility of some perverse consequences, at least in the interim, should not be 
dismissed.  
Therefore, the letter said, MfE “cautions against undue reliance on an NPS”. Their view was that it 
should be part of a wider package of working with local government and guidance.550 In the event, 
after internal and external debate, Cabinet agreed in December 2000 to proceed with an NPS.551  
The point at which it was agreed to proceed with an NPS, in late 2000, is a convenient point to end 
this study’s chronological sequence of events in developing the biodiversity strategy. The NPS was 
the last part of the overall architectural framework of the strategy. A New Zealand Biodiversity 
Strategy existed as a policy document; it contained goals, actions, and responsibilities; and was 
funded to a level that surpassed any previous single environmental initiative in New Zealand. But it 
had taken seven years from the ratification of the CBD until a strategy was finalised. And it could 
have been quite a different document but for the impact of combinations of external and intra-
governmental influences. 
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6.4 Discussion  
Developing a biodiversity strategy in New Zealand took eight years. There were three attempts to 
reach agreement within the bureaucracy and with ministers on a strategy, in 1994, in 1996, and 
between 1998 and 2000, each involving increasing levels of effort on the part of DoC and MfE. The 
final result was impressive in environmental policy terms, in that it represented a major step forward 
in nature conservation policy in New Zealand, and a significant increase in the levels of resources 
available to address biodiversity problems compared with what had gone before. The various twists 
and turns in the narrative are revealing in terms of influences on environmental policy within 
government. 
The complexity involved in the biodiversity strategy flowed from debate amongst the constellation 
of affected interests. This is shown in the positions taken by the Federated Farmers on one hand and 
environmental NGOs on the other. There was a measure of agreement about the overall objective of 
addressing indigenous biodiversity decline. The difference was that one side promoted voluntary 
measures, and the other wanted direct intervention backed by rules. This same tension was evident 
throughout the internal government debates about the strategy. The knowledge and awareness of 
the causes and effect of biodiversity decline were well-known. The technical solutions, however, 
were more problematic, and added to the debate about how to implement a strategy. An interesting 
feature of the biodiversity strategy in complexity terms is that Maori interests did not arise to the 
extent they did in the ocean’s case study. It is possible that the policy process and policy proposals 
accommodated Maori. However, this answer seems too simplistic. Certainly, senior figures in 
Maoridom had been actively sought out and engaged with the strategy. Maori were sympathetic to 
the overall objectives of the strategy.552 Nevertheless, it may have been fortuitous for the strategy 
that it was produced before the Waitangi Tribunal heard and deliberated on the WAI 262 claim to 
indigenous flora and fauna. 
The strategy was also influenced by events, in this case the 1999 election. It is possible that a less 
effective strategy may have emerged after 1999 had it not been for a combination of a change of 
government, an ideologically sympathetic government, and a passionate conservationist with senior 
cabinet ranking as Minister of Conservation. However, care should be taken with such 
counterfactuals. While there could have been alternative policy rules and tools given ideological 
differences, and lesser resources, it is important to recall that strategy was all but approved by the 
previous government, and with Prime Ministerial support.  
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The biodiversity strategy represented, for its time, an environmentally effective policy. Its 
environmental effectiveness arose out of making environmental values a priority, by seeking to 
reverse decline in indigenous biodiversity. Furthermore, it was integrative in that it provided a 
platform for other environmental policy work on oceans policy, biosecurity policy (resulting in a 
national biosecurity strategy553), work towards a national policy statement on biodiversity under the 
RMA (even though, despite intentions, one hadn’t been produced by the end of 2012), and regional 
and district policies and planning instruments.554  
Its policy effectiveness  lay in the fact it had clear actions (it was more than symbolic).  It ended up 
being well resourced, it made provision for new knowledge (it set up new terrestrial, freshwater and 
marine information systems and funded new research), and it influenced subsequent behaviour (the 
term entered the lexicon of discourse about nature conservation and environmental 
management).555 It provided a platform for other policy work. It supported instruments that reached 
beyond existing protected areas by expanding national contestable funding mechanisms such as the 
Queen Elizabeth II National Trust, Nga Whenua Rahui, the Nature Heritage fund, and set up a 
biodiversity condition fund and a biodiversity advice fund. 
This is not to say that the biodiversity strategy was either perfect or that it “solved” the problem of 
indigenous biodiversity decline. 556 There was bipartisan support for the overall strategy from both 
sides of the political spectrum. Given that the strategy had been developed under a National-led 
government, this was not surprising. Where there was a potential policy weakness was in the 
support base for how to implement the intent of the strategy on privately owned land.  Opposition to 
rules and government intervention was widespread amongst landowners, and some environmental 
groups, who believed biodiversity protection was best achieved by voluntary approaches and 
appealing to hearts and minds.557 
However, in terms of Schneider and Ingrams’ criteria described in chapters 2 and 4, a framework for 
action was created. It was one that advanced the issue of addressing biodiversity decline in terms of 
knowledge and support. Furthermore, it dealt with biodiversity decline in an integrated way. So, 
what particular combinations of internal government features influenced these results? 
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Agency  influenced the biodiversity strategy through ministerial advocacy of Upton and Smith in the 
1990s and the drive by Lee in early 2000. Whereas in the earlier 1990s the role of Marshall of 
acquiescence rather than strong advocacy meant departmental initiatives were more important. The 
role of individual officials in leadership is also evident, particularly that of Johnston from DoC and 
Lawson from MfE. The history of individual officials influencing policy development is well recognised 
in the literature.558 An example from New Zealand, little known but well illustrated by Thomson, is 
the role of a middle ranked Lands and Survey Department official, Ron Cooper, in developing New 
Zealand’s 1953 National Parks Act.559 However, when examining the role of officials in policy 
development, the influence on them of institutional features, and the interaction between those 
institutional features and officials’ cognitive perspectives should not be underestimated. The 
biodiversity strategy’s development shows institutions and ideological views played a very significant 
part in the policy result. 
Evidence of Institutional effect is pronounced. From an intra-departmental perspective, DoC would 
always have been, or else endeavoured to be, a key player. Protecting indigenous biodiversity was 
DoC’s core business. Furthermore, the strategy was an opportunity for DoC to increase the profile of 
nature conservation in terms of government priorities and to secure more funding to improve 
biodiversity protection. It is noticeable, however, that DoC was slow to organise itself internally to 
develop the strategy effectively. Various shuffling of staff and different functional policy teams 
dealing with the strategy made DoC’s efforts disjointed and disorganised up until late 1997. This 
raises the possibility that, as an operationally focused department, DoC had not developed a 
sufficiently dedicated policy-process capacity to press on with a major project like a biodiversity 
strategy. After 1997 faster progress was made once a team with greater staffing, focus and seniority 
was put in place. MfE’s focus arose from Environment 2010’s commitment to a biodiversity strategy, 
but it just as likely would have arisen without it given MfE’s environmental policy responsibilities.  
Both departments’ institutional functions influenced the way they approached policy assumptions, 
design, and objectives, best illustrated in exchanges between the two departments (and with 
Treasury) over how to implement the strategy, who should take charge of which bits, and why. The 
cognitive perspectives of the two departments derived, in part, from the way they had been set up in 
the mid 1980s, and their functions, and the way operational departments view policy departments 
(thinkers, not doers) and the way policy departments view operational departments (doers, not 
thinkers).560 This provides an additional explanation (besides one of government priorities and 
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resources) for DoC’s desire to exercise control and leadership, and the department’s support for 
direct intervention by national agencies to improve the condition of biodiversity (seen in actions in 
the strategy that involved increased management action by DoC and Minfish), and MfE’s preference 
for local government and community delivery. Intra-departmental effects are also evident in the 
actions of Treasury. It was driven by concerns about cost arising from its role as protector of the 
public purse, mixed up with policy prescriptions that arose from and re-inforced that role. While it 
can be argued that, on one level, DoC was self interested in a strategy that garnered more resources 
for the strategy, the same type of argument could be made that Treasury was self interested in 
policies that minimised the effect on the government’s budget. 
In terms of policy process and rules of engagement, the biodiversity strategy shows that where a lead 
department, in this case DoC in the period from 1992 to 1998, was not very skilled, then policy 
development could not only be slow, but it also ended up being driven by other departments. 
Although there  are elements of a controlling rationality from Treasury about poor process and 
analysis, there was a strong element of truth that the early iterations of the strategy had not been 
rigorously thought through. It was only when DoC and MfE built up an interdepartmental team and 
began to coopt other departments into understanding the nature of the policy problem, the resource 
implications and policy responses, that headway was made at an interdepartmental level. At this 
time (1990s) Treasury was in a dominant position and either convincing them, or neutralising them 
with bureaucratic politics, was the key feature of the rules of engagement over policy. It is here that 
cognitive features played a role in influencing the nature of policy. 
Simon Upton has been quoted as saying that the National Party caucus of the 1990s was not deeply 
sympathetic to environmental matters.561 Nevertheless, protecting indigenous biodiversity received 
at least a measure of support when considered by Cabinet in the late 1990s. As noted, the Prime 
Minister was willing to be associated with it. Where there does seem to have been government 
reservation in the 1990s was about the way the strategy planned, in an integrative way, to span 
biodiversity protection for public land and private land. Cabinet, Upton, and Smith displayed political 
caution both about the nature of engagement with landowners (witnessed by their preference to use 
MfE rather than DoC), and the tools to be used. The ideological orientation of the centre-left 
coalition that came to power after 1999 was more favourably disposed to the totality of the strategy. 
It also accounts in part for their favourable consideration of new budget proposals, which under 
another administration may have been more sparing.562 In practice, the new government was 
handed a near-completed strategy on a plate. Where they had ideological reservations was about the 
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theoretical underpinnings of governance and delivery proposed the draft strategy, in particular the 
funder-provider model. 
Ideology is also evident at a departmental level. DoC was committed to the idea of integrated 
conservation management based around state involvement, action on the ground, and technical 
leadership. This can be seen in the type of actions promoted by DoC and in exchanges with Treasury 
and MfE.  MfE’s orientation was more to the concept of community empowerment. Treasury 
advanced a consistent policy prescription for the delivery of biodiversity protection that  challenged 
the institutional rationale of integrated conservation management on which DoC was based. The 
Treasury officers’ view was that any central government role should be confined to coordination, 
providing information, and initial investment, while implementation should preferably be transferred 
to local government. Just what a Treasury or an MfE dominated strategy might have actually looked 
like, however, enters the realm of the counterfactual. It would have been more devolved. There may 
be grounds for speculating that funds on specific projects might have been used more efficiently in 
cost terms (aligning with an economic rationale). And it might have meant greater community voice 
in governance (aligning with a communitarian rationale). But devolution to local councils might also 
have given rise to parochial debates about whether funds should be applied to nationally important 
issues or sites, or allocated on a regional basis. The model was also likely to involve considerable 
transaction costs and, given biophysical complexities of biodiversity issues, would have presented 
measurement and consistency challenges that a centralised model has found easier to address, at 
least in the absence of national standard or direction, as has been the experience with the RMA. This 
is not to say that there weren’t elements of devolution or contestability in the delivery of the 
strategy. Rather, this feature was applied in the end to private land, rather than becoming a principal 
design feature. All this, however, is speculation. And furthermore, it couldn’t be predicted that a 
funder-provider model would definitely have eventuated if there hadn’t been a change of 
government, given that public policy thinking was already beginning to question a blanket application 
of these models to public service.563  
The main point is that departmental ideologies and rationalities were at work during the 
development of the strategy. Eventually, it was a DoC view, mixed with elements of MfE’s 
communitarian perspective that  emerged in the final biodiversity strategy.  
Just how time taken to arrive at a completed the biodiversity strategy played a part in its 
effectiveness is ambiguous. It took eight years. Conceivably it could have been completed earlier with 
better policy capacity on DoC’s part. But it is hard to say whethera strategy developed any earlier 
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whether would have been more effective. Probably it wouldn’t have been, given the fiscal 
constraints applied to public service expenditure in the early and mid 1990s. And time mean that it 
was finalised under a government more sympathetic to environmental values. Time didn’t result in 
issues becoming more complex. In fact, as knowledge and visibility increased, potential points of 
conflict lessened, reinforcing the ‘conflict potential-knowledge awareness’ model of complexity 
drivers described in Chapter 4. 
  
In conclusion, institutional influences, particularly intra-departmental ones, and cognitive features 
working in combination are the key factors that explain how, for this particular case study, a strong 
environmentally effective policy emerged out of the development of the biodiversity strategy. Events 
played a role in the final shape of the policy, as did agency, but in comparative terms, institutional 
and cognitive features are more prominent. 
Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the biodiversity strategy are 
represented in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Biodiversity strategy influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate A or large A) 
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Chapter 7 
Case Study: Addressing Decline in Freshwater Quality 
7.1 Introduction 
Water quality has been a recurring issue for environmental management in New Zealand. Various 
regimes for water management and water care have existed over the past sixty or so years. From the 
mid 1990s, questions arose about the adequacy of existing policy to maintain water quality, on the 
basis of evidence of decline caused by diffuse sources of pollution. This case study examines 
government attempts to establish new environmental policy to tackle freshwater quality decline 
from the early 1990s to the 2000s, based on the research questions set out in Chapter 4. 
7.2 Freshwater quality: context and complexity in the late 20th and early 21st 
century 
The ready availability of freshwater in New Zealand has until recently been taken for granted, as has 
the environmental quality of freshwater. Freshwater is abundant in many parts of the country. The 
New Zealand’s 2007 State of Environment Report says freshwater is both clean and in good supply by 
international standards.564 However, over the past twenty years water quality has come under 
increasing pressure, particularly from non-point-source discharges as a result of agricultural 
intensification, nutrient runoff, access to waterways by cattle, urban storm water run off (with its 
associated contaminants), and forestry.565 Throughout all of the 1990s and most of the 2000s there 
were no mandatory national freshwater standards, except for drinking water quality. 
Agriculture provides much of the recent pressure on New Zealand freshwater. Pressure arises from a 
combination of expansion of irrigation, growth of dairy cow herds, and a six fold increase in use of 
nitrogenous fertilisers, from around 60,000 tonnes in 1991 to a peak of 355,000 tonnes in 2004 (with 
an average of around 325,000 tonnes since 2004).566 Recent MfE reports say the quality of water has 
deteriorated in rivers mainly as a result of farming. Any environmental gains in terms of reduced 
point-source pollution of waters by regulation and management measures are being overshadowed 
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by increasing ‘diffuse’ pollution. The reports say lakes and rivers in pasture-dominated catchments 
and in towns and cities commonly have degraded water quality.567 
A wide range of interests are involved with freshwater and its use. It underpins New Zealand’s 
agricultural productivity. The farming sector invests heavily in water infrastructure, and promotes 
increasing use of water to expand areas irrigated for agriculture. Water is essential for many 
industrial and manufacturing activities. Natural freshwater sources such as aquifers and protected 
water catchments provide relatively clean drinking water, by world standards.568  It is a recreational 
resource for swimming, boating and fishing. 569   Rivers, lakes, and freshwater springs are culturally 
significant for many New Zealanders, especially Maori for whom freshwater has spiritual and identity 
associations. Maori also claim use and ownership rights based on customary interests and provisions 
of the Treaty of Waitangi.570 
Many industry organisations focus on freshwater and its use. These include the main farming lobby 
associations such as Federated Farmers, Irrigation New Zealand, Horticulture New Zealand,  Meat 
and Wool New Zealand, Dairy New Zealand, and industry groups like Water New Zealand. 
Environmental non government organisations (NGOs) such as the hunting  group, Fish and Game 
New Zealand, and the nature conservation NGO, the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, are 
active in promoting protection of enhancement of  freshwater quality. 
Water is managed in New Zealand as a public resource. The primary legislation for water 
management is the Resource Management Act (RMA). There is no specific national water agency. 
Three government departments have direct national responsibilities for water management policy; 
the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) for general water policy and water protection measures, the 
Department of Conservation (DoC) for protection of indigneous freshwater species and freshwater 
recreational fisheries and freshwater habitats, and the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).571 MfE 
and DoC’s responsibilities are environmental ones and  listed in their empowering Acts.572 MPI’s 
responsibilites arise from its function to promote primary industry but are non-statutory. MPI’s 
priorities are business growth, exports, and innovation. It describes its role in freshwater as 
encouraging and supporting irrigation projects, monitoring and managing the impact of farming on 
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fresh water, and supporting the development of policies and rules governing how freshwater is 
managed and allocated.573 
Implementation of freshwater policy is devolved to Regional Councils. They are significant actors in 
promoting their views about how water should be managed at a national level. They represent a 
suite of regional and local interests, as well as having their own institutionalised perspectives on 
freshwater management.574 But they do not have direct formal role in national-level policy 
development as MfE, DoC and MPI do.  
Freshwater management in New Zealand is complex. Institutionally, there are a number of different 
government departments with direct responsibilites. There is a tier of separate regional governments 
that set regional policies within a framework established by the RMA, carry out day to day 
management, and who have their own parochial perspectives. There is a level of consensus 
scientifically about causes of freshwater quality decline but also scientific and technical debate about 
how best to address it. Public perception early on was that New Zealand water quality was good, but 
this changed in the late 1990s and concern about decline in quality has grown.575 There are a wide 
range of economic, social, and cultural interests involved with how water is managed. Freshwater 
use lies at the heart of the New Zealand economy (dominated as it is by agriculture). There is a 
special New Zealand cultural and constitutional dimension in Maori interests in freshwater. 
Freshwater is used for recreation by a significant proportion of New Zealanders. The large number of 
interests with different objectives create significant conflict potential. When combined with  debate 
about causes of freshwater decline, and growing public concern about decline, developing new 
water-related policy is likely to be complex and demanding.  
7.3 Developing freshwater policy: 1990s-2013 
7.3.1 Policy background and the Resource Management Act 
In 1991 the Resource Management Act (RMA) replaced a longstanding regime of water and 
catchment management. The earlier regime was based on the 1941 Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Act and the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act. This regime involved management by a 
network of regionally elected Catchment Boards. The network was  supported and to some extent 
overseen by a central government water and soil directorate as part of the Ministry of Works and 
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Development.576 The RMA changed the old regime dramatically. It devolved day-to-day management 
of freshwater to regional government, with the central government role largely confined to 
establishing national objectives and standards. This was the responsibility of MfE.577  
Some policy work on water management instruments was undertaken by MfE in the late 1980s 
during the design of the RMA, but otherwise water specific initiatives were taken no further at that 
time.578  
The RMA was viewed initially as environmentally positive for management of freshwater. The Act 
made the preservation and protection of freshwater bodies a “matter of national importance.”579  A 
major change ushered in by the RMA was the ability to apply integrated catchment management, 
which potentially meant control of all sources of water quality degradation. Early analyses said the 
RMA had considerable potential for better environmental management generally because of the way 
it integrated environmental values in New Zealand’s  resource management regime.580 However, the 
Act and its institutional arrangements began to exhibit implementation shortcomings.581 It appeared 
to deal effectively with point-source discharges but not at all sufficiently with diffuse sources.582 
Other issues were that no national level objectives or standards for water management were 
produced, there was a significant degree of variability in management approach by different regional 
councils, and, in the views of some, regional councils were weak political authorities overly 
susceptible to vested interests of existing water users.583  
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Debates about RMA implementation,  whether the principles of the RMA itself led to efficient, 
equitable, or effective management of natural resources, coupled with influential economic, social 
and cultural interests in water, and the emerging evidence of increasing land use pressures, demands 
for access to more water, water availability limits, and declining freshwater quality, created the basis 
for policy review. 
7.3.2 The 1990s: sustainable land management & national agenda for water 
By the mid-1990s, water quality began to feature as an environmental policy priority. Managing 
water resources was one of the key goals of Environment 2010, the then government’s 
environmental strategy document. The strategy’s water objective was to manage quality to meet 
current and future needs of ecological systems, communities, agriculture and industry.584 
Environment 2010 bore the personal imprint of the Minister for the Environment, Simon Upton, but 
its detail was the product of MfE.585 
Drawing from  Environment 2010, MfE produced, as part of an interdepartmental effort,  a 
sustainable land management strategy aimed in part at maintaining and enhancing water quality, 
arguing two principles: first, sustainable land management rested with the individual land user, and 
second, environmental considerations must be integrated along with economic and social goals in 
management.  586 
Linked to the sustainable land management strategy, MFE also worked on what became known as a 
national agenda for sustainable water management. The agenda was published in 1999 after a three 
year programme consulting with stakeholders.587 Using scientific/technical information, the national 
agenda on water was clear about the causes of freshwater quality decline. The proposed actions, 
however, were very general. They  focused on more research, and on government departments 
taking a non-interventionist approach, playing a facilitative or brokering role rather than regulating. 
The thrust of the Sustainable Land Management Strategy and the national agenda for water was to 
persuade individual property owners and land managers to change management techniques and 
behaviours, encourage community participation, provide guidance for regional councils to improve 
implementation of the water management provisions of the RMA, target research efforts, and to 
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supply information to assist Maori participation in water management processes.588 There was 
mention that some form of national standards or direction might be introduced, but this was 
tentative.589 The tenor of these proposed government actions emphasised voluntary action and 
incentives. 
Reasons for the approach taken in the 1990s to water quality can be attributed to the climate of 
ideas within government. Water governance at this time relied on the principles and the 
implementation of the RMA. The legislation was regarded at the time as world leading in its 
integration of environmental values in resource management.590 It was, however, a dramatic change 
in an implementation sense in that it shifted the locus of government action to regional and local 
authorities. Bedding the legislation in needed considerable resource and skill, and MfE’s ability to 
participate was hamstrung by lack of resources.591  
There was also a difference of ideas about the assumptions  inherent in RMA, and the type of rules 
that could, or should be used in implementing the Act. Within government, economic departments 
argued the Act was being interpeted to place too much emphasis on environmental outcomes, and 
insufficient on economic outcomes. Ideas for central government direction through national 
standards received  limited support, although one National Policy Statement, setting standards for 
coastal development, was produced by DoC in 1994.592 The economic development departments, led 
by Treasury and the Ministry of Commerce, were in general opposed to greater central direction.593 
And as the decade went on the economic development ministries became stronger in their criticism 
of the RMA as a constraint to economic growth.594 In the processes of negotiation and bargaining 
regarding any new policies, MfE was placed in a position of defender of the RMA. The MfE view was 
that, with the right support, or incentives, or assisting actions, the RMA could be used to address 
water quality issues. Furthermore, the centrality of the RMA to MfE’s role and functions influenced 
the growth of an ideology within MfE supportive of devolved management, and the value of 
community action (linked to the idea that with the right incentives, the individual will look after 
natural resources). This in turn may have been reinforced by structural design. MfE looked on 
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regional councils, in particular, as an “operating arm.” This tended to make MfE especially responsive 
to council views and wary of being directive. In the 1990s, a non-interventionist view from central 
government coincided with a parochial regional government view (in part a mechanism of defence 
against certain minimalist views of territorial local government promoted within central 
government), and hence militating against national direction.595 
Another influence was the effect of MfE’s Minister, Simon Upton. Upton was a forceful cerebral 
Minister.596 His relationship with MfE was contradictory. He enjoyed debate about ideas. He drew 
heavily on non-departmental advisers. But he was supportive of the Ministry, except where he felt its 
policy ideas did not meet his high expectations about policy advice and how government 
departments should perform.597 Upton himself has said his influence should not be over-emphasised, 
however. In his view MfE was not supportive of  ideas to develop national direction in the later 
1990s, with an inference that MfE’s position prevailed.598 
In the end, the sustainable land management strategy and the national agenda for water did not get 
very far, possibly because their actions were ill-defined, but definitely because they were overtaken 
by a change of government. In 2002 the PCE reported that the sustainable land management 
strategy was reviewed in 1998 and was still being implemented, and the national agenda was 
considered obsolete.599 
The combination of MfE’s limited resources in the 1990s, difference in approaches between 
departments, MfE’s cultural attachment to the devolved institutional system, MfE’s unwillingness to 
advocate strongly for national level direction, and the paradoxical relationship with its Minister seem 
to provide some explanation about why the issue of water quality did not progress further than 
statements of proposed light handed action. In the event, proposed actions on water quality 
proceeded no further due to a change of government in late 1999. 
7.3.3 Late 1999 to Mid-2000s: sustainable development 
A change of government in late 1999 resulted in a reassessment of environmental policy priorities.  
MfE argued that the issue of freshwater quality decline was a nationally significant environmental 
issue. They said this in their 1999 briefing to the incoming centre left Labour-Alliance party coalition 
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Agencies," in The governance of public agencies & authorities (Bratislava2001).  
598 Young, Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act. Pp.38-39. 
599 PCE, "Creating Our Future: Sustainable Development in New Zealand." P.14 & 18.  
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government.600 In March 2000, the new Minister for the Environment, Marian Hobbs, said that water 
quality issues were in the “problems to be fixed basket.”601 But water wasn’t the highest priority. 
Water was not among the topics to receive a new injection of funds in the 2001 Budget. New funding 
was given instead to waste minimisation, supporting the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 
supporting the operation of the RMA (largely through promoting best practice), climate change 
response, creating a National Policy Statement on biodiversity, and a national environmental 
indicators programme. 602  
By mid-2001, however, Hobbs signalled that water quality was a priority.603 MfE had persuaded the 
government that water management should be a flagship programme in New Zealand’s sustainable 
development strategy, produced in mid 2002 in preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. This was accompanied by an injection of specific new funding to the Ministry for work 
on water issues.604  
Just as Environment 2010 had provided government departments with a priority for action on water 
in the 1990s, the Sustainable development for New Zealand: Programme of action purported to do 
the same in the early 2000s. The document was unequivocal when it came to water. It set out three 
objectives: to allocate and use water in a sustainable, efficient, and equitable way; to maintain water 
quality for all appropriate needs; and to protect water bodies with nationally significant natural, 
social, or cultural values.605 
There were, however, some aspects of the water programme, as approved in the sustainable 
development strategy, that had potential to divert attention away from water quality. The Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) had argued successfully that the economic issues related to water 
use (supporting greater agricultural intensification) also had to be looked at in tandem with water 
quality. Consequently, two departments (MAF and MfE) and two Ministers (Agriculture and 
                                                          
600 MfE, "Brief to Incoming Minister." 
601Speech to Water 2000 Conference, 21 March, 2000, 
www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/water+2000+conference+carlton+hotel+auckland  (accessed 10/7/2013). 
602 Funding boost for Ministry for the Environment, 9 May 2001, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/funding-
boost-ministry-environment  (accessed 3/4/2011). 
603 Sustainability cornerstone of environment, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/sustainability-cornerstone-
environment-policy (accessed 3/4/2011). 
604 DPMC, "Sustainable Development Programme of Action." The key message of the Strategy was that the New 
Zealand Government would commit itself to the triple objectives of sustainable development (environmental, 
social and economic). The Strategy identified three other flagship programmes besides water: sustainable and 
efficient energy use, sustainable cities, and investment in child and youth development, plus a reporting 
programme. The Strategy was not without its critics, however. See PCE, “Sustainability Forum” in 2007 at , 
http://www.pce.parliament.nz/publications/all-publications/ (accessed 3/8/2012) and Bosselmann, "Why New 
Zealand Needs a National Sustainability Development Strategy."  
 Money for water work, 15 May 2003, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/money-water-work (accessed 
3/8/2012). The 2003 Budget allocated $2 Million for research, policy work and consultation over two years. 
605 DPMC, "Sustainable Development Programme of Action." 
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Environment), rather than one, were made responsible for results.606 This arrangement relied on a 
close working relationship that might not always be guaranteed given that one ostensibly worked to 
an environmental outcome and the other to an economic development outcome. In addition, 
government departments were expected to give effect to a principle of partnership, and that meant 
that proposals needed some degree of negotiation with other interested parties, including the 
collective of regional and local government, recreational groups, agriculture, energy producers, and 
Maori. 607 
The early stages of the water programme, nevertheless, proceeded relatively smoothly and in 
accordance with common policy development practices in the New Zealand public service. By mid-
2004 technical working papers and background reports were produced on water allocation and use, 
effects of rural land use on water quality, and potential water bodies of national importance (to 
which officials had argued successfully to include economically important water bodies). 608  
Within just over a year, in October 2004, departmental officials had developed a programme that 
proposed using RMA tools for national direction (National Policy Statements, and National 
Environmental Standards), a market management mechanism (water transfer and trading), and 
priority allocation rather than first-in first-served, but was more equivocal about nationally 
consistent default values for water quality and protecting water bodies of national importance.609 
Public consultation on proposals was launched in December 2004 with a document entitled 
Freshwater for a sustainable future: Issues and options.610 In February 2005 public meetings, 
meetings with local government and hui with Maori were held at 20 locations and 292 written 
submissions were received. 
The results, contained in the consultation summaries, were fairly predictable. Environmental NGOs 
wanted clear mandatory national direction. Agricultural and commercial water users were lukewarm 
about rules but would accept something if it provided more certainty about access to water. Local 
                                                          
606 An interagency committee was created to monitor progress. MfE and MAF were committee co-leads, with 
representation of DPMC, Department of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development, DoC, Ministry of 
Health, Treasury and Environment Waikato (representing regional councils) and the Marlborough District 
Council (representing local territorial councils). The Ministry of Culture and Heritage was added in 2004 
607 DPMC, "Sustainable Development Programme of Action." P.11. 
608 See Cabinet committee paper POL (04) 320, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/prog-action/cab-paper-
consultation/ (accessed 10/7/2013). 
609 Ibid. The drivers of the equivocation are not entirely clear. Speculatively, it may have been a combination of 
MfE’s ambivalence, MAF‘s (and regional councils’) dislike of the national water body protection mechanism of 
water conservation orders, and regional council advocacy against national prescription. See Cabinet paper POL 
(06) 321, paragraph 19, and Chamberlain, "Strategy for New Zealand Water Management with Particular 
Reference to National Policy and Interventions."  
610 MfE, "Freshwater for a Sustainable Future: Issues and Options," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 
2004). 
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and regional government, giving voice to their position in favour of “local choice”, were generally 
unhappy about central government direction. 611 Maori wanted more involvement in management 
and acknowledgement of their rights.612 
At this stage officials had a policy mandate, completed scoping policy proposals, sought direction 
from Cabinet, and completed public and stakeholder consultation, within the space of two and a half 
years. However, it took nearly another year, until April 2006, for officials to go back to Cabinet with a 
proposed implementation programme. The proposed programme remained tentative. It proposed a 
leadership group of representatives from local government and stakeholders to advise on priorities, 
further work by officials on the need for and likely content of NPSs to address more efficient water 
use and demand management, further work on establishing criteria for nationally outstanding 
natural water bodies, and developing tools to improve water management.613 The message from the 
language of the Cabinet paper is that, after three and a half years, departmental officials were 
recommending more work. Possible contributors may have been an election and a change of 
Environment Minister in 2005, but general environmental policy settings had not changed; nor had 
the degree of pressure from external interests, at this stage. Thus it seems plausible to argue that 
causes lay within the bureaucracy.  
First, there were different  views amongst departments. The co-lead department, MAF, ensured 
economic objectives were prominent. DoC argued that the voluntary approaches that lay at the heart 
of the package would not achieve sufficient protection of freshwater ecosystems quickly enough. 
Treasury and the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) argued that measures such as consent 
transfer and cap-and-trade approaches were essential. Statutory regimes, they said, required “more 
flexibility” and “minor legislative change.”614  
                                                          
611 Bush, "Local Government." P.303. 
612 MfE, "Reflections: A Summary of Your Views on the Sustainable Water Programme of Action," (Wellington: 
Ministry for the Environment, 2005). Cabinet minute CAB 2006 11/11 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/prog-action/cabinet-paper-implementation-package.html (accessed 
15/10/2012).   
613 The tools included enhancing transfer of water consents and water user management of water under 
cooperative regimes, improved environmental flow methodologies, improving the ability of Regional Councils 
to recover costs, methods to protect natural character and biodiversity, methods to manage over allocated 
catchments including alternatives to the RMA’s supposed first in, first served allocation mechanism, model 
consents and model conditions, and better alignment with science priorities. See Cabinet minute CAB 2006 
11/11, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/prog-action/cabinet-paper-implementation-package.html 
(accessed 15/10/2012). 
614 Ibid. In the author’s experience it was not a regular occurrence during the period of the Labour Government 
between 1999 and 2008 for departments to display differences in cabinet papers. Ministers preferred to see 
department come to a common position. 
See also a  suite of papers produced by Treasury between 2002 and 2004 on property rights, environmental 
policy and water allocation ( www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy ), and R. Hawke, "Improving 
the Water Allocation Framework in New Zealand: Enhanced Transfer," (Wellington: Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2006). 
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Second, MfE had undergone a significant internal restructuring in 2004 and 2005 resulting in a new 
senior management team, an internal structure based on major stakeholder groupings, and an 
internal priority on “fixing the most urgent matters.”615 It reinterpeted its role from being primarily a 
policy ministry to one that “works effectively with others to achieve the sustainable development of 
New Zealand”.616 The Ministry was embroiled with intense political debate about the costs of 
proposed climate change policies.617  Water policy was dealt with in the unit known as Working with 
Local Government. The title of the unit suggested a priority on relationship management, not 
necessarily on policy substance. Furthermore, some staff who might otherwise be working on water 
policy were diverted to deal with water management in the Waitaki River in Canterbury and a review 
of flood management following floods in the Manawatu region.618 Also, MfE’s overall expanding work 
programme, although now better resourced than in the 1990s, was creating competition for 
management attention. The numbers of staff working on water policy were small.619 
Finally, having two lead agencies required them to work together seamlessly, and particularly for 
them to draw in other agencies. The different departmental views evident in the mid-2006 Cabinet 
paper suggest this wasn’t happening as well as it might. 
What this meant for environmental and policy effectiveness is that no clear new framework to 
advance environmental values regarding water management was emerging, beyond the existing 
RMA statutory requirements. 
7.3.4 Mid 2000s to 2008: sustainability and stronger ministerial steering 
 After mid-2006 the tempo of action regarding water management began to change. Public  concern 
about the slow rate of progress on freshwater matters led to stronger Ministerial intervention.620 
Soon after, the Prime Minister announced that environmental sustainability would be a top priority 
for the government.621  
                                                          
615 MfE, "Annual Report 2002-2003." P.91.  
616 ———, "Protecting People and the Environment: Briefing to the Incoming Minister for the Environment " 
(Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2005). P.4. 
617 Kelly, "Climate Change Policy: Actions and Barriers in New Zealand." P.78. D. Bullock, "Emissions Trading in 
New Zealand: Development, Challenges and Design," Environmental Politics 21, no. 4 (2012). Pp.661-662. 
618 See C. Kilner, "The RMA under Review: A Case Study of Project Aqua," Political Science 58, no. 2 (2006).. 
MfE, "Meeting the Challenges of Future Flooding in New Zealand," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 
2008).  
619 See ———, "Annual Report 2005-2006."Pp. 2-11. Also commentators on climate change policy noted 
bureaucratic infighting and procrastination during this time. See Boston, "The Complicated Politics of Climate 
Change." Pp. 215-216. 
620 “Action must follow state of environment report” Fish and Game Council, 30 January 2008, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0801/S00236.htm (accessed 4/12/2012). 
621 Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament 12/2/2008, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-
minister039s-statement-parliament (Accessed 3/8/2012). 
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There is evidence of political frustration about the slow progress on water policy.  Cabinet wanted 
progress reports and work completed by specified dates.622 Then, under the tenure of acting 
Environment Minister, David Parker, decisions were taken to proceed with an NPS on freshwater 
management, and a National Environmental Standard (NES) on ecological flows.623 Parker, although 
only an acting minister, had earlier experience in RMA water matters and a track record of pushing 
policy issues.624 He claimed to have driven the water policy instruments.625 Parker was followed in 
the Environment portfolio late in 2007 by an experienced and senior minister, Trevor Mallard. 
Furthermore, Parker and Mallard, and MfE, would have been helped by the Prime Ministerial priority 
for environmental sustainability, accompanied by greater awareness of the economic significance of 
environmental quality. Economic departments were now saying environmental  sustainability was a 
significant component of economic growth.626 Consequently, the intra-government climate was 
potentially favourable to environmental initiatives. At a departmental level, however, MfE ‘s 
leadership changed rapidly, with a succession of four different chief executives between 2006 and 
2008, and controversy about the extent to which the department had become politicised.627  Some 
progress was made on water issues, but it was not fast. 
An NES on measurement of water-take was agreed in February 2008, pending drafting of the 
regulation, and agreement with regional councils on exemptions.628 In March 2008 a discussion 
document on an NES on ecological flows and water levels was produced, accompanied by a press 
                                                          
622 See the language in Cabinet committee paper POL (06) 321, Paragraph 3. 
http://mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/prog-action/cab-paper-progress-report/ (accessed 10/7/2013). 
623 See Cabinet minute (09) 20/12, Appendix 1. RMA instruments had been regarded as part of the policy mix 
since 2004, but up until 2007 officials were still equivocating about their sue, nature, and scope, apart from 
requiring better measurement of water-take on a nationally consistent basis.  
624 See Statement of evidence on behalf of David William Parker in an application to amend the Kawerau Water 
Conservation Order 29 May 2009, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/rma/central/nps/hearing-proceeding/20-1-
statement-evidence-david-parker.pdf (accessed 3/8/2012).  
625 “As acting minister for the environment I unblocked the national policy statement on freshwater quality”, 
Red Alert blog, 30/7/2012, http://blog.labour.org.nz/2012/07/30/i-seek-leave-to-make-a-personal-
explanation/ . The author supports this assertion, based on personal experience as CEO of MfE at the time. 
626 Helen Clark, Labour Party Annual Conference keynote address, October 2006, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0610/S00539.htm (accessed 4/12/2012). The Natural Resources Sector 
briefing to incoming ministers 2008, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-incoming-minister-
2011/nrs-bim-2011.pdf (Accessed 4/9/2012). 
There is evidence the shift had begun earlier within Treasury. See Treasury, "Growing Higher Living Standards 
for New Zealanders: Briefing to the Incoming Government," (Wellington: Treasury, 2002). Pp.58-64.   
 “Our priority sustainability initiatives are…working towards a National Policy Statement on freshwater 
management.” Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament 12/2/2008, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-minister039s-statement-parliament (Accessed 3/8/2012). 
627 David Benson Pope resigns, Dominion Post, 27 July, 2007, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/51486/David-Benson-Pope-resigns (accessed 4/12/2012). 
628 Cabinet committee minute POL (08) 16, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/prog-action/cabinet-paper-
measurement-of-water-takes.html (accessed 2/3/2011).  
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release from Trevor Mallard saying the standard aimed to promote consistency across the country in 
decision-making to ensure there was sufficient amount of water flowing in water bodies.629  
Missing from the mix was any announcement about protecting nationally important water bodies, 
one of the objectives of the 2003 sustainable development strategy.  In 2004 officials led by DoC had 
already identified criteria and a list of potential waters of national significance. It had been expected 
that decisions on this subject would be made in 2005.630 In 2006, Cabinet papers reported work was 
under way on further criteria.631 By mid-2008 it no longer appeared on the officials’ work 
programme. Whether this was deliberate is not clear. What appears to have happened is that 
officials widened the scope of what should be protected to include all values (including economic and 
cultural ones).632  Establishing and then agreeing on criteria across the wide range of values became 
very complicated. Without strong leadership, no consensus could be reached. Some topics, including 
protecting waters of national significance, were no longer evident as part of the work programme. 
Just why is not clear. Perhaps ministers were persuaded it was less of a priority than the RMA 
instruments, or it was dropped by officials. Furthermore, the two lead agencies, MfE and MAF, were 
not supportive of water conservation orders, the existing national-level tool for freshwater 
protection.633 From now on, reference was to water bodies of “outstanding” significance, rather than 
“national” significance, and the process for identifying and protecting them was delegated to 
regional councils.634 
                                                          
629 MfE, "Proposed National Environmental Standard on Ecological Flows and Water Levels: Discussion 
Document," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2008). Ensuring healthy water-national environmental 
standard, 2/3/2008, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ensuring-healthy-water-%e2%80%93-national-
environmental-standard (accessed 2/3/2011). 
630 ———, "Water Programme of Action: Potential Water Bodies of National Importance," (Wellington: Ministry 
for the Environment, 2004). MAF stated that final decisions on waters of national importance would be taken 
by the end of 2005.See RMupdate at http://maxa.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/publications/rmupdate/rm14/rm14-
01.htm (accessed 3/8/2012). 
631 Cabinet committee paper POL (06) 321, Paragraph 23. “The Department of Conservation is leading the 
development of these criteria in consultation with the Ministry for the Environment and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry. Initial work is underway on developing criteria and the focus is now on identifying 
existing tools that can be used to assess the relative natural values of different water bodies. The next stage 
will involve using the tools to test the draft criteria, and to identify the extent of likely overlap between natural 
values and nationally significant development opportunities.”  
632 Cabinet committee paper POL (04) 320 
633 This assertion is based on: first, the fact that it had disappeared from view; second, that there was a political 
imperative to deliver some action on water; third, and more speculatively, that Parker, and then Mallard, with 
the Environment portfolio, would have been receiving more exposure to RMA interventions, than protection of 
water bodies, which was aligned more with the Conservation portfolio; and fourth, that MfE and MAF were at 
best ambivalent about water conservation orders, one of the protection mechanisms suggested for waters of 
national importance.  
634 MfE, "Proposed National Environmental Standards on Ecological Flows and Water Levels.," (Wellington: 
Ministry for the Environment, 2008). Policy 1 (2) & (3.2).  
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An NPS, the water policy centre-piece, and a key priority for the government, was finalised as a draft 
and then released in July 2008.635 Producing the draft required input and negotiation, and bargaining 
and compromise, between a multitude of departments at multiple levels and at multiple times. In 
addition, the draft also required MfE to prepare a regulatory impact statement. The general test 
required by regulatory impact statements was that, “the problem cannot be adequately addressed 
through private or non-regulatory arrangements and that a regulatory solution is required in the 
public interest.”636 The type of language used in the draft , including wording like “progressive 
enhancement of the overall quality of Freshwater Resources”, and “including actions to ensure 
appropriate freshwater resources can reach or exceed a swimmable standard” drew criticism not 
only from environmental NGOs, but also Simon Upton, the previous National Party Minister for the 
Environment for most of the 1990s. He also criticised MfE for not having a big enough team devoted 
to such an important environmental issue. Upton’s view was that the officials’ processes had resulted 
in an insipid and environmentally ineffective document.637  
By late 2008, the water-take measurement NES was ready for final approval.  The framework for an 
NES on ecological flows had received public feedback and was back with officials. The draft NPS was 
under review by an independent Board of Inquiry.638 The entire suite of measures was overtaken, 
however, by the election at the end of that year and a change of government. 
In summary, policy work picked up momentum after 2006. Intra-government factors that contributed 
to momentum appear to be an increasingly favourable climate of political support, a softening of 
ideological differences about environmental values between departments, and priority put on the 
subject politically (and possibly personally) by Ministers for the Environment. Nevertheless, by the 
end of 2008, some form of framework to address water quality had not yet been achieved, although 
one involving an NPS and four NESs was in train. There seemed to be intra-government constraints in 
                                                          
635 “Our priority sustainability initiatives are…working towards a National Policy Statement on freshwater 
management.” Prime Minister’s statement to Parliament 12/2/2008, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-minister039s-statement-parliament (Accessed 3/8/2012). ———, 
"Proposed National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management," (2008). 
636 Treasury, Regulatory Impact Analysis Handbook (Wellington: Treasury, 2009). P.8. 
 637The qualified language of the draft drew criticism from environmental NGOs and other commentators. Five 
national environmental NGOs united and called for “far reaching changes”. See “Critical issues with the 
officials’ draft national policy statement”, 26 June 2008, Memo from national NGOs,   
http://www.ecologic.org.nz/?id=61&page=Freshwater+policy (accessed 4/12/2012). 
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638 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/board-inquiry-appointed-water-policy-stmt (accessed 2/3/2011). The 
RMA requires for any proposed national policy statement that the Minister appoint a formal board of enquiry 
(Section 47), or to decide not to use a board of enquiry, but then to follow similar processes required of a 
board of enquiry (Section 46). 
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departments’ capacities to advance the environmental components of water policy: in MfE either 
because of competing priorities, insufficient numbers of people assigned to develop water policy, or 
leadership issues; and a combination of DoC, MAF, and MfE inabilities to further the concept of 
waters of national significance.  
7.3.5 2008-2013: A “New Start for Freshwater” 
The 2008 election returned a centre-right government. It put an ideological emphasis on promoting 
economic growth, rather than on environmental sustainability that had featured as a policy priority 
in the closing years of the previous Labour-led government.639 
MfE argued in its briefing to the new government that water quality decline was one of New 
Zealand’s critical environmental issues. It was supported by economic development departments.640 
Departmental briefings in late 2008 laid emphasis on the environmental parameters of water 
management, while in 2011 more emphasis was placed on the economic growth dimensions, and by 
2013 Cabinet papers increased this emphasis even more.641 The new Minister for the Environment, 
Nick Smith, made dealing with water management, and water quality, one of his key priorities. Work 
by the Board of Inquiry proceeded with the earlier NPS work. An NES on water take measurement 
was promulgated. Smith established a new Scandanavian-derived approach to assist on water policy 
known as the Land and Water Forum (LAWF).642 LAWF was designed as a sectoral, rather than 
departmental, form of policy development, drawing on the idea that sectoral policy development  
resulted in greater acceptability of policy proposals.643 The LAWF policy process was championed by 
Guy Salmon, an adviser to Smith both when Smith was in Oppositon, and when he became Minister 
for the Environment. Another influence was the ex-senior public servant and chair of LAWF, Alister 
Bisley. As well, a range of initiatives to encourage better land use practice and water care were 
                                                          
639 Speech from the throne, 9 December 2008, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-throne (accessed 
4/12/2012). 
640 MfE, "Briefing to the Incoming Government 2008: Environmental Sustainability  
" (2008). Pp. 8-10, and The Natural Resources Sector briefing to incoming ministers 2008, 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-incoming-minister-2011/nrs-bim-2011.pdf (Accessed 
4/9/2012). 
641 The Natural Resources Sector briefing to incoming ministers 2008, 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-incoming-minister-2011/nrs-bim-2011.pdf (Accessed 
4/9/2012). The Natural Resources Sector briefing to the incoming government 2011 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about/briefing-incoming-minister-2011/nrs-bim-2011.pdf (accessed 
4/9/2012). Cabinet paper “Water reform: Overview”, November 2012 and “Water reform overview: 
implementing the water reform strategy”, December 2012 (Cabinet paper reference number unknown) 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/topics/freshwater.html (accessed 21/4/2013). 
642 Salmon, "Governance of the Rural Environment - Are Existing Approaches Working?.", Salmon, 
"Collaborative Governance on Environmental Policies Affecting Rural Landowners: Comparing Nordic and New 
Zealand Practises.." Salmon was an adviser to the Minister and widely seen as the architect of this initiative. 
While LAWF became a central sounding board for ideas about water management reform, the government 
continued to seek views about Maori aspirations regarding water management from the Iwi Leaders Forum 
that had come into existence in 2007. 
643 Nilsson, "Framework for Analysing Environmental Policy Integration." P.354. 
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introduced.644 The NPS Board of Inquiry, whose work spanned the election, made substantial changes 
to the earlier version of the policy.645 These changes were seen as improving the draft that had been 
so criticised in 2008, both environmentally and in process terms.646 The Board of Inquiry’s report was 
not considered immediately, but referred to LAWF. It in turn recommended the Board’s report be 
accepted largely unchanged.647 The Board’s recommendations, however, were diluted when 
approved by the Minister.  The Cabinet paper on the NPS stated, ”While I have sought to retain the 
Board's recommendations wherever possible, I have made some changes to improve the workability 
of the NPS and its fit with the government’s broader policy approach, including a better reflection of 
people’s ability to provide for their economic well-being.”648 The changes made to the NPS at 
Ministerial level have been criticised as providing only a weak form of national direction.649 
Nevertheless, the NPS could be described as providing some sort of policy framework, however 
flawed in the views of some critics, and that the LAWF process eventually proved successful in 
reaching consensus in environmental terms, probably more than the prior departmentally dominated 
processes.650  
While these developments were going on, MfE’s internal structure went through a series of changes, 
from the relationship model of the mid 2000s, to a model of a policy directorate and a programme 
directorate from 2008. A water reform group was set up within one of the Divisions of the Policy 
Directorate. In late 2012 a new stand-alone water directorate was created within MfE (to take effect 
in March 2013) reporting to the chief executives of MfE and MPI, with 40 staff from MfE and 
                                                          
644 See Freshwater reform: Fresh start for water, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/freshwater/fresh-start-
for-fresh-water/  (Accessed 27/10/2012), and Land and water forum, 
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645 Board of inquiry into the proposed national policy statement for freshwater management, "Report and 
Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry into the Proposed National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2010). 
646 LAWF, "Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Freshwater," (Wellington: Land and Water 
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649 G. Charlton, Brunette, B., "Development and Water Use in New Zealand: Water Priority and Allocation under 
Section 5 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the National Policy Statement," in Water and Society, ed. 
D.W. Pepper, Brebbia, C.A., (Southampton: WIT Press, 2011). P.355. 
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secondees from MPI, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), DoC, Treasury, 
DPMC, and the Office of Treaty Settlements (OTS).651  
Following the promulgation of the NPS, policy evolution continued, demonstrating the axiom that 
policy is rarely if ever finished.652 A question of how to give effect to the NPS and deal with 
government priorities remained. LAWF, in its second and third report recommended a suite of 
measures to support the NPS and improve water management.653 LAWF had completed its work and 
ceased to operate by late 2012. Interest group lobbying began to reassert itself.654  
The National-led government was concerned primarily about two issues: ensuring regional 
government gave stronger consideration to economic growth (believing Regional Councils, if left 
undirected, would not do this, and instead give priority to environmental considerations), and how to 
satisfy Maori cultural interests in water and their aspirations for water ownership.  Officials were 
exercised about how to set national standards in order to provide national coherence to 
environmental  limit-setting, how to give effect to the NPS’s policy requiring regional councils to 
identify and protect outstanding water bodies, and about consistency and efficiency of access to and 
use of water, essentially to expand agricultural productivity. The concerns of both ministers and 
officials are evident in the language of Cabinet papers supporting a new freshwater agenda known as 
Freshwater Reform 2013 and Beyond.655 It signalled reforms that would be progressed, over time.656 
7.3.6 Summary 
Improvement of freshwater quality has been part of government environmental agendas for over 
twenty years, to greater and lesser degrees. In 1999 the national agenda on water said: 
We have made good progress on many of the water management issues that emerged in the 
1960s. But we now need to make progress in the following areas: 
                                                          
651 “Government pools bureaucrats to finalise water policy”, National Business review 
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/govt-pools-bureaucrats-finalise-water-policy-bd-132523 (accessed 21/4/2013). 
652 Schneider, "Policy Design: Elements, Premises, and Strategies." P.80. 
653 LAWF, "Second Report of the Land and Water Forum: Setting Limits for Water Quality and Quantity, and 
Freshwater Policy- and Plan-Making through Collaboration," (Wellington: Land and Water Trust, 2012). ———, 
"Third Report of the Land and Water Forum: Managing Water Quality and Allocating Water," (Wellington: Land 
and Water Trust, 2012). 
654 Federated Farmers national spokesperson on water, Ian McKenzie, “Good Management Practices can 
deliver quality outcomes across all water quality parameters,” Farmers Weekly NZ, Monday, May 27, 2013. 
New Zealand Fish and Game Council, “Govt plans will wreck river protection.” March 11, 2013. 
http://www.fishandgame.org.nz/newsitem/govt-plans-will-wreck-river-protection (accessed 5 May 2013). 
655 See Cabinet paper “Water reform: Overview”, November 2012 and “Water reform overview: implementing 
the water reform strategy”, December 2012 (Cabinet paper reference number unknown) 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/topics/freshwater.html (accessed 21/4/2013). 
656 See Cabinet paper “Water reform: Permission to release freshwater reform proposals and approval to 
undertake targeted engagement”, February 2013 (Cabinet paper reference number unknown) 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/topics/cab-paper-water-reform-permission-release-freshwater-
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Allocation, efficiency and equity issues and impacts of abstraction on instream values; 
The condition of our lowland stream ecosystems, especially in intensively farmed areas; 
Groundwater, quality and quantity, and the impacts on streams of abstraction of groundwater; 
Estuaries and harbours, in particular, the impacts of storm water; 
Microbiological contamination, especially of freshwater (surface and groundwater); 
Eutrophication and loss of habitat in our lowland lakes.657 
In 2010 Land and Water Forum said: 
New Zealand has made good progress in clearing up point source pollution over the past twenty 
years, but monitoring shows that our water quality is declining in many places, particularly in 
lowland water bodies. Also, urban waterways remain highly polluted, including on account of 
sewage leakages, stormwater run-off and discharges from processing factories. At a national 
level, diffuse discharges now greatly exceed point source pollution.658 
In one sense these two quotes support a contention that policy work is always on-going.659 However, 
they are almost identical. It is remarkable how little emerged between the early 1990s and 2010 in 
terms of policy frameworks with environmentally effective elements given the length of time that it 
was the focus of policy attention, the amount of effort from ministers and departments, and a 
succession of decisions at Cabinet level to act. Between 1995 and 2007 almost nothing formal 
emerged in national policy terms besides what was already in Section 6 (a) of the RMA.660 Only after 
the start of 2008 can it be said that new directive policies began to develop, and emerged in 2011 in 
policies A1 to A4 in the NPS that direct regional councils to set nutrient limits.661 Even then, critics say 
that environmental values are subservient to economic growth priorities in current approaches to 
water management.662  
Between the mid 1990s and 2013, policy development to address freshwater quality decline had 
been nearly continuous, despite a hope in 1991 that the RMA alone would deal with the issue. 
Although it was not intended to analyse the RMA in this chapter, a number of features about how it 
has been implemented are evident: ideological attachment to its promise and the principle of 
devolved management; implementation shortcomings and lack of national standards; political 
pressure for alternatives (particularly ones that water down the RMA’s central environmental 
premise); and constitutional debate over Maori interests. What the chapter provides so far is the 
                                                          
657 MfE, "Making Every Drop Count: The National Agenda for Sustainable Water Management- Action Plan." 
Pp.2-3. 
658 LAWF, "Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Freshwater." P.xi. 
659 Schneider, "Policy Design: Elements, Premises, and Strategies." P.80. 
660 There is a question whether interpretations of the RMA constitute policy. In strict constitutional terms it 
doesn’t, but in practice it may. Judicial interpretation is not, however, the focus of this study. 
661 National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2011, Policies A1-A4. See Sinner, "Implications of the 
National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management." P.9. Sinner argues nutrient limits may arrest decline in 
water quality, but it will depend on Regional Councils acting quickly to set limits, which Sinner regards as a risk. 
662 Ibid. See also Cabinet paper “National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management.” Paragraph 64.Cabinet 
paper reference number unknown.  http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/freshwaternps.pdf  (accessed 
2/10/2012). Charlton, "Development and Water Use in New Zealand: Water Priority and Allocation under 
Section 5 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the National Policy Statement." P.355. 
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information base on which to analyse drivers within government and how they influenced 
environmental policy. The remainder of the chapter undertakes this analysis using the research 
framwork and applying the research questions. 
7.4 Discussion  
Policy development designed to address decline in freshwater policy has spanned a period of 22 
years and is still continuing. In this time at least two policy initiatives, the national agenda on water in 
the late 1990s and the sustainable programme of action on water in the mid-2000s, were largely 
ineffective. Only after 2007 is it possible to identify clearer national-level actions. This despite 
freshwater quality decline being at, or near, the top of environmental policy agendas for the whole 
period. 
The level of complexity in managing freshwater in New Zealand is high. The economic importance of 
use of freshwater by primary industries (the heart of New Zealand’s economy), and tension between 
economic, cultural and social values, have always created potential for conflict and lack of policy 
consensus. By contrast, there is a considerable scientific knowledge of causes of freshwater quality 
decline. However, public visibility of the issue has only grown significantly since the early 2000s.663 
Complexity is clearly a feature with a potential to cause delays in policy development.  
There are few singular events directly impacting on freshwater policy in the way that occurred in the 
other two studies. The foreshore and seabed controversy spilled over into freshwater policy in 2006 
causing delays because of political and constitutional concerns about water ownership. Maori 
aspirations to resolve the ownership issue have remained a potent consideration in water policy 
development since, contributing to conflict potential and complexity. Policy development was 
influenced by cognitive shifts and ideological effects of elections in 1999 and 2008, but whether 
these were dramatic shifts is debateable. This will be discussed later in this section of the chapter.  
Assessing the environmental and policy effectiveness of freshwater policy depends at what point 
the assessment is made. If one looks at the national agenda on water produced in 1999, an 
assessment could be that its potential environmental effectiveness was moderate in the sense that it 
emphasised environmental values. But, in terms of integration it was weak in that it didn’t integrate 
either internally or externally. There was nothing new other than the existing policy in the RMA. 
Furthermore, its policy effectiveness was weak. It actions relied on guidance and light handed advice 
to regional and local councils, with no formal means of direction and no apparent commitment to 
resources for implementation. 
                                                          
663 K.F.D. Hughey, G.N. Kerr, R.Cullen, Public Perceptions of New Zealand's Evironment (Christchurch: EOS 
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Nationwide debate, research, and technical workshops and guidelines in the 2000s led to industry 
agreements, and, at a sub-national level, policies in regional and local plans, and specific operational 
action at key crisis sites.664 But, again, this took place under existing RMA policy. 
Developments between 2007 and 2013 present something more concrete to assess in environmental 
and policy terms.665 By 2012, two national policy instruments were in place that dealt directly with 
freshwater quality, besides the general provisions to the RMA. These policies were the national 
standard on freshwater drinking quality produced by the Ministry of Health in 2007, and the National 
Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2012 (the NPS). Regulations provided for nationwide 
measurement of large water abstraction.666 There was additional voluntary guidance on technical 
matters dealing with ecological health, managing waterways in rural areas, groundwater sampling 
protocols, best practice guidance on surface water quality, and microbial water quality guidance for 
recreational use of freshwater areas.667 
The key policy product was the NPS. It incorporated environmental values in all objectives and 
policies. The objectives of the NPS require every regional council to ensure the overall quality of 
freshwater within a region be maintained or improved. It was also explicit about requirements for 
integrative management in Objective C1 and policies C1 and C2. In these senses, the NPS could be 
described as potentially moderate to strong in terms of environmental effectiveness, because it 
incorporated environmental values in a clear and integrative way. In policy effectiveness terms, the 
NPS had the weight of law behind it. It is mandatory for regional councils to give it effect in their 
statutory planning documents. In this sense the NPS meets one of Grant’s criteria for policy 
effectiveness: backing by rules and laws. There are, however, alternative views about both the 
environmental and policy effectiveness of the NPS.668 The main criticism is that it needed to be 
accompanied by national standards for water quality.669 The reason why critics say the NPS should be 
complemented with national standards is that otherwise it runs the risk of perpetuating issues of lack 
                                                          
664 For example, a nutrient trading scheme had been introduced to combat the increased nitrification of lake 
water from intensified farming in the Taupo catchment, the Waitaki catchment had been made subject to a 
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reduce nitrogen and phosphorus entering lakes from land use. Water resources plans had been implemented 
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666 Resource Management (Measurement and Reporting) Regulations 2010. 
667 See MfE, “Guidelines and tools”’ http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/water-quality.html (accessed 
21/4/2013). 
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of clarity and uneven implementation that have existed since 1991.670 In this sense the NPS was 
insufficiently integrated internally with other policies (national standards and further direction 
regarding implementation).671 Allied to this criticism is the argument mounted in the past by the 
OECD that New Zealand national water policies rely too heavily on guidance and voluntary measures 
(evidenced in the range of voluntary standards and guidance on MfE’s website).672 Statutory national 
standards for water quality have been worked on by MfE since 2007 and advocated by the Land and 
Water Forum in its final report, but as of mid-2013, nothing has eventuated.673  
There was support for an NPS, witnessed by the consensus of interests that developed during the 
NPS. But, as was argued in the second LAWF report, further national environmental standards for 
water quality were needed, on the grounds that without that guidance traditional regional resistance 
of regional councils and some industry bodies to national direction would reassert itself, a feature 
many have argued has been a perennial source of ineffectiveness in New Zealand’s freshwater 
quality policy.674  
The overall picture is of an environmental policy product in mid 2012 that had potential for 
environmental and policy effectiveness, but also potential integration and policy vulnerabilities 
including residual opposition to national direction from the implementation agencies (regional 
councils), and industry bodies and individuals who were sceptical of nationally based standards and 
rules. 
Taking a long view, what is remarkable is how it took many years to arrive at even this point, a policy 
of the type Simon Upton says he had come to favour in the late 1990s, while  Minister of the 
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recommended by officials in new policy proposals. See Cabinet paper, “Water reform: Implementing the water 
reform strategy.” Cabinet paper reference number unknown. http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-
papers/topics/cab-paper-water-reform-overview-implementing-water-reform-strategy.pdf (accessed 
21/4/2013). 
672 OECD, "Environmental Policies in New Zealand," (Paris: OECD, 1981), ———, OECD Environmental 
Performance Review: New Zealand (Paris: OECD, 1996), ———, OECD Environmental Performance Review: New 
Zealand. 
673 See MfE, "Proposed National Environmental Standard on Ecological Flows and Water Levels: Discussion 
Document." The Cabinet paper “Water reform: Implementing the water reform strategy” December 2012 says 
that something will be produced. http://www.mfe.govt.nz/cabinet-papers/topics/cab-paper-water-reform-
overview-implementing-water-reform-strategy.pdf (accessed 21/4/2013). It remains to be seen whether this 
will happen and what form it might take. 
674 "We welcome the fact that it (the NPS) has finally been approved and provides some direction. However it 
will not on its own achieve the step-change improvement in water quality sought by the Land and Water Forum 
and EDS". “Freshwater announcements need to go further” Press release Environmental Defence Society 12 
May 2011. LAWF, "Second Report of the Land and Water Forum: Setting Limits for Water Quality and Quantity, 
and Freshwater Policy- and Plan-Making through Collaboration." Pp.9-11. 
7:  Freshwater policy 
160 
Environment.675 As discussed above, complexity is a contributing factor, but the narrative of 
freshwater policy development points to other explanations. 
The effect of agency on water policy is seen in the influence of external groups identified in Section 
7.2 of this chapter, and of a number (but not all) ministers and advisers within government. Less 
apparent is influence of individual officials. The evidence of this case study points to periods of 
activism under Upton, Parker, Mallard, and Smith, and quiescence in between.676 Upton worked 
together with MfE on Environment 2010 and the sustainable land management strategy and national 
agenda on water that followed, but, as noted, Upton believed there were different ideas between 
him and the Ministry about how to achieve better water quality, which may suggest why things did 
not proceed then as rapidly as they might have. Parker and Mallard provided strong drive for 
progress with policy development between 2007 and 2008. The influence of the Prime Minister 
Helen Clark between 1999 and 2008 should also not be underestimated, both in the shape of the 
Sustainable Development Strategy (including water management as a key priority) and in the 
government commitment to environment sustainability as a top policy goal between 2006 and 2008. 
The 2011 cabinet paper approving the NPS suggests Smith personally directed changes to give the 
policy greater emphasis on economic considerations. The influence of ministerial advisers such as 
Guy Salmon, and chair of the LAWF, Alister Bisley, is also evident, but relative to the overall time 
period, this influence is isolated. However, there doesn’t appear to be a stand-out example of 
influence or strong leadership of individual public servants outside of their institutionalised positions. 
While it may have occurred (possibly in recent developments and hence not yet revealed), it is not 
obvious. If the influence of agency had been strong, especially from activist ministers and between 
1999 and 2008 with a supportive Prime Minister, faster progress might have been expected. That it 
didn’t happen means that other factors were also in play. 
Intra-departmental institutional effects constrained MfE in the 1990s. It had very limited resources 
to deal with a large number of problematic environmental issues besides water quality, such as 
bedding in the RMA, developing climate change reponse policies, and creating a new regime to 
manage pollution and hazardous substances. Lack of resources, however, has less validity after 2003 
when MfE received substantial new funding to develop water policy.  
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MfE was also constrained in an organisational sense by having to rely on regional councils for data, 
expertise, and implementation, which carried transaction costs and required negotiation. MfE 
generally wanted to keep regional councils on-side wherever possible. MfE depended on regional 
councils, and local councils, to implement the RMA (effective implementation of the RMA was a key 
priority for MfE for much of this period) and felt it couldn’t push councils too much. But regional 
councils did not want to be directed, which is precisely what national direction would do. At the 
same time, while sometimes supporting calls by economic departments for market type instruments, 
MfE was also conscious that such instruments had onerous implementation and relationship issues 
for councils.677 
Just as the overall structural arrangements between MfE and regional councils created an 
institutional effect on how MfE came to view policy proposals, so too did some of the ideological 
foundations of the RMA. For much of the time of this case study MfE was sceptical about a range of 
directive instruments to improve water quality. It  preferred  voluntary approaches, information, and 
guidance over direction, and was cautious about narrative forms of national direction and what it felt 
might turn out to be overly prescriptive national standards (based on a science view that water 
quality was influenced by biophysical conditions at a catchment and sub-catchment level just as 
much as by land use). As discussed in Chapter 2, the rules an organisation works under can set up 
patterned ways of thinking. This becomes an institutional effect as much as a cognitive one. The 
RMA’s mode of environmental management is devolved (and very highly devolved in the absence of 
national direction). Hence it seems plausible that MfE’s caution about national direction, or new and 
different policy directions, and its support for voluntary measures as locally empowering instruments 
to solve water quality issues,  may be attributable, in part, to departmental ideology arising from the 
RMA, despite Ministerial preferences for greater direction.  
There is also evidence that MfE’s internal structure was an issue in the mid-2000s. Water quality 
involved new policy development, but MfE was structured for nearly four years on relationship lines 
with an emphasis on partnership (in part encouraged by the ideology of the government at the time 
favouring a partnership style in working with territorial local government, plus a view within the 
government arising from some of MfE’s earlier policy work, such as climate change policy 
development, that the Ministry was too policy-centric and detached from day-to-day realities).678 The 
number of staff allocated to water policy varied and was never large until recently. Compared to 
examples described in other case studies, water policy did not seem to receive the same degree of 
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firm departmental underpinnings that driving new policy requires. Thus, the institutional design of 
MfE, its internal organisation, and departmental culture help account for the types of policy 
preference promoted by the Ministry, and delays during the policy process. 
Water policy development was also influenced  the rules of engagement for this particular policy. 
First, MfE shared the leadership of policy development with MAF, whose organisational goals and 
objectives were not primarily environmental. MAF perceived that MfE’s prime legislation, the RMA, 
constrained the flexibility of agricultural production. For MAF, a priority was to increase agricultural 
production through more irrigation.679 By early 2000, MAF was beginning to recognise the economic 
importance of water quality, as were other departments, notably Treasury.  The point was, though, 
that the institutional arrangements gave greater rein to competing ideological views about how to 
address water quality decline, and, where there was not firm leadership, bargaining and negotiation 
dragged on. 
Second, there was not the same degree of cross department institutional cooperation in the way that 
had occurred in the later stages of the biodiversity strategy development or the oceans policy task 
force model in 2002-2003. In both those cases, the combination of skills and senior representation 
from two environmental departments, MfE and DoC, created an organisationally strong 
environmental team. Once the emphasis on waters of national importance disappeared, DoC’s role in 
the water policy development diminished. The environmental departments did not actively use the 
rules of engagement to capitalise on a favourable political climate of ideas about water quality  
between 2003 and 2007. The formal interdepartmental team approach only began to emerge after 
2008, but by that time the ideological climate was changing.680 
Cognitive features at a political level can account in part for the ideological orientation of proposals 
for water policy in the 1990s, the mid 2000s, and after 2009. In the 1990s, government views of 
environmental values ranged from ambiguous to unsympathetic according to Simon Upton, 
combined with an attachment to neo-liberal policy prescriptions.681 The 2000s was pro-environment, 
in fact strongly so between 2006 and 2008, based on a sustainable development environmental 
paradigm.682 After 2008, the political climate was not conducive to environmental initiatives unless 
                                                          
679 MAF, "Post Election Briefing to Incoming Minister: Emerging Strategic Issues Domestic," (Wellington: 
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680 The most recent, and ambitious, manifestation is the creation of a dedicated Water Directorate within MfE 
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681 Young, Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act. P.32. Upton himself was a 
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there was a proven economic benefit.683 The political priority was economic growth. There were 
shifts in the climate of thinking within the non-environmental parts of bureaucracy from the mid 
2000s about how to address environmental issues: moving from regarding environmental issues as 
externalities that, if they required government action at all, could be dealt with by market 
mechanisms, to an ecological modernisation perspective.684 However, while this feature can be seen 
as a factor that influenced a light-handed approach to environmental policy development in the 
1990s, and the promotion of economic development from 2009 on, given the comparative 
cognitively favourable attitudes evident at a cabinet level earlier in the 2000s it doesn’t, of itself, tell 
us why water policy failed to eventuate then, or why it took till 2011 for anything concrete to 
emerge. What this suggests is that despite a commitment to environmental values, between 2006 
and 2008, such attitudes do not necessarily translate into environmentally effective policies without 
institutional support. 
This raises the question about the impact of time on water policy development. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, time is not an agent, but it is an indicator of system effectiveness and can serve to 
increase or decrease complexity. In the case of water policy it shows an apparent inability of the 
machinery of government, in the period covered by this case study, to develop policy in a timely way 
to deal with a significant environmental issue. Freshwater quality declined, and continues to decline, 
in catchments dominated by agriculture and urban development.  
 
In conclusion, the freshwater quality study represents the most complex of the three case studies in 
terms of conflict potential, but not the most challenging in terms of events. Complexity helps explain 
in part the length of time taken over policy development. It might be expected that agency would 
speed up policy adoption where there were activists involved, particularly ministers, but this doesn’t 
seem to have happened. There is evidence where ministers sought to address institutional 
constraints, for example by Smith and his promotion of the LAWF policy process, but even here the 
LAWF process (an institutionalised one) took three years, with as yet uncertain environmental 
outcomes. Upton, Parker and Mallard were not able to drive policy to conclusion. Admittedly, they 
were short-circuited by events, in this case elections, but it is not as if these were unanticipated. 
Government priorities (cognitive factors) similarly can provide only some explanation for policy 
delay. They help account for different policy approaches and styles of the past twenty two years. 
However, if they were overidding factors why wasn’t new water policy finalised in the mid-2000s 
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Environment and Minister for Climate Change Issues," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 2011). 
7:  Freshwater policy 
164 
when there was declared government intention to act? A significant explanation for policy variability 
in this case study is the influence of institutional factors; an institutional attachment to a particular 
policy approach (non-regulatory, admittedly cognitive, but institutionalised); organisational 
arrangements internally and externally that made it harder to develop environmentally effective 
policy; and difficult rules of engagement that required sufficient departmental capacity in order to 
develop the type of close departmental cooperation to operate well. Recent organisational changes 
(the Water Directorate), and process initiatives (LAWF) are attempts to address these issues 
institutionally, but it is too early to say if they will eventuate in increased environmental policy 
effectiveness. 
Using the framework from Chapter 4, key factors influencing the freshwater quality policy in the 
period of this case study are represented in figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 Freshwater policy influencing factors (scaled to small A, moderate A or large A) 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this research has been to investigate the development of New Zealand environmental 
policy by the Executive branch of government and especially its environmental departments. The 
main question of the research is how are environmental policy efforts of environmental departments 
in New Zealand influenced by internal factors within government and how have these factors 
contributed to policy variability? The initial idea was that two factors would be principal 
determinants of effective environmental policy: the degree of government commitment to 
environmental values; and how the government’s environmental departments contributed to 
environmental policy development. 
Analysis of three prominent examples of environmental policy-making that took place between the 
mid-1990s and early 2010s reveals that the initial proposition is partially supported; but also that the 
picture is more complex. The main finding of the research is that whether environmentally effective 
policy is produced depends on four variables: 
 The level of Cabinet commitment to environmental values relative to other values; 
 The environmental commitment and ‘will and skill’ of ‘environmental’ ministers 
(environment and conservation); 
 The ‘will and skill’ of officials within the environmental departments, notably their ability to 
provide leadership; 
 The extent to which environmental departments are organised and equipped to play a lead 
role in developing environmental policy (with regard to internal resources, and departmental 
capacities to engage with government institutional rules around policy development).   
All four factors are interdependent and ‘necessary’ conditions for the development of 
environmentally effective policy. Where only the first three conditions are met an environmental 
policy may result but is likely to be not so environmentally effective, given the fourth variable’s 
influence in sustaining or constraining policy development over time. 
The following sections of this chapter elaborate on this general finding, as well as presenting 
observations about other relevant features that emerged in the course of analysis of the case 
studies, including a distinctive environmental policy approach and the effect of 
political/constitutional influences.   
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8.2 Environmental policy effectiveness: comparing the case studies 
How did the case studies compare in terms of environmental effectiveness and policy effectiveness? 
Taking environmental effectiveness first, the most effective policies were the biodiversity strategy 
and the proposed 2003 oceans policy. Both had environmental objectives as principal priorities. They 
were structured in a way to integrate environmental considerations: the biodiversity strategy across 
wider environmental policy; and the proposed oceans policy across traditionally non-environmental 
policy domains. Freshwater policy, when it finally found expression by 2011 in the national policy 
statement (NPS), was found to be moderately effective environmentally. It was explicit about 
environmental objectives compared with other priorities although, by the time it was approved by 
Cabinet, these objectives were less comprehensive environmentally than those recommended by the 
NPS Board of Inquiry. The 2012 oceans policy, as translated into legislation, was more restricted in 
environmental effectiveness given the limited degree of integration with other policies governing 
marine management. Last minute changes improved what would otherwise have been an even more 
narrowly prescribed policy in terms of environmental effectiveness. 
In policy effectiveness terms, both the biodiversity strategy and the proposed 2003 oceans policy had 
sound structural logic, but also some shortcomings.  
The proposed 2003 oceans policy had clear integrative rules and tools, including means of 
implementation. However, it might be argued that its political architecture was flawed in that it 
failed to anticipate the foreshore and seabed controversy. The counter-argument, however, is that 
the policy incorporated strong provisions for Maori engagement and recognition of Maori interests 
(although because it was silent on ownership issues this argument may not be how Maori saw 
things), and the policy may well have been adopted if the government had responded differently to 
the court decision about the foreshore and seabed issue.  
The biodiversity strategy had a clear overall structural logic to its policy design in that it sought to 
influence central government action across a range of policy domains, it assigned responsibilities for 
action, and involved considerable resources for implementation. Where it was less effective in policy 
terms was in its design to deal with privately owned land. In an endeavour to satisfy landowner 
opposition (to reinforce the political architecture of the policy), the mechanisms for implementation 
were based on incentives and voluntary action. It has also been argued it didn’t make sufficient 
provision to fully engage territorial local government. Proposals for clearer national guidance were 
never fully completed. Some have argued that voluntary action is a preferable approach to 
biodiversity protection policy (and this was the nub of the Federated Farmers opposition to the 
overall policy), but shortcomings in implementation, particularly in the variability of how biodiversity 
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is protected at a regional and local government level, has been the basis of subsequent calls for 
clearer national direction.  
The 2012 oceans policy was moderate to strong in policy effectiveness terms. It had clear rules and 
tools for what it was trying to do. It had support, at least for its limited environmental objectives.  
Freshwater policy, as articulated in the 2011 NPS, had significant policy shortcomings. In structural 
logic terms, while it had clear rules, it wasn’t accompanied at the same time by specific tools to 
address a long-standing issue with the Resource Management Act (RMA) of variable implementation 
by regional councils, for example by stipulating clearer environmental bottom lines. Thus, its support 
base was split between those who argued that additional instruments were essential for it to be 
effective, and those, particularly in some key target groups such as Federated farmers, who upon the 
completion of the final report of the Land and Water Forum (LAWF), reasserted the value of 
voluntarist policy approaches. 
In summary, using the criteria developed for this study, the proposed 2003 oceans policy and 
biodiversity strategy were more effective as environmental policy than the 2011 freshwater NPS or 
the 2012 oceans policy. Later sections of this chapter discuss the comparative influence of various 
sources of variability that contributed to this result. First, however, the question of the length of time 
taken to develop these policies is discussed. 
8.3 Time as a dependent variable and indicator of sources of variability 
Developing an oceans policy took fifteen years. The biodiversity strategy took eight years. There 
were sixteen years between when the government, in the Environment 2010 strategy, said it would 
act on freshwater quality and when a form of substantial national policy was produced.685 In 
contrast, other jurisdictions produced policies that addressed the same issues earlier, for example:  
Australia adopted its oceans policy in 1998 and its first biodiversity strategy in 1993; Canada its 
oceans policy in 1997; and the United Kingdom its biodiversity strategy in 1993. This is not to say that 
these other nations’ policies were any better for being produced more quickly. But the case studies 
are not the only examples of prolonged environmental policy development in New Zealand. Climate 
change policy evolved from the early 1990s through at least three iterations of different proposals, 
finally arriving in the form of an emissions trading scheme in 2008.686 A national policy for the 
management of waste took from the early 1990s until a Waste Minimisation Act was passed in 
                                                          
685 The “National agenda for sustainable water management” produced in 1999 might be regarded as a form of 
weak policy, but in effect it was only a work programme. See Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2.  
686 Harbrow, "Trends in New Zealand Climate Change Policy". Bullock, "Emissions Trading in New Zealand: 
Development, Challenges and Design." 
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2008.687 There are examples of faster policy development, such as the Resource Management Act in 
the late 1980s and hazardous substances policies in the mid-1990s but these took place when there 
was greater Executive influence over the system of government, prior to the MMP electoral system 
diluting that influence somewhat.  
Environmental policy does not happen quickly in New Zealand. But the role that time played is 
ambiguous. Time served to strengthen the biodiversity strategy. Opportunities were missed in the 
case of oceans policy. This suggests that time can be a significant factor in whether policies flourish 
or wither, but that time is not the driver. Rather it is a dependent variable. For example, the long 
time taken to develop policy suggests that the relatively high degree of Executive power in New 
Zealand is not as important a factor in policy production as one might expect. Instead, it supports the 
argument that the three year electoral cycle is a strong constraint and can intervene to prolong 
policy development in cases of greater complexity or where government commitment is not strong, 
because it takes time to get agreement on common ground or to accommodate competing interest 
(Roe described this as a process of policy-makers seeking to ‘stabilise assumptions’).688 Thus, longer 
time taken for policy development is rather an indicator of other factors at work, such as the 
electoral system. The significance of other intervening and independent variables is discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
8.4 Sources of variability: comparing the case studies 
 
8.4.1 Complexity and developments/events: intervening variables 
The most complex of the three case studies is the freshwater example, because of its conflict 
potential. The policy target groups – industry, agriculture, and local government –represented 
interests that traditionally have exercised considerable power in New Zealand politics. From the mid-
2000s the rise of Maori political power, brought about by MMP and Treaty of Waitangi 
jurisprudence, further increased the potential for conflict by bringing water rights and ownership 
debates to the fore. Knowledge and understanding about causes of water quality decline (intensified 
land uses leading to increased nitrification, phosphorous loadings, turbidity, and bacteriological 
loadings) and remedies (changed land management practises) were relatively well understood, but 
the public visibility of the issue, and causes, was not high until the early/mid-2000s.  
                                                          
687 MfE, "National Waste Data Report," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 1997), ———, "The New 
Zealand Waste Strategy: Towards Zero Waste and a Sustainable New Zealand," (Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment, 2002), ———, "Waste Minimisation in New Zealand," (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment, 
2009). 
688 See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3. 
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In contrast to the freshwater case study, public understanding that there was a problem with 
biodiversity decline was higher, even though the scientific knowledge about detailed ecological 
functioning and interactions between that functioning and management interventions to address 
biodiversity decline was less certain. Conflict potential, although apparent, was not as fraught as in 
the freshwater case given New Zealanders’ strong appreciation of nature conservation. Furthermore, 
policy target groups supported or acquiesced in the objectives of the policy, although holding 
differing views about policy tools.  
Oceans policy represented a mix of nascent conflict potential combined with a low public visibility of 
the policy issues. This meant it was only potentially complex if the policy debate either perpetuated 
the low visibility (which may have then have led some to question why any policy was needed) or 
stirred up concerns of interest groups (which, when it happened, wasn’t because of the policy per se  
but because of the foreshore and seabed issue). 
Of the three case studies, oceans policy stands out as an example of how a particular event 
elsewhere (the foreshore and seabed issue) derailed policy development. A legal issue about 
whether an iwi might have special rights to establish marine farms in the Marlborough Sounds 
inflated into wider questions about the nature and extent of state authority generally over the 
inshore waters surrounding New Zealand and in the wider EEZ. 
The same issue about Maori rights and ownership affected freshwater policy. The difference 
between the oceans and freshwater case studies is that the proposed oceans policy framework was 
largely abandoned, whereas in the freshwater case it resulted in short term delays and the 
formulation of an approach that allowed policy development to continue while still reserving Maori 
future interests. 
Events also affected the biodiversity strategy, but in a different way. In its case, the policy benefitted 
from an election, resulting in a large new budget and a changed form of governance. As argued in 
chapter 6, however, the 1999 election didn’t alter the overall policy goals but it did result in greater 
budgetary backing and rejection of ideas for a New Public Management (NPM) - inspired style of 
implementation.  
Elections, indeed, had an effect in all three case studies. They brought to power after 1999 a 
government that promoted environmental values and, after 2008, one that emphasised economic 
priorities over environmental ones. Elections are thus powerful influences. The importance of 
elections in these case studies is not that they initiated or stopped the policy development. What 
was important was the opportunities or constraints presented by elections and how various actors 
within government responded. 
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Complexity (particularly the dimension of conflict potential) and events intervened in the three case 
studies. In oceans policy in 2003 they became the primary influencing factor. However, across the 
case studies their degree of influence was not constant. Events are always dynamic and 
unpredictable. Complexity is to some extent linked to structural conditions. New Zealand’s economic, 
cultural, social and biophysical context created different levels of social conflict about freshwater, 
biodiversity and oceans policy, and at different times. Consequently, context and levels of conflict are 
important in explaining policy variability, especially given likely political sensitivity to issues of social 
conflict. But at the same time, given political sensitivity, one might expect government policy systems 
to be designed to be able to respond to complexity and the effect of events. Hence events and 
complexity can only be part of the explanation for the variability that emerged in the three case 
studies. We need to look to other features to provide a more complete picture of sources of 
variability and their comparative effect. 
8.4.2 Institutional features 
Institutional features influenced the nature of policy development in each of the three case studies.  
This section looks at three intra-government institutional features specifically: organisational ones; 
institutional frameworks for environmental management; and the rules of engagement for policy 
development. Analysis draws on ideas discussed earlier in the thesis that intra-government 
institutional arrangements can be constraints or strengths; constraints if those arrangements 
inherently confine environmental values compared with other collective values, or strengths if they 
hold open opportunities to recognise environmental values and the need for their integration in 
policies. 
Organisational factors played a significant role in the biodiversity strategy and the proposed 2003 
oceans strategy. In each case, there was evidence of the following features: internal reorganisations; 
collaborative structures between the two environmental departments; clear internal (and external) 
environmental mandate; mobilisation of resources; and assigned leadership roles. Improved 
organisation provided a platform to counter different institutional and cognitive influences that 
might otherwise have marginalised the policies’ potential effectiveness.  
In the case of the final 2012 oceans policy, institutional organisational factors were less influential 
from an environmental perspective when compared with other intra-government features or extra-
governmental lobbying.689 With freshwater policy, internal organisational institutional influences had 
more of a constraining influence. More specifically, at potentially opportune times such as the early 
                                                          
689 This assertion comes with a caveat, as pointed out in Chapter 5. When the record of departmental views and 
inter-departmental exchanges are made public, it may be that one or more departments’ repeated advocacy of 
stronger environmental provisions was influential in last minute changes that strengthening of the 2011 
policy’s environmental provisions.  
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and mid-2000s, shortcomings in MfE’s internal organisational arrangements meant the Ministry was 
slow to take advantage of a political climate favourable to environmental quality improvement.  In 
these examples, the organisational shortcomings constrained how officials were able to perform, and 
lengthened the time taken in policy development. 
Institutional frameworks for environmental management influenced development of freshwater 
policy and the biodiversity strategy, especially where it was proposed to apply to private land. 
Frameworks conditioned departmental thinking about appropriate policy tools. In this sense the 
institutional frameworks can, where they give priority to environmental goals, support 
environmental effectiveness but detract from policy effectiveness. MfE, for example, was at odds 
with the preferences about policy tools of some potentially influential ministers like Upton, late in his 
time as Environment minister, or Parker in 2007.690 The post-1987 New Public Management –based 
structural design of MfE as a policy ministry and fourteen regional councils as regulatory and 
implementing agencies, combined with regional council opposition to central direction or national 
standards, gave rise to a particular voluntarist policy approach as a standard response. It was an 
example where ideology became institutionalised, and constrained further thinking, whereas 
emerging environmental problems often call for new ways of thinking.  In the freshwater case, the 
MfE/regional council structural framework in particular channelled policy thinking, and notably 
combined with MfE’s  organisational shortcomings, contributed to policy delay in the mid 2000s. 
Equally, the nature conservation and fisheries management structural frameworks influenced how 
DoC and Ministry of Fisheries approached policy tools for biodiversity protection and oceans 
management.  Both departments displayed a preference for a more directive approach and 
standards-based provisions (fisheries applied through market based instruments, and conservation 
through national rules via locally derived but compliant plans). This is not to say that one approach is 
better than any other. What this shows is the influence of these institutional arrangements on 
subsequent policy proposals. They may be a strength or a constraint to environment policy 
effectiveness depending on policy design. Which approach is adopted depends on the political 
assumptions about policy tools at the time (a cognitive feature) and on the effect of rules of 
engagement. 
Rules of engagement around the policy process are  a third important intra-government institutional 
influence in the case studies. The formal policy development rules that govern interdepartmental 
engagement are meant to ensure relevant government interests are brought to bear on a policy 
                                                          
690 See Chapter 7. Upton argued that he had begun to support firm national standards, but was not supported 
by MfE. Young, Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act. Upton earlier in his 
political career had advocated neo-liberal policies. Parker has said he had to unblock freshwater policy in 2007. 
Red Alert blog, 30/7/2012, http://blog.labour.org.nz/2012/07/30/i-seek-leave-to-make-a-personal-
explanation/.  
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issue. But, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the process is not a level playing field. Some departments 
are more powerful than others, and some are more capable than others. This is evidencedin the case 
studies: for example, the greater power of Treasury relative to MfE and DoC in the biodiversity 
strategy; of DPMC relative to the combination of  MfE, DoC and Minfish in the early oceans strategy 
work; and the influence of MAF on MfE in freshwater policy development. Progress was made 
environmentally in each case study where there was a cross-departmental team, under the 
leadership of one or both of the environmental departments, headed by senior personnel able to 
commit resources, negotiate with authority with other departments, and linked directly to ministers. 
Another feature was where the more powerful economic or political management departments 
(essentially Treasury or DPMC) were either suborned into, or had internally developed, a supportive 
view. It wasn’t necessarily a question of formal power (because the Treasury’s formal power, 
although exercised, didn’t eventually result in their preferred views being imposed on the 
biodiversity strategy) or resources (because despite considerable resources, freshwater and oceans 
policy both took an extraordinarily long time with mixed results). What was important from an 
institutional perspective was when environmental departments’ organisation and operating 
procedures promoted agility in dealing with the rules of engagement and dominant policy 
approaches.  
Overall, the case studies show organisational arrangements, environmental structural frameworks, 
and rules of engagement can detract from environmental effectiveness and potential policy 
effectiveness. There can be organisational shortcomings that lengthen the time taken to address 
issues and develop policy. Structural frameworks can shut out new ideas. Rules of engagement can 
present barriers by being dominated by other rationalities. But such institutional constraints can be 
overcome by organisational capacity where the following features are present: 
 A clear mandate to achieve an environmental result, not necessarily at all costs or to the 
exclusion of other priorities, but a result where environmental priorities are emphasised;  
 Resources such that the policy focus is not starved, but at the same time is not over-
resourced (too few resources seem to be a problem, as in the mid 1990s, but generous 
budgetary provisions, such as those in the 2000s, may not necessarily assist  progress); 
 Concentration of effort in policy processes such that it enables using the rules of engagement 
in ways that advance environmental objectives; 
 Capacity to recognise strengths and weaknesses arising from departmental institutionalised 
cognitive perspectives and internal ideologies, as well as those of other departments, and to 
bring this to bear in processes of bargaining and negotiation. 
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Looking at institutional features, however, does not give a full picture. Focusing on institutions alone 
is too deterministic. How institutions are changed, and skill in applying organisational capacity, and 
navigating around rules of engagement are agency features. Hence agency and political assumptions, 
and how these are interpreted, also play important roles in the degree of potential environmental 
effectiveness. 
 
8.4.3  Agency features 
Ministers and officials exercised a consistently strong to moderate influence in the case studies. At 
times their influence was decisive. With regard to ministers, this is not at all remarkable in the New 
Zealand context. Constitutional and policy-process arrangements place ministers and Cabinet at the 
centre of the policy system. In the biodiversity example, Upton and Smith played significant roles in 
process and policy direction, and Lee acted to bring the strategy to the Cabinet table (encouraged by 
DoC and MfE officials). In the oceans example, in the period between 2000 and 2002, Hodgson was 
an even more significant driver of both content and process, as was Smith in the period of 2009 to 
2011. Similar levels of high ministerial influence occurred in freshwater policy under Parker in 2007, 
and Smith from 2009. Ministers, and at times Prime Ministers, demonstrated political will in 
advancing environmental policies in the late 1990s and 2000s. After 2008, although individual 
ministers promoted environmental policies, overall political will was lacking. 
The extent of the role played by individual departmental officials in the case studies, compared with 
that of ministers, presented an evidential challenge. File sources reveal individuals who were 
influential, but, as noted earlier in the thesis, there are internal incentives for both the public service 
and politicians to not identify the role played by the public service to avoid the accusation of 
government by bureaucracy. In addition, institutions can channel the choices individuals make, 
especially given that individual officials invariably operate as agents of their departmental mandates. 
But mandates and rules are open to interpretation. Officials make choices, at times at odds with 
departmental or ministerial preferences.  Individual skill and will is involved in persuading others. In 
the biodiversity strategy, for example, leadership, initiative and skill in persuasion, bargaining and 
bureaucratic politics was displayed by Johnston and Lawson. And officials seized the opportunity of a 
change of government to quickly advance the strategy. In the oceans policy case, Gow and the 
interdepartmental team were significant drivers in the shape of the proposed 2003 oceans policy. 
With freshwater policy, however, it is more difficult to identify a consistently dominant departmental 
official either between the late 1990s and 2008, or once the LAWF process got underway as the 
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forum for policy development, although perhaps an argument will be made in due course for senior 
MfE officials guiding that process.691  
Despite evidence in the case studies for the influence of agency, there is also evidence that, even 
when there was drive on the part of ministers and decisions made in Cabinet, this did not necessarily 
result in action. For example, Cabinet decided to proceed with an NPS on biodiversity, but none 
eventuated. Work on oceans policy lacked focus and speed in the period between 2000 and early 
2003, despite Hodgson’s drive. Decisions were made in late 2005 to recommence and complete an 
oceans policy, but nothing was in fact completed until 2012. Formal decisions were made in 2006 to 
develop a freshwater NPS (based on relatively clear signals of the New Zealand Sustainable 
Development Strategy finalised in mid-2002) but one was not completed until 2011. If agency on the 
part of ministers and officials was the sole factor that decided the fate of policy, one might have 
expected results sooner. 
Evidence from the case studies suggests while agency is a decisive feature, its influence is the result 
of interaction with structural features and, from the point of view of effective environmental policy, 
it is also conditioned by cognitive factors. 
 
8.4.4 Cognitive features 
Cognitive assumptions are part and parcel of policy development, whether those assumptions are 
formed on the basis of individual experience and learning, or shaped by other forces such as culture, 
rules, or other norms and ideologies. Cognitive factors help shape the debates within government 
about whether an environmental issue deserves attention and what needs to be done about it. 
What do the case studies reveal collectively about cognitive assumptions, the comparative degree of 
influence of government priorities for action, and the types of reasoning applied to those priorities? 
What comes through between the mid-1990s and late 2000s is evidence of a gradual convergence of 
ideas about the value of environmental quality espoused by the environmental departments and 
government political commitment to similar values, with the economic departments arriving later in 
this convergence. After 2008, there appears to have been a trend of divergence between the views 
                                                          
691 As noted in Chapter 7, the influence of Guy Salmon, an external influence on the minister, is discernible in 
the policy process, as is the influence of the chair of LAWF, Alastair Bisley, who might be seen as a de facto 
official. There is evidence from other environmental policy areas of influential departmental officials, such as in 
climate change policy by Murray Ward in the late 1990s and early 2000s or Dave Brash in 2008. See 
http://www.gtriplec.co.nz/who-is-gtriplec/ (accessed 1/11/2012) and “An emissions trading scheme for New 
Zealand”, John Whitehead, Speech to the Journalists Training Organisation, 8 August 20007, 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/media-speeches/speeches/emissionstrading  (accessed 
21/11/2012). 
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of the political arm of government (where economic development was seen as more important than 
maintaining or enhancing environmental standards), and the environmental departments and the 
economic departments where convergence of views about the value of environmental quality was 
developing. The convergence is evident in the evolution of support for a biodiversity strategy, and 
how the government applied environmental priority to freshwater and oceans policy in the early 
2000s. The divergent trend is seen in Cabinet papers and public pronouncements of the government 
after 2008, in contrast to the more pro-environment cross-departmental briefs of 2008 and 2011. 
However, again from the evidence in these case studies, just because there is government 
commitment to environmental values, and expressions of support for those values, as with the 
various centre-left coalition governments of the 2000s, this does not necessarily mean that these 
translate into policies. Otherwise one might have expected environmentally oriented freshwater and 
oceans policies to have emerged quite quickly by the mid-2000s.  
Politics is, after all, about choices between competing values. Other cognitive assumptions influence 
both what values have priority and what choices are made. Assumptions about the importance of 
economic development and property rights are part of the reason why biodiversity protection on 
private land was approached so cautiously, why there was sectoral fragmentation in oceans policy 
post 2003, and for the Cabinet decision for a shared lead by MfE and MAF (rather than a sole MfE 
lead) on freshwater policy work. Similarly, social equity and justice considerations formed part of 
political deliberations, eventually, about Maori interests in oceans and freshwater policy. 
The case studies highlight a distinctive approach to policy tools as a default policy prescription for 
many environmental issues in New Zealand. This approach comprised devolution of implementation, 
few national standards and reluctance to be prescriptive, preference for voluntary measures, and 
promotion of tradeable rights as policy instruments. Earlier in this chapter it was argued that 
institutional structural arrangements helped reinforce this approach and had influenced 
interdepartmental debates about possible policy tools and political architectures for biodiversity, 
oceans, and freshwater policies. While the institutional perspective suggests a hierarchical approach 
to policy development, in the first instance it involves competing ideas and belief systems of multiple 
actors and networks. However, in the bargaining and negotiation during the policy development 
process, ideas and beliefs that ran counter to prevailing views were harder to argue, which brings 
into play agency features of skill and competency, and institutional features of organisational 
capacity. How these features combine, their patterns and their effects, is the subject of the next 
section. 
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8.5 Combinations and patterns in the case studies 
This section looks at the effect of complexity and events (the intervening variables), and institutional, 
agency, and cognitive factors (the independent variables) to identify patterns of influence on New 
Zealand’s environmental policy from an intra-government perspective.   
If we look at all these influences together and compare them with the case studies’ environmental 
policy effectiveness, agency (in terms of political will and skill), combined with cognitive factors (in 
terms of how much value is put on environmental quality and the dominance of a particular form of 
policy design) are consistently significant features within the New Zealand government 
environmental policy system. 
Events are neutral factors, in that they occur whatever the issue or whatever the policy domain. 
Clearly events influence policy. But it is how they are responded to that is important, as shown in the 
different responses to the foreshore and seabed controversy (and hence degree of effect on policy 
development) in the case of oceans policy and freshwater policy respectively. 
What stands out, and differentiates the case studies, is first, the impact of complexity, in particular 
its conflict potential, and second, institutional features. Both conditioned the exercise of agency by 
ministers/officials and the effect of government priorities and how departments responded. 
The influence of complexity is not a surprising finding, given that this is a recurrent feature of policy 
variability mentioned in the literature. Complexity is not, however, an intra-government factor of 
itself. Rather, when it comes to forming policy, degrees of complexity create different levels of 
challenge in any efforts to get agreement on common ground or to accommodate competing 
interests (stabilising assumptions), both within and outside government. Conflict potential is reduced 
by stabilising assumptions.  
What this research shows is that what is significant amongst intra-government factors is the 
correlation between degrees of environmental policy effectiveness and an interaction of agency and 
institutional features, particularly organisational ones. The idea that institutions matter has long 
been recognised in public policy. The case studies reveal that, in New Zealand, departmental capacity 
is an important contributor to levels of environmental policy effectiveness. This finding throws a 
different light on the proposition that agency and cognitive factors are the dominant intra-
government influences. 
Where a more environmentally effective result emerged in case studies, either or both MfE and DoC 
did the following: ensured environmental objectives were a policy priority, in a determined way; 
secured overall leadership of the policy process (with a senior official exercising day-to-day 
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oversight); re-organised themselves internally (they changed their standard organisational structure 
to focus capacity on the issue at hand); integrated processes with other departments; and drew in 
senior officials from those departments that might seek to constrain environmental objectives. This 
can be summarised as concentration of effort, driven by an environmental imperative, and the 
application of political bureaucratic skills to the rules of engagement in ways that advance 
environmental objectives. These features were then used to affect the processes of policy 
development, either in tandem with, or in spite of, the influences of wider environmental 
management institutional structures and the accepted rules of engagement.  
The features described in the previous paragraph represent an exercise of agency on the part of 
officials. Thus, agency can enable structural/institutional changes that facilitate environmental 
organisations to take a leadership role. The changes then organise and equip departments in an 
institutional sense to play a more effective role in the development of environmental policy. But 
where institutions do not allow or facilitate this to happen, agency is likely to be constrained or 
ineffective. The result can be policy delay or lower effectiveness. This illustrates a necessary 
interdependence between agency and structure in the context of environmental policy development 
within the Executive branch of government.  
8.6 The analytical framework and its value 
This study has approached the research from a perspective that government policy is shaped by 
political factors related to state capacity and subsystem complexity. It has used a framework that 
examines a suite of key operating conditions that affect how public policy is produced and then 
evaluated them in terms of their effect on environmental policy. The approach has proved a useful 
heuristic. It provides a consistent way of investigating and contrasting three prominent examples of 
environmental policy development and helps tease out different degrees of influence of features 
that affect policy development. 
The challenge in using environmental policy effectiveness as a form of measurement is that 
effectiveness can have many different interpretations. Having selected a biophysically oriented 
interpretation of the term “environment”, I have then employed a meaning of environmental 
effectiveness based on ideas that it occurs when it is both a priority policy objective, and when that 
priority is integrated, within environmental policies and/or across wider policy domains.  Similarly, 
with policy effectiveness I have used criteria that are widely recognised in policy literature, 
combining the structural logic (the assumptions and linkages in policy design) and the potential 
political architecture (the structures, processes and constructs). Using environmental and policy 
effectiveness together provides a relatively simple, albeit qualitative, method of assessment. 
Different criteria and different interpretations of “environment,” effectiveness, and what constitutes 
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effective policy obviously might give different results. Nevertheless, the approach used here employs 
criteria that are widely validated. Furthermore, it is one that, in my opinion, is useful for assessing 
environmental policy proposals by policy practitioners as well as researchers. 
The categories of operating conditions used in the framework to examine influences on 
environmental policy effectiveness are applied both individually and collectively in many analyses of 
public policy.  
The categories of complexity and events have been a useful way to understand how extra-
governmental factors affected the case studies. Context and events have a substantial influence on 
public policy and how a governing system responds. Using conflict potential, and levels of scientific 
knowledge and visibility, is a useful simple way to assess complexity. Of the two dimensions of 
complexity, that of conflict potential proved more significant as an influence on the case studies than 
levels of knowledge and visibility. It may be that the idea that high levels of scientific knowledge and 
visibility leads to consensus is too rational, as studies of climate change debates have pointed out.692 
The value of the knowledge/visibility dimension, however, is as a tool of analysis, rather than as a 
definitive indicator of greater or lesser complexity.  
The three other categories, institutions, agency, and ideas (the cognitive features), serve as heuristic 
ordering devices for the key intra-government features that condition the political choices made in 
the process of policy development.  The analytical framework might have differentiated further the 
different stages of policy development, or might have employed the concept of power more 
formally. In terms of policy stages, however, this research is focused most on the developmental and 
decision-making stage rather than agenda setting, legitimation, and implementation stages. And 
power and its exercise are inherent in all of the features that influence how public policy is produced, 
because in the end policy is a political act. 
In summary, the analytical framework employed in this research takes well known drivers of public 
policy, combines them into the most obvious groupings of intra and extra- government influences, 
and then assesses them in terms of their effect on environmental policy effectiveness. It has proved a 
useful approach to the empirical work of the study in that it draws out patterns of influence within 
the ‘black box’ of Executive policy development and decision-making. It could be applied to other 
areas of environmental policy in New Zealand, notably the prominent one of climate change policy, 
and the overall framework for environmental management, the Resource Management Act. Further 
comparative studies employing a consistent form of analysis as used here, would further extend 
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knowledge of how an executive system approaches environmental policy. Furthermore, it could well 
help achieve greater environmental policy effectiveness. 
 
8.7 Overall conclusions 
I have endeavoured through this research to contribute to knowledge of jurisdiction-based 
environmental policy-making by elaborating on New Zealand’s situation. In so doing, my purpose has 
been to throw light on what happens within the so-called “black box” of Executive government 
environmental policy-making.  
Do intra-government factors help explain New Zealand’s slow development of environmental policy 
and its variable effectiveness? The answer, not surprisingly, is yes. After all, the Executive is the 
engine house of public policy. This research contributes a clearer understanding of how and why this 
is so.  
It is a result of the interaction between the preferences and abilities of individuals and groups, ideas, 
values and interpretations, and institutional settings. All are conditioned by external context and 
events. In the case studies, the role of individuals (in terms of will and skill) and ideas (in terms of 
values and priorities) were prominent.  
The main finding of the research, though, is that there are four key intra-government variables 
involved as primary determinants of environmental policy effectiveness in New Zealand. They are: 
a) The level of government commitment to environmental values relative to other values; 
b) The environmental commitment and ‘will and skill’ of ministers holding environmental 
portfolios; 
c) The ‘will and skill’ of officials within the environmental departments, notably their ability to 
provide leadership; 
d) The extent to which environmental departments are organised and equipped to play a lead 
role in the development of environmental policy (with regard to internal resources, and 
departmental capacities to engage with government institutional rules around policy 
development).   
More importantly, these four variables are interdependent. Together they combine the influence of 
individuals in a, b and c with the institutional influence of d and part-institutional influence that 
applies in c. Environmental policy is not just the result of agency nor structurally determined, but the 
result of their interaction: agency can enable structural change that facilitates environmental 
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organisations to take a leadership role, but where institutions do not allow or facilitate this to 
happen, agency can be constrained or ineffective even where there is government commitment.   
Implicit in this finding also is that, in New Zealand at least, environmental government departments 
play a more significant part in policy development than some literature suggests. Institutional 
interdependence assumes more importance because of the unitary form of government and 
comparatively fewer policy veto points, hence greater reliance on departmental capacity. But, 
compared with the other three influencing features active within government, the institutional 
variable is less significant than some advocates for departmentalism might expect.  
 
These findings offer a basis for thinking about how environmental government departments may 
enhance environmental policy effectiveness. More specifically, I suggest they can do so by: 
 Ensuring there is a priority placed on environmental imperatives in policy design; 
 Concentrating effort by reorganising and aligning operating procedures internally to focus on 
the issue at hand; 
 Forming close alliances with supportive departments and drawing in opposing departments; 
 Organising to shape and lead the policy process within the machinery of government. 
Whether these suggestions, which involve institutional arrangements, are actioned is largely a matter 
of agency, and the cognitive bases on which agency is exercised. It underlines the essential 
interdependence of agency and institutions for environmental policy effectiveness, but without 
agency they would remain empty recommendations. 
 
What are implications of these findings? The first is that those who work within departments should 
be explicit about what they are trying to achieve in environmental terms. As J.Q. Wilson’s study of 
the bureaucracy notes, clarity of objectives is a key component of organisational performance.693 
New Zealand’s two main environmental departments already each have an environmental role as 
their primary imperative. Their statutory roles are explicit about the “principled priority” of 
biophysical conditions and the human dimensions that affect and are affected by them. Those roles, 
however, have been interpreted in different ways from time to time, either as a result of internal 
management priorities, or in response to stakeholder pressure and/or government political priorities. 
Without clarity of environmental objectives, the other three organisational characteristics that 
contribute to environmental policy effectiveness become meaningless. 
A second implication is that concentration of effort means that operating according to existing 
internal structures or procedures may not suffice when dealing with emergent issues and new policy. 
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Rather, it involves being prepared to adopt new operating methods, and quickly, given New 
Zealand’s propensity for environmental policy delay. It also means ensuring that adequate resources 
in terms of personnel capability, seniority, and budgets are found. It means, finally, being willing to 
confront current policy approaches and departmental ideologies, whether they hold sway internally 
or within other departments, especially if these features constrain environmental effectiveness or 
policy effectiveness.  
A third implication is that bureaucratic political agility is required to work to advantage within the 
rules of engagement. It is not just about presenting logical policy options, although these are a 
necessary component. Environmental departments don’t have the same amount of power as the 
three central agencies (DPMC, Treasury or the SSC), or as ministers have. But they can exercise 
influence through policy development leadership, either through actively seeking a formal leadership 
role (as happened in the biodiversity strategy and, eventually, in oceans policy) and/or more 
importantly by skill in persuasion, bargaining, and bureaucratic politics (as DoC and MfE displayed 
with the biodiversity strategy, eventually, and with ocean policy in 2003). Furthermore, the case 
studies showed there is strength in numbers and more was achieved environmentally where both 
departments worked in unison, with their ministers, and where they brought other departments to 
an environmental point of view. This is not necessarily an argument for types of policy integration 
achieved through groupings of departments with different purposes. There is a case to be made that 
inter-departmental cooperation results in learning to appreciate and accept others’ perspectives and 
priorities and endeavouring to accommodate them. But this approach has also been shown to run 
the risk of reverse integration, where other priorities end up overriding any environmental ones. 
Various departments invariably advocate for their own sectors, either explicitly through legislation or 
departmental mandate (as are, for example, the Ministry of Primary Industries; the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment; and DoC). Furthermore, they act politically in pursuit of their 
primary institutional objectives, as shown in the case studies, be those objectives environmental, 
social, or economic. This is not party political behaviour. But it is institutional political behaviour, 
drawing on sectoral institutional frameworks or organisational purpose that predisposes them to 
pursue specific policy objectives. Institutionalised politics play out through the rules of engagement. 
To deny or downplay these characteristics under a rubric of neutrality or rational policy development 
is, I suggest, naïve. It detracts from overall policy effectiveness by weakening the process of 
persuasion and bargaining and/or perpetuating the power of some ideas and neutralising others. 
 
While environmental government departments are part of the focus of this research, another has 
been the wider intra-government effects on environmental policy. The results of this research 
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confirm that, while there is a concentration of power in New Zealand’s Executive, when it comes to 
developing public policy that concentration is constrained by the three year electoral term. An 
implication from this is that if ministers or governments, or departments, desire to introduce or 
change environmental policies in New Zealand quickly, they need to ensure the requisite alignment 
of agency, ideology and institutional support within those three years, or else seek to stabilise 
assumptions to reduce conflict potential so that in time new or changed policies can occur. Stabilising 
assumptions should reduce conflict potential, but delay can sometimes result in conscious or 
unconscious policy shifts, as demonstrated in freshwater policy. From a departmental perspective, 
the cards might appear to lie where they fall as far as government priorities, ideologies and 
capabilities of their ministers are concerned. However, even here, departments can enhance 
potential environmental effectiveness through information and advocacy and by exposing ministers 
to new ideas, so influencing their preferences. These actions are a form of politics that most 
government departments employ or are involved in, with evidence especially strong in the 
biodiversity strategy and the oceans policy examples. 
 
The framework used in this study provides a basis for further exploration of links between 
environmental effectiveness, policy effectiveness, and the factors within government and outside 
that promote or limit both. Further research investigating just how strong the influence of agency 
and cognitive features is in New Zealand’s environmental policy would be beneficial within and 
across all government departments.  Explanations for why and how agency emerges or fluctuates 
within departments is fragmentary:  is it simply highlighted because there are institutional 
weaknesses? Is it because the small size of the New Zealand policy system means that individuals and 
belief systems have greater prominence?  
Further research from an organisational perspective on other case studies of environmental policy 
development would also be useful. Few recent studies in New Zealand have investigated in detail 
environmental policy development in this particular way. Studies of individual policies tend to focus 
on either environmental effectiveness and/or policy effectiveness and treat many organisational 
components cursorily. This research has identified four key organisational characteristics that 
contribute to potential environmental policy effectiveness, but just as policies are ever-evolving 
(policy is never finished), so too is the body of knowledge about features that help New Zealand 
environmental government agencies to contribute to the development of more environmentally 
effective policy.  
Another use for the framework is by policy analysts. In this regard, the idea of environmental policy 
effectiveness seems especially pertinent in that it provides criteria to assess both environmental 
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effectiveness (in terms of the level of priority afforded to environmental objectives and integration 
within the environmental policy domain and/or across government policies generally), and policy 
effectiveness (in terms of the structural logic of tools matched to objectives, and political 
architecture in terms of support generated). In my experience in government these ideas and their 
application are often lost to sight, despite having wide currency in the literature and schools of 
environmental public policy. 
 
Finally, the motivation for this research was to expand knowledge and improve understanding of 
how environmental policy is formed within government in New Zealand. For those outside the 
machinery of government it can often be a mystery or a frustration. The same is said by many within 
government. Both perspectives often do not grasp the full sweep of internal and external drivers. 
This research, while focusing on the intra-government features, has also endeavoured to consider 
wider influences. Having said this, a basic premise of the research is that central government and its 
workings are fundamental to the development of environmental policy. By shining light into the black 
box of Executive government, I hope this study helps make what goes on less opaque for those who 
sit outside, and helps those inside to make the world a greener place. 
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